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1. Preface 
 
The start of the so-called Arab Spring is considered to be the self-immolation of a vegetable 
vendor called Mohamed Bouazizi, who set himself ablaze on the 18th of December 2010 in the 
region of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, as a protest against what he considered to be unfair treatment 
by a (female) officer.  Bouazizi’s protest spread all over Tunisia and across the Arab world. 
Tunisia’s long time president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was ousted on the 14th of January, and he 
subsequently fled to Saudi Arabia. 
Egypt joined the protests very soon after Tunisia, and President Hosni Mubarak resigned on 
the 11th of February after holding office for 30 years. After Mubarak left his post, the Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed control until elections were held and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, in the form of the Freedom and Justice party, won the majority of votes for both 
the People’s Assembly and Shoura Council, and started its rule. Mohamed Mursi of the FJP was 
elected president, rule was highly contentious and increasingly authoritarian. The 
demonstrations started again, and Egypt went through a counter-revolution that resulted in 
the army taking control with Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as president. Sisi’s rule has also proven to be 
authoritarian, with severe restrictions on freedom of speech and other basic rights.  
These two countries and their revolutions have a lot in common, but they also differ in many 
aspects. The goal of my thesis is to find out the revolutions’ impact on women in these two 
countries. I will study the development of women’s rights and status in the larger context of 
both countries, because the revolutions are not separate from their societies but more 
products of the environment they were born in.  I look into the changes in women’s status 
before and after the revolutions by using Valentine Moghadam’s theory on gender and 
revolutions to discern the nature of the two revolutions and to see whether they represent the 
emancipatory model or the patriarchal model of revolution.  
Women’s status and rights are difficult to study definitively, but my approach includes looking 
at political participation, legislation, and status in society. Both Tunisia and Egypt have 
recently promulgated new constitutions, and some of the legislation concerning women has 
been updated. Regarding political participation, I study women’s representation in the 
 
 
parliament and political offices. There are many examples of status in society, and in this 
thesis I take a look at sexual harassment, which has increased in both of these countries, and 
violence against women. I will also look at women’s education and employment of women 
because of its ability to function as an indicator on women’s status: Are women and girls 
educated in the first place? Do they find employment? Investing the education of girls’ and 
women’s presence in formal employment are positive signs, both because they speak of the 
level on which women are valued, and also empower them and improve their chances to make 
it on their own and to have power over their own lives. The discourse on women and their 
rightful place in society is an important factor, and present in both revolutions. 
I will start the thesis by presenting the theoretical framework in which I operate; the larger 
framework of the study of revolutions, and Valentine Moghadam’s theory of women and 
revolutions, which is a part of this discipline. I will then present the theoretical framework of 
this thesis, which I have modified from Moghadam’s theory, and explain further the methods 
of the study. After this I will go through the timelines of the revolutions – before and after – 
and analyze the situation at the time in the context of legislation, politics and society. After 
this, I will present the results and argue for the placement of the countries into the categories 
of patriarchal or emancipatory revolutions, while also studying the reasons for the outcomes. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
The larger theoretical framework of this thesis consists of theory of revolutions, 
modernization theory, Moghadam’s theory of social change and their outcomes on women, 
and sources I have analyzed to prove whether the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt belong in 
the category of emancipatory or patriarchal revolution. 
2.1. The Arab Spring in the Context of Revolutions 
 
The scholarship on revolutions is old and vast. The concept has been approached from 
multiple points of view, and researchers often disagree even about the most rudimental 
things. Theorists are divided into many disciplines and theoretical approaches, which is part 
of the reason their views on revolutions are very different. Goodwin analyzes these 
 
 
differences in his article Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements (in The Handbook of 
Political Sociology 2005, ed. Janoski et al) and summarizes the main points of the scholarship 
very well. 
Definitions of revolutions vary from general to narrow, and the more general approach 
includes all instances where the people are mobilized and the government or the ruler is 
overthrown. Most scholars make the mobilization of masses one requirement of a revolution, 
although some scholars have analyzed “revolutions from above”, such as coup d’états. Some 
scholars think that a revolution does not need to be successful in order to be defined as a 
revolution – sometimes the revolutionaries do not get the power they were seeking, or fail in 
implementing the planned changes. An even narrower definition includes fundamental and 
rapid social, economic and even cultural changes as a prerequisite for the movements to be 
defined a revolution. Scholars call these revolutions “social revolutions” and also “great 
revolutions”. It is up to contest what changes actually count as “rapid and fundamental”, but 
the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt still fit all of the aforementioned requirements, although 
Egypt may be considered a failed revolution (this will be dealt with in depth later in the 
chapter concerning Egypt).  
One theory of revolutions is modernization theory. In this theory, revolutions are linked with 
the transformation from “traditional” to “modern” societies, i.e. the process of modernization 
itself. The process might lead to a revolution when the structure and nature of society changes 
very rapidly. According to Samuel Huntington, revolution is an aspect of modernization, and 
can’t thus happen in highly traditional or highly modern societies. The definition of a “highly 
traditional” or a “highly modern” society is unclear. Marxists also subscribe to the idea that 
revolutions happen in transitional societies; according to this theory, however, the transition 
is not from traditional to modern, but from one economic model of production to another as a 
result of class struggle. (Goodwin 2005:404-407) 
The definition of a “highly modern” society is, as I said, problematic, and seems to have been 
formulated by polarizing non-Western societies with Western societies, thus coming to a 
conclusion that traditional societies are regulated by custom, attachments being primarily 
with the family, clan and tribe, while a modern society has, for example, social mobility and 
formal equality (Goodwin 2005:405). It is unclear why a modern society cannot have so-called 
traditional values, or if some Western countries with their lack of social mobility are still 
highly modern. Most countries and societies are “formally equal” but in the West as 
 
 
elsewhere, this equality is often in practice conditional on the color of one’s skin, sexual 
orientation or gender. Eurocentrism and oriental views seem to plague the study of 
revolutions as much as any other discipline. The fact that some, maybe even most, “highly 
modern” societies are individualistic does not prove that individualism (or any of the aspects 
brought forth by Huntington) is a necessary prerequisite for the establishment of a modern 
society. China, for example, rose from a very different background. 
Another theory presented by Goodwin is that these modernizing revolutions happen in 
societies that are highly developed and modern in some aspects, but whose political rights lag 
behind. Some theorize that modernization causes a “revolution of rising expectations” – for 
example economic expectations that the state is unable to meet. (Goodwin 2005:404-406) 
These two make the most sense in Tunisia’s and Egypt’s cases, as one of the countries was 
very developed but had repressed political rights at the time of the revolution. Egypt was not 
nearly as developed as Tunisia, but was still advanced in some areas (e.g. military). An 
important aspect in both revolutions was the frustration of the youth, who were - and are - 
often highly educated but unable to find employment. The problems of the modernization 
process of the countries might, therefore, have led to a revolution of rising expectations. 
Goodwin also presents a theory on how the rulers’ response to revolutionary forces predicts 
the outcome – if the rulers are flexible and are willing to adjust some things to better fit the 
revolutionists’ claims, they will stay in power. “Elite intransigence” will work as a catalyst for 
a revolution. (Goodwin 2005:406) This phenomenon can be observed in the Arab Spring; 
some rulers were willing to make concessions, while others clung to power and were 
dethroned, or in Syria’s case, plunged the country into a bloody civil war. 
The reasons behind revolutions are also contested, and the nature of revolution varies as well, 
as some of them are violent while some are not. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
nature of the revolution seems to have an effect on the outcome – also for women, as 
Moghadam has theorized. I will delve deeper into the revolutions and their outcomes in the 
following chapters, but this aforementioned point seems to hold for Egypt and Tunisia who 
experienced quite different revolutions, even though they started the same way. The response 
from the rulers was different, and Tunisia’s revolution was largely non-violent, unlike Egypt’s, 
who also experienced a surge of violence after the revolution as well, both as a part of the 
counter-revolution and spontaneously. 
 
 
The wing of modernization theory that argues that revolutions do not happen in modern 
societies does not, in my opinion, apply to the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt as I have yet to 
see proof that these two do not count as highly modern societies. The entire modernization 
theory cannot be discarded though, because it applies in the form that I presented last 
(“revolution of rising expectations”), and also because it is used by Moghadam whose theory I 
apply. Marxist theory focuses on economic means of production and is thus not entirely 
applicable to the focus of my thesis, although Moghadam herself has used this theory several 
times.  
I study the effect of the revolutions on women mainly from a state-centered perspective – 
legislation, government policies and politics influence and control women’s lives everywhere 
in the world. Other aspects and views are just as worthy of study, but my approach suits a 
state centered approach best as my main sources are articles, constitutions, legislature, 
government policies, and statistics. The state-centered approach is essentially a top-down 
approach, and while the opposite approach would definitely be fruitful and interesting, my 
limitations as a non-fluent Arabic speaker and inability to do field work allows this course of 
research that I have undertaken. For these reasons, I take advantage of modernization theory 
and a state centered approach.  
In the following chapters, I examine the development of women’s rights in the two countries 
through changes – or lack thereof – in legislation, politics and society. An important part of the 
chapters on legislation, especially after the revolutions, is the new constitutions of the two 
countries. As McLarney points out in her chapter on Egyptian constitutions, in post-
revolutionary constitutions revolutionary freedoms are transformed into civil liberties, which 
is what Hannah Arendt called the “end of revolution” (McLarney 2016:111-112).  
2.2. Women in Revolutions  
 
“No man has been excluded from history because of his sex, yet all women were.” 
(Lerner 1986:5) 
 
The concept of a patriarchal society is the cornerstone of modern feminist theory. Patriarchal 
societies are ruled by men, and women’s status in them is lower than their male counterparts, 
 
 
and thus patriarchy is at the root of women’s subordination. In these societies – i.e. almost all 
societies - women are mostly mothers and wives while men hold power both in the family and 
in society. The origin of patriarchal societies is contested, and famed scholar Gerda Lerner 
offers one explanation in her book The Creation of Patriarchy (1986). 
Women are not just oppressed in a patriarchal society, but they also cooperate in upholding 
the system (Lerner 1986:vii). Feminist scholars agree that patriarchy does not only harm 
women, but everyone else as well: patriarchal societies tend to be very strict with gender 
norms, hurting men as well as children. It can also have a harmful effect on society in general: 
women are uneducated and unemployed, families tend to be poor while the number of 
children remains high and men are disproportionately powerful, which leaves a great number 
of people’s problems unheard.  
In any history book women seem to be nonexistent. The traditional (and patriarchal) 
explanation for the lack of contributions to society is one produced by predominantly male 
scholars is that women are inherently different from men, and that they lack the skills and the 
will to make innovations, produce art and rule empires (Lerner 1986:6). This is an 
explanation that can be found over and over again, also in the modern world. This is also tied 
to the patriarchal model of revolutions, where women are assigned the role of nurturer and 
caregiver. In this kind of thinking men are the heads of families and states wielding unlimited 
power, while women concentrate on being wives and mothers. 
Due to women’s exclusion from society, politics and science, their contributions in them have 
been limited. This is true for the study of revolutions as well, as many scholars have been men 
with no interest in women and their struggles. Moghadam has, along with many others, 
criticized the scholarship on revolution: in spite of being vast, it tends to overlook gender and 
women in its analysis. According to Moghadam, there is an “increasing consensus” among 
researches that the cultural dynamics of revolutionary societies (along with political and 
economic factors) should be taken into account when studying revolutions: 
 “[…] gender is an integral part of the social structure, a basic element of 
production and reproduction, and a central feature of concepts of the ideal 
society and of national identity.” (Moghadam1997:133) 
Gender is also an integral part of cultural dynamics, and thus cannot be ignored (Moghadam 
2013:50-51). Moghadam argues again for her starting point with women in the center in the 
preface of her 2013 edition of Modernizing Women:  
 
 
“Can there be genuine democratic transitions in the twenty-first century without 
the participation of women? Can the region thrive when so many women are 
outside the formal labor force and lack economic citizenship? My answer to both 
questions is a resounding no.” (Moghadam 2013: x) 
This point is relevant not only to the revolutions and transitions of Tunisia and Egypt, but 
their futures as well: women’s economic and political rights are of fundamental importance 
for a successful democratic transition. As I will later prove, both countries are still lacking in 
at least some these aspects, but in Egypt’s case the situation is even more alarming. Egypt’s 
democratic process has also not been as successful as Tunisia’s, and perhaps the status of 
women is one of the aspects – among many others - contributing to this. 
According to my interpretation, Moghadam represents the modernist study of revolutions, 
while she also uses Marxist theory. She is not very clear about the theories that have 
influenced her study, although just the fact that one of her models of revolutions is 
“modernizing” would suggest that she subscribes to modernist theory. She also states that 
“revolutions have thus far occurred in semiperipheral countries or in societies undergoing the 
transition to modernity”. Moghadam stresses the national class and social fractures in the 
outcomes of the revolution, although other aspects may have their role in instigating a 
revolution (i.e. world economics, world wars etc.), which points to Marxism (Moghadam 
2013:50). 
Moghadam’s definition of revolution includes: 
1. “an attempt to rapidly and profoundly change political and social structures” 
2. “mass participation” 
3. “usually … violence and the use of force” 
4. “notions of the “ideal” society” 
5. “some cultural reference points” 
(Moghadam 2013:50) 
These points are all valid in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt – both revolutions demanded and 
achieved a rapid change in political structures, and at least an attempt at changing the social 
structures as well. Both revolutions mobilized vast amounts of people. Tunisia’s revolution 
was far less bloody than Egypt’s, but both included some level of violence and use of force. An 
ideal society in the minds and words of the revolutionaries was one with democracy and 
equality for all. As unemployment was (and still is) a major problem in both countries, better 
job opportunities - for youth especially - was a goal for both revolutions. Cultural reference 
points are outside of the scope of my thesis, but they played a part when the countries were 
 
 
finding and recreating their identity. Return to tradition and what people consider to be their 
“own” has been an important factor in other patriarchal revolutions that Moghadam analyzes 
– in Algeria after colonialism, and Iran, where revolutionaries wanted to reject Western 
influences. 
Women obviously have varying interests, and revolutions mean varying outcomes for 
different groups. To put it simply, “women’s interests” do not exist, because they change 
according to other aspects of their life. Moghadam uses Maxine Molyneux’s theory of gender 
interests to explain how women’s interests are sometimes similar and sometimes not. 
Molyneux does this by differentiating between practical gender interests and strategic gender 
interests. (Moghadam 1997:1361) 
Legal reform and family law are examples of strategic gender interests, taking “the form of 
broad reforms which question the structural basis of gender inequality”. Legislation affects all 
women (at least potentially) through reproductive rights, suffrage, family law etc. Strategic 
interests are, broadly speaking, interests of all women. Practical gender interests, unlike 
strategic interests, do not challenge inequality itself, but are laws and policies formulated by 
women and men to make specific basic things better for women. Practical gender interests 
focus on women’s access to resources and welfare, not society at large. (Moghadam 1997:134)  
Moghadam combines her own and Molyneux’s theory and proposes that the women’s 
emancipation model serves strategic gender interests (Moghadam 1997:138). Thus, this 
model brings about a profound change for women and includes them in the post-
revolutionary process. The patriarchal model of revolutions stresses gender differences and 
woman’s role in the family, while excluding women from the public arena and decision 
making. This is why Moghadam also calls this model the woman-in-the-family model. 
 Moghadam’s theory on gender and revolutions, using Molyneux’s work, rests on four points: 
1. “Revolutions entail conscious attempts at economic, cultural, and ideological 
transformations”. Gender as a part of the social structure influences these aspects, and 
gender relations are in turn influenced by them. 
2. Gender relations/system affect revolutions and they may also be affected by the 
revolution. Existing gender relations may affect the revolutionary movements and 
                                                       
1 I have been unable to find a copy of Molyneux’s work, and I have therefore had to rely on Moghadam’s 
interpretation,  
 
 
post-revolutionary governments, while gender relations may also be changed by the 
revolution. Gender relations and revolutionary policies thus interact with each other, 
which can be seen for example in legislation.  
3. Revolutionary movements almost always set out to change the family and personal 
status laws, which can affect gender relations and women drastically. Revolutionary 
movements try to remake the society, and thus gender is central to state-building.  
4. Revolutions may be inimical to women’s interests, or they may advance women’s 
status, or both. A revolution can be both advantageous and disadvantageous to 
women’s rights if revolutions only serve practical interests while ignoring strategic 
interests, thus offering some advances for women while still ignoring the bigger 
picture and not attempting to challenge women’s subordinate status.  
(Moghadam 1997:138-139)  
Moghadam and Molyneux focus on gender interests, which is in my opinion both the strength 
and the weakness of their theories. In previous revolutions, women might have experienced 
an improvement in their social status, but after certain revolutions they, like men, 
experienced famine, loss of liberty and war. Overall, the effects of the revolution have 
sometimes made life worse for women and men alike, and I do not see how this is a positive 
outcome. Equality in the workplace is only relevant if you have a place of work to go to; 
division of resources can be equal only if there are any resources to share. Then again 
improvement of strategic interests is still an improvement, although this does not contribute 
towards solving the roots of the problem.  
This is why I think we should be talking about women’s status compared to men. Many 
feminists object to this on the basis of “othering” – seeing men as the norm and women as the 
“other” that is always compared to the norm. I accept this; however, I think it’s impossible to 
talk about status and rights without comparing it to someone else’s status and rights. We 
might as well be comparing women’s status in Tunisia and Egypt to women’s status in Europe, 
but the focus of my thesis is in the Middle East and North Africa. Women acquired more rights 
compared to men after the Marxist Revolution in China, but we can’t say that women’s status 
got objectively better. The old elite suffered, many of them women. Many peasants suffered 
due to lack of food. Mao encouraged big families, which also affected women. Overall women’s 
status might have gotten worse but compared to men it did get better.  
 
 
One influencing factor in the status and rights of women are international conventions and 
the so-called world community. The UN is a major player in international politics, and its 
conventions have often set the standard for human rights. In theory, the parties that sign and 
ratify conventions agree to uphold them. Countries that don’t do this can face loud criticism 
from both foreign and national actors. For women’s rights groups, these conventions and their 
standards are important. In her work, Moghadam calls these conventions and declarations the 
“global women’s rights agenda” (Moghadam 2013:10-11). I also use UN’s and other global 
groups’ (e.g. Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, World Economic Forum) work to find detailed 
information about the performances of Tunisia and Egypt. It is relevant to find out if the 
countries are committed to upholding international standards of, for example, human rights, 
and if this influences their legislation; or, if they reject the views and agreements of the 
international community and opt for a more nationalist path, which tends to emphasize 
patriarchal values and their own cultural backgrounds. Egypt seems to balance precariously 
between these two options, but I will go more in deep into this later in this thesis.  
2.3. What Defines Gender Outcomes 
 
I begin this chapter by delving deeper into Moghadam’s theory of revolutions, and in the 
following sub-chapters I present a couple of cases based on her work. These cases are all 
important in Moghadam’s work, and also relevant regarding Egypt and Tunisia, and the two 
can easily be compared to previous revolutions. 
A key element of Moghadam’s theory is her use of country cases as examples of the two 
models of revolutions – patriarchal and emancipatory. One of the problems with Moghadam’s 
theory, however, is the lack of definitions: the question of what defines a patriarchal or an 
egalitarian (or emancipatory) revolution is never clearly answered. For Moghadam, the 
overall outcome seems to be more important than isolated aspects, and this is why it’s not 
always clear how objective her analysis is. For example, when presenting the French 
revolution of 1789 she writes quite a lot about the change in discourse and how this resulted 
in categorizing the revolution as patriarchal. In the case of Iran, she focuses exclusively on the 
issue of veiling and the changes in family law, also categorizing it as patriarchal. Due to this 
obscurity and inconsistence, I have made two interpretative visual aids based on my own 
 
 
conclusions on Moghadam’s theory (see next chapter as well as Attachment 2: Gender 
Outcomes).  
Moghadam also uses a variety of terms for her two models: 
1. patriarchal model = woman-in-the-family (both 1997) = Woman-in-the-Family Model 
(2013) 
2. women’s emancipation = modernizing model (both 1997) = Women’s Emancipation 
Model (2013) 
For clarity, I use the terms patriarchal and emancipatory.  
Moghadam gives examples of revolutions and sometimes focuses on certain aspects in each 
revolution. Moghadam has historical examples for both of the models. In Moghadam’s theory, 
France’s 1789 revolution is a quintessential example of a patriarchal revolution, while the 
Bolshevik Revolution is a classic example of an emancipatory revolution (Moghadam 
2013:51). Other important examples for her are Turkey (emancipatory), Eastern Europe after 
the fall of Communism (patriarchal), and Iran after the 1979 revolution (patriarchal).  
The outcomes of a revolution depend on many aspects, and this is relevant for women as well. 
According to Moghadam, during the revolutionary period women can either be linked with 
modernization or tradition. The status of women can be used as either towards 
modernization, with the development of women’s right an important part of the general 
modernization of the country, or they can be paired with tradition, family, and patriarchal 
gender roles. According to Moghadam, “the ‘woman question’ may be raised either to 
legitimize women or to mobilize them toward a specific end” (Moghadam 2013:37); women 
can either be accepted as important agents in society, or their number and power can be used 
to further political goals, and after they have been achieved, women are pushed back into 
their houses where they belong, according to the traditionalist view.  Ever since the French 
revolution women have been used as images and symbols of the revolution; in spite of this, 
the “idealized woman” does not always get her reward after the revolution.  (Moghadam 
2013:37) The results of revolutions don’t appear by accident, although they can be hard to 
predict, which is why research of this sort is important – it might make it possible to predict 
outcomes of revolutions and battling negative results before they happen. 
 
 
According to my interpretation of Moghadam’s research, gender outcomes are consolidated 
jointly with regime consolidation when the state and its identity are formalized. During this 
time questions of family, gender, male-to-female relations, women’s representation and 
women’s rights reflect the revolutionary movements’ and regimes’ agendas.  
“Whether political discourses support women’s emancipation and equality or 
whether they glorify tradition, morality, the family and difference, the point 
remains that political ideologies and practices are gendered and that social 
transformation and state-building entail changes in gender relations as well as 
new configurations and property relations.” (Moghadam 1997:157) 
After a revolution, legislative changes take place, especially if the revolution is a successful 
one. As Moghadam writes, “feminist scholarship has shown that state building, lawmaking, 
and the construction of national identity are far from gender-neutral processes” (Moghadam 
2013:37). For her, the first example of this is the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution that brought 
massive, positive changes for women. States have generally had a huge impact on the status of 
women in the modern times, and have either advanced women’s status or pulled them back. 
For example, the Nordic welfare state model has gradually made changes for the good of 
women. (Moghadam 2013:37) 
Multiple aspects guide the process of regime building and its consequences for women. One of 
the influencing factors is the atmosphere of the revolution itself; as I mentioned above, the 
question of women and gender appears already during the revolution, and women’s status 
during the revolution may speak volumes about their status after it. According to Moghadam, 
linking women to family and tradition leads to a patriarchal result, while seeing women as a 
force of modernization points towards an emancipatory outcome. In practice, revolutions 
tend to have aspects from both models, but the end result is what defines the revolution. For 
example, in Algeria women gained new political rights, but suffered many setbacks in other 
areas.  
Revolutions can lead to democratization while having negative consequences for women, at 
least compared to their male counterparts. Therefore, democratization itself is not a sufficient 
goal as it does not, in reality, guarantee equality. An example provided by Moghadam is 
Poland, where the number of female members of parliament fell from 30% to just 9% in 1991, 
and the rise of conservative parties and the re-emergence of Catholicism had negative effects 
for women, for example through the restrictions of women’s reproductive rights. The 
phenomenon gave birth to the terms “male democracy” or “democracy with a male face” 
 
 
(Moghadam 2013:217), and the effects can still be seen in the 21st century as Polish women 
battle once again for their rights for abortion. The revolution was also an example of a country 
returning to its roots and traditions, and the foreign influences of Communism were 
eradicated.  
Moghadam does not usually focus on women’s employment and education, although she 
emphasizes women’s role in the modernization process of many countries in the MENA 
region, especially in the early 20th century. For many countries, this included extending the 
right to education to girls. The emancipation of women was tied to the emancipation of these 
countries in the post-colonial period for example in Egypt, Turkey and Iran. However, in spite 
of this, male nationalists often remained hostile to women and their causes, and women were 
not always granted the right to vote until later in the century. In this atmosphere demands for 
education were less contentious that demands for political rights, but women still remained 
loyal to the nationalist cause. (Moghadam 2013:41-42) 
Employment and the right to work have been important goals for feminist organizations and 
women, and Moghadam sometimes mentions the changes in employment, although she does 
not seem to emphasize it much. Employment is an important part of participating and being a 
full member of society, and it might be that Moghadam just sees women’s opportunities for 
working as an indicator of their opportunities for participating in society. She proves in her 
chapter concerning South Yemen that employment is important for equality, and Yemeni 
activists called for women’s liberation through work. In South Yemen, participating in society 
was not possible for all women, and employment of women was stigmatized and frowned 
upon. The country remained poor, and in 1990 it merged with North Yemen, a much more 
conservative country, which entailed changes for women’s status as well. South Yemen was a 
perfect emancipatory revolution (at least judging by Moghadam’s text), except for women’s 
economic empowerment. (Moghadam 2013:60)  
Religion is also an aspect that features often in Moghadam’s work, but its relationship to 
revolutions and their outcomes remains unclear, which is interesting considering how 
important it has been in the revolutions that Moghadam analyzes. In my work, I have looked 
for a “rise in patriarchal religion”, i.e. an interpretation of religion that marginalizes women; I 
think this is a necessary distinction, since I don’t want to take the route that many others have 
of judging religion (especially Islam) as inherently patriarchal and inimical to women. 
 
 
Changes in legislation don’t guarantee equality either. There is often also “a wide gap between 
formal and substantial equality”; women’s equal status might be recognized legally, but 
nothing is done for their benefit in order to bridge the gap between men and women. Daycare, 
maternity and paternity leaves, and other changes that help women with responsibilities 
traditionally considered the woman’s job have helped to really empower and emancipate 
women. (Moghadam 2013:218-219) Legislation represents strategic interests and for 
Moghadam, strategic interests are necessary for an emancipatory revolution. Even though 
legislation does not guarantee women’s rights in practice, its nature is an indicator of the 
status of women; lack of legislation on domestic violence, for example, shows disinterest in 
violence against women. 
Regarding Egypt and Tunisia (and Morocco), Moghadam analyzes them in the 2013 edition of 
her book Modernizing Women. She does not, however, call the events of 2011 revolutions but 
democratic transitions (Moghadam 2013:212). I disagree with this stance, since both 
revolutions fit her own definition of a revolution, and because they were not, strictly speaking, 
democratic transitions. No elections were held, but the presidents were forced out. What 
happened after this was a democratic transition (at least in Tunisia, partly in Egypt as well), 
but the events leading to this were obviously revolutions. Perhaps seeing Egypt’s situation 
today, she would change her definition, as Egypt is clearly not democratic. She also states that 
Egyptians and Tunisians themselves use the term revolution (Moghadam 2013:212), but for 
some reason she decides not to. The reasons for this decision are not clear to me, and I use the 
term revolution throughout this thesis, except when I use the term counter-revolution to refer 
to the ousting of Mohamed Mursi by the Egyptian army, although this could also be called a 
coup d’état.  However, since the coup was sparked by demonstrations and demands by the 
Egyptian people, I still call it a revolution. 
 
2.3.1.  Patriarchal Revolutions 
 
Algeria is an example of a patriarchal revolution in the Middle East and North Africa. In this 
case, Moghadam focuses on discourse and women’s status in society, mentioning women’s 
political rights very briefly and ignoring legislative changes entirely – even though legislation 
is very important for her theory.  
 
 
Algeria became independent in 1962 after a bloody revolution in which women were heavily 
involved, even as revered fighters, and women actually gained more political rights and 
representation; they were given the right to vote, and they were even represented in the 
National Assembly. According to Moghadam, the outcome of the revolution was still 
patriarchal. This is attributed to the fact that women fighters, famous heroines of the 
revolution, were pressured towards marriage and family life in order to protect their 
reputation. The national discourse after the revolution did not paint femininity as an 
inherently negative feature – as patriarchal revolutions do, according to Moghadam -, and the 
era of revolution was emancipatory in many aspects. At the same time the government also 
advocated for a more traditional role for women, and rejected European values and way of life 
while emphasizing Algerian heritage, including Islam and the Arabic language, and modest 
Islamic dress (the hijab in this case).  
The government was opposed to birth control in hopes of population growth and did not 
favor women’s employment. In 1979, 97,5% of women were unemployed (compared to 45% 
of men), fertility rates reached 6,5 children per woman, and women got married young (in 
1967, 10% of them were married at the age of 15). Then again, free education served Algerian 
women and was a major force in the activism of Algerian women. The aftermath of the 
revolution included therefore many conflicting aspects as the young country was finding its 
way, and Moghadam interprets it as patriarchal. (Moghadam 1997:139-143, Moghadam 
2013:55-57)  
Another example of a patriarchal revolution is the revolution in Iran in 1977-1979 when the 
shah, seen as Westernized and corrupt, was replaced with an Islamic theocracy. Women were 
a part of the revolution in large numbers, and many appeared veiled in response to the 
regime. This happened in the aftermath of the revolution as Islamists won over other 
opposition forces. As the remaining leftists lost their power in the beginning of the 1980s, the 
government made the hijab compulsory. The revolution also resulted in amended family law 
that included, for example, lowering the age of marriage. Women and femininity were seen as 
negative; women were described as “bourgeois dolls” who represented the harmful 
Westernization of Iranian society. According to Moghadam, unveiled, educated and employed 
women “frightened and offended” Iranian men. Women were, therefore, pushed towards 
family life. Women retained their right to vote, and the constitution ensured equality of men 
 
 
and women, although in practice the unequal nature of the family law and the penal code 
resulted in unequal treatment. (Moghadam 2013:60-62) 
In the cases of Algeria and Iran, a clear juxtaposition between the traditional and foreign 
influences can be seen. Moghadam theorizes that the patriarchal model occurs when 
revolutions emphasize their own cultural background, often as a “reaction to external modes 
of control” (Moghadam 1997:157), for example colonialism or Western influences. Thus ,in 
this model, tradition controls the discourse, and it entails traditional roles for women and 
men. 
Some scholars, including Moghadan, have stressed the importance of keeping women’s rights 
on the agenda of the revolution. When women give up the calls for their rights for the good of 
the revolution, they are ignored and forgotten after the situation unfolds. In the case of Iran, 
for example, women were told to patiently wait for their turn until the dictator had been 
displaced, after which the discussion could be taken up again (Esfandiari 2012:1). This, of 
course, never happened. Haleh Esfandiari, the director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s 
Middle East Program, says regarding the Arab Spring: 
“If women expected revolutions – Iranian or Arab – to lead to an expansion of 
their rights, the reality has generally been otherwise, and the pattern if almost 
the same everywhere. Women are excluded from power centers that replace the 
old regimes.” (Esfandiari 2012:1-2) 
Women cannot count on the benevolence of men if they want to see advancement in their 
rights; however, this is often the only possible course of action. 
 
2.3.2. Emancipatory Revolutions 
 
Moghadam is not very clear about the definition of an emancipatory revolution, but that is 
somewhat understandable – an emancipatory revolution must contain multiple advances of 
women, even though there are often negative consequences as well. As can be seen in the case 
of Algeria and Iran, political rights are not enough to ensure equality of the sexes, especially if 
society remains hostile to women and their agency. This is why I suggest that the aspects of 
political representation, legislation and status in society should all be taken into account when 
determining the results of revolutions. In my opinion, these three all represent strategic 
interests, and are therefore significant markers of an emancipatory revolution. 
 
 
Moghadam uses the Bolshevik revolution of Russia, Turkey in the 1920s and South Yemen in 
the 1960s and early 1970s as examples of the emancipatory model. The reasons for an 
emancipatory revolution are many: for example, women’s emancipation has sometimes been 
necessary to facilitate economic and social progress. This was the case in all of the 
abovementioned cases and specifically in Bolshevik Russia and the Soviet Union, where 
women were needed in the labor force. South Yemen also took a turn towards Marxism and 
saw women as a necessary part of the work force; therefore, their participation was essential 
for economic and social stability (Moghadam 2013:58-59). In Turkey’s case, this was an 
attempt to make the country more modern, more Western and more appealing in the eyes of 
the West. In Russia and the Soviet Union that followed, equality between sexes was important 
for the ideology of the state. (Moghadam 1997:151) In the Soviet Union, women were also 
needed to increase the political base of the Socialist regime and in the labor force, and 
therefore the country underwent large changes in legislation and discourse to improve 
women’s status (Moghadam 2013:37-38).  
In all of these cases, the new secular regime also challenged religion and its power. In South 
Yemen, for example, legislative changes meant changing laws derived from Islam, therefore 
challenging God himself. I suspect that the reasons for this relationship with religion are 
manifold: attempting to strip the church or the clergy of their power and riches, seeing 
religion as inimical to modernization, and perhaps decreasing the hold that religion had of 
society and social relationships. In South Yemen, traditional modes of control over women 
(i.e. tribal practices) were outlawed, and women’s role changed from mothers and caregivers 
to workers and citizens (Moghadam 2013:59). Revolutions tend to rearrange the relationship 
between state and religion and the subjects, and these contentious forces keep battling each 
other even to this day, as can be seen later in the cases of Tunisia and Egypt as well. Secular 
and religious forces seem to be hostile to each other and the changing of the balance in power 
may bring dramatic changes for the other party, as can be seen very clearly in the cases of Iran 
in 1979 and Bolshevik Russia.  
One of the possible influencing factors of an emancipatory revolution is the background of the 
country itself; for example, Esfandiari sees Tunisia’s “strong secular tradition and firmly 
established progressive laws on women’s rights” as explanation for the country’s successful 
revolution (Esfandiari 2012:3). Is secularity therefore the only way to achieve equality? 
 
 
Other factors that are sometimes brought up in texts regarding Tunisia’s revolution are the 
vast number of educated women and the progressive rights they had already before the 
revolution, especially in the form of the personal status law. Tunisian women were already 
quite empowered before the revolution; they were educated, often employed, and the country 
already had a devoted feminist community and NGOs dedicated to women’s rights. In 
Moghadam’s examples of emancipatory revolutions, education and political rights have often 
been prominently featured. These do, in some way, form the basic framework which 
facilitates women’s empowerment. Through them women have the chance to really become 
citizens, and improve the way women are perceived. This, in turn, can promote women’s 
status in society – in theory, at least.  
2.4. The Theoretical Framework of This Thesis 
 
As we can see, Moghadam’s theory is not always simple and straightforward, and I’ve 
modified it to be more consistent and applicable for my thesis. Since I focus on politics, 
legislation and society, I’ve categorized some of the revolutions Moghadam analyzes based on 
this division, hoping to get a more simplified picture. Moghadam’s approach is 
understandable since all revolutions are different, and the role and status of women is 
different as well. Some revolutions have resulted in fundamental changes in legislation, while 
others have changed how women are portrayed in the media, for example. I will now explain 
more clearly and in detail the theoretical framework that I have modified for my uses. 
I categorize the social changes of Tunisia and Egypt as revolutions for reasons presented in 
chapter 2.1. The definition of social revolution also fits, except for the counter-revolution in 
Egypt. For this reason, and for the sake of simplicity, I use the term revolution. I don’t go deep 
into the reasons behind these revolutions, but modernization and conflicts it has brought 
seems to have been a driving force between them. The term “revolution of rising 
expectations”, as mentioned by Goodwin, also fits. Moghadam also leans on theory of 
modernization, and it’s therefore a part of my thesis, although not a major part. 
Since I focus on Tunisia and Egypt, I have used (mostly) examples from the Middle East and 
North Africa, although some examples are too important in Moghadam’s work to be 
disregarded completely (France 1789, Eastern Europe in 1989). Since my focus is in the 
 
 
development of women’s status in the fields of legislation, political participation and society, I 
have arranged Moghadam’s theory to fit this division. Moghadam actually uses these points 
herself, but the division is not clear and she does not say which aspects she considers 
important and what not. I will explain these further later, but in short, legislation in this thesis 
means constitutions, family law, and other legislation that might be relevant to women; 
political participation means women’s representation in parliament, the amount of ministerial 
positions they hold, voting and female candidates; society includes sexual harassment, 
common views on women (concerning e.g. rape, divorce), education and economic 
participation and opportunities. The last two points I study mostly through statistics 
regarding enrollment, education attained and literacy, and women’s participation in the labor 
force. The point of this is to look at the aspects that shape and affect women’s lives outside of 
formal politics and legislation, although I obviously can’t go too deep into these aspects. 
However, in my opinion this societal dimension is too important to ignore. 
Gender is an integral part of society, and often a special case in legislation and politics. 
Women’s rights, status and their role in the family and in society are all issues and topics that 
come up often in public and private discussions in the Middle East and Africa as well as 
elsewhere in the world. Gender plays a role and revolutions, and revolutions have an effect on 
women. 
Combining all of these points, I study the cases of Egypt and Tunisia, and place them in either 
the model of patriarchal revolution or emancipatory revolution. I wish to be more clear and 
transparent than Moghadam, and therefore I present here a detailed model of how I work. 
Looking at the legislation, political participation and status in society, I attempt to discern 
whether the situation has gotten better or worse for women: 
1. What changes (if any) did the new constitution and the possible new legislation 
introduce? Does this improve women’s lives? Does it have an impact on their strategic 
or practical interests? Are there any attempts to include and tackle issues that affect 
mostly women (e.g. sexual assault, domestic violence)? Are women and their voice 
included in the legislative process? I go through the constitutions, and if it’s an 
improvement from before, the revolution gains a point, so to speak. (See the graph 
below and Attachment 2: Gender Outcomes) 
 
 
2. Has political representation increased? If yes, how much? Is this a significant change? If 
yes, the revolution gains a point. Are there more female ministers? Did women vote 
actively? Is the political field hostile or friendly to women?  
3. Has the situation of sexual assault changed since the revolution? Has women’s standing 
in society changed? Has women’s education, literacy and employment gotten better, 
and are there any signs of improvement? Are there harmful stereotypes that 
undermine women? 
It’s also important to find out if the development of the revolution had an effect on the 
outcomes, and if it did, how. This is a point I attempt to keep throughout this thesis in order to 
see the full picture and development of Tunisia and Egypt. 
To make sense of Moghadam’s theory, I made a few visual aids to compile her work and in 
order to easily see the outcomes of the revolutions. First, I divided the revolutions according 
to Moghadam’s theory to emancipatory and patriarchal revolutions, using some of the criteria 
that Moghadam uses. I then combined these and assigned values to the aspects that 
Moghadam (and I) study; if, for example, women’s representation in parliament increased, the 
revolution gains one point. If their representation decreases, one point is removed. If the 
result is ambiguous or information is not available, the value assigned is zero. 
Changes in Examples Kemalism
France 1789
Algeria 
1962
Iran 
1979
E-Europe 
1989
Russia 
1917
Turkey 
1920
S. Yemen 
1967
Politics
Participation and 
representation
parliament 0 1 -1 -1 0 1 0
MEPs/ministers 0 0 1 -1 0 0 0
political rights -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 1
Women 
excluded/included -1 0 0 -1 1 1 1
Society Discourse
women's role -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1
femininity: negative -1 1 -1 -1 1 1 1
women & nat identity -1 -1 -1 1 1 1
patriarchal 
religion/modernity -1 -1 -1 1 1 1
exclusiveness/inclu
siveness -1 -1 -1 -1 1 1 1
Legislation
changes in 
constitution 1 -1 1 1 1
exclusiveness/inclu
siveness 0 -1 0 1 1 1
family-law: neg/pos -1 -1 -1 1 0 1
Results: -5 -1 -9 -10 10 10 10
 
 
These examples are all from Moghadam’s works, mainly from Theorizing Revolutions and 
Modernizing Women. There are more examples for patriarchal revolutions that emancipatory 
ones, mostly because I wanted to focus on examples in the Middle East and North Africa. 
Moghadam classifies Algeria’s revolution as patriarchal; however, looking at the graph above, 
the result is quite ambiguous. Moghadam does not offer information on all the aspects above, 
so I have attempted to gathered information elsewhere. In case I have not been successful, I’ve 
assigned the value of zero. My thesis focuses on Tunisia and Egypt, which is why I don’t want 
to go too in deep in other revolutions, especially those of least importance for this thesis (i.e. 
Russia, Eastern Europe, Turkey). 
The title “Discourse” is used here in a very vague sense: for Moghadam and me the term refers 
to an attempt to discern whether women’s role and the conversation regarding women have 
undergone changes. In this aspect, I have to rely on individual examples, often provided by 
other scholars.  
Later, I will add Tunisia and Egypt into this model and it will become possible to see more 
clearly how they fared in relation to the others. 
3. Before the Revolutions 
 
As I mentioned before, Tunisia and Egypt have many similarities but also many differences. I 
will start this chapter by looking into some of the biggest differences and see what they, and 
subsequently their revolutions, have in common. I will start by presenting some general facts 
about the two countries, after which I will analyze Moghadam’s work in relation to the events 
of 2011. I analyze Tunisia and Egypt side by side, but I later study them individually. 
Tunisia and Egypt have many fundamental differences, most of which I will not look into in 
this thesis. However, it is important to acknowledge the diversity of the area and the vast 
differences between these two countries. Egypt is one of the biggest countries in Africa and 
the Middle East both geographically and population-wise. Egypt has an enormous population 
of 90 million people, thus being the most populous North African and Middle Eastern country. 
Tunisia on the other hand is fairly small, with a population of about 11 million people.  
 
 
Egypt is one of the oldest countries on the planet, but Tunisia also has a long and rich history 
and it has been a home to many ancient civilizations, such as the Carthaginian and the Roman 
empires. Egypt’s old colonial master is Great Britain, while Tunisia along with most of 
Western Africa was controlled by France. Both achieved independence at roughly the same 
time and both fell quite quickly to the hands of autocrats. In the modern age, Tunisia has been 
better off economically, and many problems that affect Tunisia affect Egypt even worse. These 
are all relevant factors for the start and, some say, the results of the revolutions. For example, 
many scholars emphasize Tunisia’s legislation, modelled after the French. 
Problems are only one of the things that Tunisia and Egypt have in common. Both countries 
are Arab with a Muslim majority, although Egypt has a large minority of other religious 
denominations. Middle East and North Africa as an area is not one famous for gender equality, 
and this applies to Tunisia and Egypt as well. Tunisia has done somewhat better in this aspect. 
In the Middle East women tend to be marginalized in politics as well as society. Measuring and 
calculating scores for something like gender equality is problematic and difficult, and even 
more so when different countries are ranked based on their performance. However, these 
kinds of rankings make simple comparisons possible, and they give an overview of how the 
country is faring compared to the global average. 
The Gender Gap Report, an annual publication collected by the World Economic Forum, is one 
way to measure gender equality around the world. Tunisia and Egypt, along with other Arab 
countries, have not fared well in this list, but are consistently ranked as the worst region in 
the world for women. The Gender Gap Report measures economic participation and 
opportunity, educational attainment, political empowerment – all of which I study in this 
thesis – as well as health and survival. Another quite famous measurement of equality and 
well-being is UNDP’s Human Development Report. The report features indicators of gender 
inequality and gender development, both of which I will use in this thesis. These scores 
facilitate comparisons between the two countries as well as their past and present. 
Moghadam identifies five major events leading to the Arab Spring in her 2013 edition of 
Modernizing Women.  
1. The Arab Human Development Report published in 2002, where Arab scholars 
identified the three biggest shortcomings of the region as gender inequality, 
authoritarian rule and restrictions on knowledge. Thus, it can be assumed that Arab 
 
 
states and citizens have become more aware of their shortcomings related to 
gender equality, democracy and civil rights. Calls for these happened before the 
Arab Spring, and they were often violently suppressed. 
2. Reform of Moroccan family law in 2003 and 2004, a great achievement for 
Moroccan feminists and women.  
3. The 2003 Kifaya! (Eng. enough) movement of Egypt that challenged Mubarak’s rule 
and demanded democracy (check the objectives), and a series of worker actions, 
especially 2008 protests in Egypt demanding economic justice. There were similar 
protests in Tunisia, but arguably Egypt’s influence is bigger.  
(Moghadam 2013:212-213) 
Moghadam also mentions Iran and its social movements in 2007 and 2009, but it seems to me 
that Moghadam might be overestimating Iran’s role while ignoring important events and 
situations elsewhere in the region. For example, Tunisia had seen large protests before the 
Arab Spring; for example, the government with the help of its military shut down protests by 
miners in Gafsa in 2008 (Chomiak 2011). The economic situation of many Arab countries was 
also poor, which was an important factor in driving people to the streets. The causes of the 
Arab Spring are, however, outside of the scope of my thesis, but as these were the points given 
by Moghadam, also including important movements for women, I include them here.  
The advantage of Moghadam’s list is that is shows the importance and relevance of women’s 
activism in the region. There are multiple organizations devoted to women’s rights (see table 
in page 213 of Modernizing Women) that work actively to demand equality and democracy. As 
Moghadam says, “women’s groups have been key contributors to civil society activism”. 
(Moghadam 2013:213) 
As I mentioned before, gender is important but gender alone does not define someone’s status 
in society. Multiple factors play into the oppression of women, and they often intersect. Race, 
class, and sexual orientation are just some factors that further define a woman’s life. 
Geographical location also plays a major role, and it is to be taken into account when studying 
Egypt and Tunisia, as both suffer from big regional discrepancies, and people are generally 
worse off in rural than urban areas. In Egypt’s case, different religions put women into 
unequal positions – family law in Egypt is entirely religious, which means that Muslims, 
Christians and Jews all have different rights depending on their religion. When talking about 
“women’s rights”, one must keep this in mind, because women might share one thing but be 
 
 
completely different in another. For this reason, I focus on aspects that affect women as a 
gender, i.e. as a somewhat homogenous group. 
3.1. Legislation 
 
Legislation hasn’t treated women and men equally either. In many cases, women’s rights have 
been addressed through family law. Although it could be argued that family is not exclusively 
a female concept, in many cases and countries this tends to be the case. Family laws tackle 
issues such as polygamy, divorce and abortion, and these issues have often been 
disadvantageous to women. 
As mentioned before, the first constitution of independent Tunisia was the one accepted in 
1959, and it was progressive globally and especially in the MENA region. The constitution also 
gave substantial power to the president, Habib Bourguiba at the time, and emphasized the 
role of Islam. In spite of this, both Bourguiba and Ben Ali were secular and modernist rulers 
who valued women’s emancipation as a means towards a modern prosperous state. The 
constitution was amended in 1988, 2002 and 2005.  
After Tunisia gained its independence, President Habib Bourguiba set on the path to improve 
women’s rights through legislation: Islamic shari’a-based family laws were replaced with a 
civil law, the Personal Status Code (le code du statut personnel or CSP, Medjellat al-ahwal al-
shakhsia), adopted in August 1956. Both Bourguiba and Ben Ali were supporters of women’s 
emancipation, and enacted several laws and policies to encourage this. Tunisian women were 
among the first in the region to gain the right to vote and to file for divorce and the custody of 
their children. Polygamy and male repudiation were also abolished and prohibited, and 
women dependent on social insurance gained the right to 12 weeks of paid pregnancy leave2, 
while maternity leave was 30 days. (Arfaoui & Moghadam 2016:4-5, Moghadam 2013:44)  
The CSP was quite revolutionary and a huge step for women’s rights, although some 
unfavorable aspects remained. For example, women’s share of inheritance was still half of that 
of a man’s. Some parts of the code were updated further: for example, a clause ordering 
women to obey their husbands was removed. Tunisia is the only Arab country that recognizes 
                                                       
2 Six weeks before the delivery, six weeks after, with 50% of monthly salary.  
 
 
injury to the wife as grounds for a divorce without the need of proof, and the wife can also 
seek compensation for her injuries. The Personal Status Law also states that a woman does 
not owe obedience to her husband. (Combating Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls: 
Policies to Empower Women in the Arab Region 2013, Hamza 2016:213) Women in Tunisia are 
also allowed an abortion on request, which is relatively rare globally. In Egypt, abortion is 
only possible if it threatens the woman’s life. (Worldwide Abortion Policies, Pew Research 
Center 5.10.2015) 
Bourguiba enacted several other policies to improve women’s employment, and in the 1980’s. 
women’s labor force participation was much more balanced with men’s than in many other 
countries, while women’s political participation followed. However, Bourguiba, who gave 
Tunisian women the gift of the personal status code3, also retained some sexist notions, for 
example that women should work in professions “suitable” for their gender. He also stated 
that he did not want to disrupt the harmony of the family, and that women should work part-
time. (Arfaoui 2016:226-227) 
According to Moghadam, Bourguiba’s successor Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali saw himself as a 
“champion of women’s rights”. Ben Ali formed CREDIF, an agency focused on studying 
women, and government agencies have often commissioned research from it in order to 
ensure women’s inclusion in the country’s development. (Moghadam 2013:44-45). Evidently, 
women’s rights were an important agenda for both presidents, but according to some scholars 
(e.g. Hamza and Daniele), Ben Ali used women’s rights as a tool to evade accusations of human 
rights violations and to gain popularity and acceptance in the West, and also to silence 
feminist movements and organizations. (Hamza 2016:213, Daniele 2014:19) Women were 
able to form feminist organizations, but they too were faced with government repression. 
Legislation regarding domestic violence varies between the Arab countries, and Tunisia is one 
of the few where it’s classified as a criminal offence. In Egypt, judiciaries may consider 
domestic violence – perpetrated by men against women - to be in accordance with shari’a. 
Rape is a criminal offence in all Arab countries, but spousal rape is criminalized only in 
Tunisia – or, to be more precise, the legislation can be interpreted to prohibit spousal rape 
(more on this later). According to to the UN and ESCWA’s report on domestic violence in the 
                                                       
3 “It was a gift because it came from him and not as an answer to any claims made by women. In fact, Bourguiba 
even said that by so doing, he had spared Tunisian women the efforts made by women elsewhere in the world to 
demand equal rights.” Arfaoui 2016:225) 
 
 
Arab region, the problem with criminalizing spousal rape lies with its definition, while the 
problem of domestic violence in general is the “preservation of family values”, and law-
enforcement does not regard domestic violence as a criminal offence. (Combating Domestic 
Violence Against Women and Girls: Policies to Empower Women in the Arab Region 2013:19-20) 
In Tunisia, in case the victim of the rape is under 20 years of age, the rapist can escape 
punishment by marrying his victim (Assaulted and Accused 2015:4). All these vague and 
harmful laws and practices are considered good for the family, or issues within the family, and 
therefore it’s hard to seek help. 
In many cases, legislation to protect women from violence, sexual assault and other 
infractions exist, but women don’t often take advantage of this. The reasons are many – for 
example, lack of information about their rights, illiteracy, and patriarchal traditions. This is 
not just a problem in Tunisia and Egypt, but all over the world. Women often do not report 
these kinds of crimes committed against them. Domestic violence is not sometimes even 
considered a crime, and often the victim has to have proof. Rape is especially stigmatized, and 
it’s often considered to be the victim’s fault. Spousal rape is often not even recognized, since 
sexual intercourse is considered a part of marital duties. 
Other legal documents – beside Personal Status Laws - relevant to women’s rights are the 
constitution, which sets the very basic parameters on equality of citizens; labor laws that 
govern equal pay, non-discrimination, etc.; and social security regulations that can pertain to, 
for example, pensions and other benefits and allowances. (Combating Domestic Violence 
Against Women and Girls: Policies to Empower Women in the Arab Region 2013:26) In this 
thesis I focus mostly on Personal Status Laws and Constitutions, as they are the most 
important and primary sources of legislation regarding women’s rights. 
In conclusion, legislation is important, but it’s not everything: 
“Laws that establish women and men’s equal rights provide an important basis 
for demanding and achieving gender equality in practice. But equality before the 
law is not enough to ensure women’s enjoyment of their rights: power 
inequalities, structural constraints and discriminatory social norms and practices 
also need to be addressed.” (Progress of the World’s Women 2015-2016 - 
Transforming Economies, Realizing Rights 2015: Section titled “In Brief”) 
 
 
 
3.2. Politics 
 
Feminism or interest in women’s rights didn’t start in 2011 – it’s been a popular, yet 
marginalized, ideology for decades. Women’s struggle in the Middle East and North Africa has 
often been linked with anti-colonial and nationalist struggles (Milton-Edwards 200:173, 
Moghadam 2013:39). These nationalist movements achieved independence in the 1950s and 
1960s, and the new states and their ideologies have had unexpected and varying effects on 
women. Many governments saw socialism as the way to modernity, and this sometimes 
included very radical policies on social justice and equality. This era was in many ways 
friendly to women’s causes, and they experienced many improvements in their status as they 
were more educated than ever and had the right to a career. 
Moushira Khattab, an ex-Minister of the Egyptian government, writes in her chapter of 
Women’s Movements in Post-Arab Spring North Africa that Egypt’s advances in women’s rights 
have been tied to the country’s level of cultural, economic and social development. Women’s 
rights have been important in bringing the country to a level of what is considered a modern 
nation, but their development has not been linear. She also argues that Egyptian women were 
the first to call for equal rights, and that Egypt has been the front runner of women’s rights. I 
don’t think it’s important to determine who was first, but it’s good to keep in mind that Egypt 
also has a long history of feminism. (Khattab 2016:127-128) 
Often male feminists have had big role in advancing women’s rights: early examples of this in 
these two cases are Qassem Amin (author of The New Woman, published in 1901) and 
Muhammad Abduh in Egypt, and Tahar Haddad (Our Woman, Islamic Law, and Society; 1930) 
in Tunisia. (Moghadam 2013:38) It’s an undeniable fact that in almost all countries, the 
leaders and political representatives have historically been exclusively men, and through their 
power on legislation, they either contributed to women’s liberation or not. Of course, women 
themselves fought hard for their rights and managed to influence male politicians.  
Both Egypt and Tunisia granted women the right to vote immediately after they gained their 
independence (1956 and 1957, respectively, although Egypt’s development was more 
complicated). Women’s representation in parliament has been low, but better in Tunisia. Even 
though women have had the right to run for political positions for a long time, their numbers 
have remained low. There are multiple reasons for this, but in general it can be said that 
 
 
women have been, as Moghadam puts it, “unfairly handicapped by existing custom and law” 
(Moghadam 2013:40). Women have traditionally been confined indoors and within the family, 
while men control the public sphere. This hinders women from seeking place in public spaces, 
as this goes against what is considered their normal and natural role. Their responsibilities to 
the family can also hold them back if they have no one to share these responsibilities with. In 
this way, once again, upper-class women have been in a better position, since they can afford 
daycare and nannies, and are possibly from a more liberal background.  
Many states, Tunisia and Egypt included, have subscribed to state feminism (see e.g. Abou-
Bakr 2015:182-184, Ennaji 2016:101). In state feminism women’s rights and struggles are not 
advocated on the grass root level but are instead part of the state’s agenda (see previous 
chapter). This can have both positive and negative outcomes: women’s rights become 
mainstreamed, but women’s actual problems and wishes are not heard; or as Beverly Milton-
Edwards puts it: 
“Issues of citizenship, suffrage, economic independence, violence and education 
for women are rarely addressed. While some states have made a few advances 
more than others, the political patriarchy of these states has ensured the 
continued control of women and debates about their status, rights and political 
roles in society.” (Milton-Edwards 2000:174) 
State feminism can, therefore, have a positive influence on women’s practical interests 
through government policies, but their strategic interests remain unaddressed.  
Middle Eastern states are patriarchal in nature and in the rare occasions when women’s 
problems are addressed, the discourse is controlled by the men in power. When state 
feminism benefits women, it mostly benefits women of the upper class: 
“For example, with the application of economic reforms in the 1980s (the 
structural readjustment plan), the economic and social retreat of the state began, 
which weakened the prospects for a better future for working and middle-class 
women. Thus, although state feminism succeeded in giving women access to 
education, healthcare, and employment, it did not really challenge the negative 
social attitudes toward women, who are still regarded as dependent on men.” 
Ennaji 2016:101 
In Egypt, state feminism started in the 1960s during the reign of Gamal Abd al-Nasser, who 
implemented multiple policies to advance women’s status, especially regarding education and 
employment. However, the main beneficiaries were – once again - the upper classes, although 
Nasser’s policies did ensure the right to education and employment for all women. Then 
 
 
again, these changes did not challenge the wider patriarchal nature of Egyptian society. 
(Ennaji 2016:101) This again proves Milton-Edwards’ point, and shows that these policies of 
state feminism or socialism have only addressed women’s practical interests, and as 
important as they are, they don’t challenge the unfair bias of society. During Nasser, the 
disadvantageous situation was still better than during Sadat, who opened Egypt up to both 
world economy and Islamist influences, and Mubarak, who followed his predecessor’s policies 
and largely ignored women’s struggles. Moghadam’s calls Egypt during these two presidents 
“authoritarian and neopatriarchal”. (Moghadam 2013:43-44)  
In Tunisia and Egypt, the presidents’ wives became the mascots of state feminism, which hurt 
feminism and continues to do so as feminism and women’s rights bring forth connotations of 
old, corrupt rulers. This also applies to some old feminist organizations. The Arab countries 
have often viewed feminism as something inherently Western and strange, which has also 
played its part in the countries’ resistance to equal rights (The Arab Human Development 
Report 2005: Towards the Rise of Women in the Arab World 2006:6). The criticism of state 
feminism is obviously valid, although it sometimes overlooks the legitimately positive 
advances made for women, especially regarding their practical interests. The state’s attitude 
towards women’s rights is crucial, especially when NGOs have limited space for advocacy. 
Ennaji also states that “On the other hand, it is also true that women’s movements in the 
region are intensely impacted by the political management in each country” (Ennaji 
2016:101). 
Women’s NGOs – when not controlled by the state - are an important part in challenging state 
feminism, as they offer criticism and demand changes based on women’s actual experiences.  
The first Egyptian feminist organization, Egyptian Feminist Union, was founded in 1923 by 
famous activist Huda Sharawi (El Said, Meari & Pratt 2015:201). Both countries have a couple 
of old and influential women’s rights organizations, but their reputation is not always good 
since in order to survive and gain influence, they have had to work with the regime and within 
the established rules. The most famous Tunisian feminist organizations are ATFD 
(l’Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates) and AFTURD (l’Association des Femmes 
Tunisiennes pour la Recherche et le Développement). Both organizations have worked in 
collaboration with multiple national and international institutions and made significant steps 
for the development of women’s rights. ATFD was the first organization in the area to 
establish a counseling center and a hotline for abused women. (Arfaoui & Moghadam 2016:2) 
 
 
Tying women to the family is an ancient practice and an integral part of a patriarchal society, 
and this system is not dismantled in a day. The structure of the society is still visible in both 
countries, and the progress towards equality has gone further in Tunisia than in Egypt, where 
there seems to be little will to do so at the moment: Tunisia has taken pride in its equality and 
after the revolution, its democratic transition, but Egypt has moved towards traditionalism 
since the 1980s. The emergence of political Islam and the increased importance of Islam in 
one’s life has contributed to this. These aspects were visible throughout the revolutions. 
 
3.3. Society 
 
Since the 1980s, the number of women attaining a university education has increased 
steadily. For some years now, women’s enrollment in universities has exceeded that of their 
male counterparts in multiple MENA countries; Tunisia, for example. The growing masses of 
highly educated women and mothers entering the labor force has created a social change in 
the area as it did elsewhere before. Moghadam sees the rise of Islamist parties as backlash 
against these changes, although universities are fertile territory for Islamist movements and 
some educated Muslim feminist women have challenged some of the patriarchal and 
discriminatory practices they see. (Moghadam 2013:126-128) 
Moghadam states that “women’s employment has been almost as important as women’s 
education in changing the position and self-perception of women and in altering the 
patriarchal gender contract” (Moghadam 2013:128). Through education, women can attain a 
level of independence, awareness and opportunity that enables them to seek a better life for 
themselves and improve society. Employment is further improvement on this; through 
employment, women become independent financially and are therefore no longer dependent 
on their husbands and other male relatives. Employment is important for the individual in a 
practical manner through wages and other benefits, but its importance for self-esteem is also 
profound. Women’s education and employment have been contested and even rejected by 
powerful members of society (i.e. men), surely for these reasons among other. 
While Tunisian and Egyptian women are quite educated, unemployment remains a serious 
problem. Unemployment, especially among youth, was one of the forces behind the Arab 
 
 
Spring, and the situation is even worse with women. In 2010, female share of labor force was 
19% in Egypt and 25% in Tunisia; both are low, but Egypt’s percentage quite a lot lower. Still, 
Egypt is not the worst in the category of Middle East and North Africa – Yemen took the last 
place with 6% -, while Tunisia was the best in the region – according to Moghadam, who did 
not include Israel in her grouping4. To compare, Israel’s share of women in labor force was 
61%, significantly larger than Tunisia’s. Tunisia and Egypt were both very low in the 
economic participation and opportunity sub-index – Tunisia was surprisingly a step behind of 
Egypt, at 122, Egypt being number 121 (out of 134 countries).  
Age of marriage was also lower for Egyptian women at 23 years, and 27 in Tunisia. On average 
Egyptian women had 2,9 children, while for their Tunisian counterparts the number was 1,9. 
(Moghadam 2013:7, WEF 2010) The trend can be observed globally – as women become more 
educated and gain employment, their fertility rates drop and they get married older. 
Combining family life and work is still extremely challenging as changes in attitudes seem to 
drag behind: women are still expected to take care of the family, including their homes and 
husbands and sometimes other relatives as well, and day care is often expensive. Upper class 
women are in a better position as they can afford day care and nannies, unlike lower class 
women who also might be dependent on the income of their husbands and cannot get 
divorced should the situation call for it. 
Sexual relations are still restricted in both countries, and they are expected to happen inside a 
marriage between two people of opposite genders. Premarital sex is not just frowned upon 
but condemned. Therefore, in order to have sex, one must enter into a marriage. My opinion is 
that this leads to two things: hasty marriages between two people who might not be 
compatible in the long run (as proven by high rates of divorce in both countries), and an 
obsession on sex. Relations between young men and women are scrutinized, sexuality is seen 
as bad and harmful, and the sexual repression partly leads to the epidemic of sexual 
harassment. These trends are more prominent in Egypt, often seen as more traditional 
compared to relatively liberal Tunisia. 
                                                       
4 For various reasons Israel is often excluded from the category of Middle East and North Africa. In this thesis, I 
also focus on other MENA countries due to their similar backgrounds, but I included the example of Israel here to 
highlight that Tunisia, in spite of being “the best” on some level, is still performing quite poorly. In this part, 
Moghadam uses WEF’s statistics (in which Israel is included in the category of Middle East and North Africa), and 
does not explain her choice to leave Israel out. Israel is, strictly speaking, in the Middle East, which is why I point 
out Moghadam’s choice here. Tunisia can be presented as a success story, but the reality is more complicated 
than that. 
 
 
As I mentioned, divorce is extremely common – according Egypt’s Central Agency for Public 
Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), divorces have increased by 83% in 20 years. In the age 
group of 20-34, 60% of women had already gotten divorced in 2006-2015. In spite of divorce 
being legal, it is still not perfectly acceptable. According to a news piece from Daily News 
Egypt, in Arab societies women are still blamed for the divorce (I Want a Divorce tackles 
women’s struggles in Egyptian society, Daily News Egypt 8.2.2017).  
According to a study conducted by the Tunisian government, more specifically ONFP, in 2010 
violence against women was most prevalent inside the family, while violence in the work 
place and in public spaces was relatively low. The violence seems to have been prevalent in all 
regions and classes. 47,6% of women had experienced some form of violence during their 
lifetime, while 32,9% had experienced in the last 12 months. This means that about a half of 
Tunisian women face violence in their lifetime, and a third of them had experienced it in the 
last year. Psychological abuse, including verbal and nonverbal abuse, was most common, and 
had been experienced by 15,8% of women during the last year. The study included 
economical abuse, meaning financial extortion and exploitation. (Enquête Nationale sur la 
Violence à l’Egard des Femmes en Tunisie 2010 2011)  
Researchers have presented multiple theories and views on why the Middle East seems 
backward in its treatment of women. One of the aspects of Middle Eastern life is Islam, a 
religion practiced by over a billion people. Islam is often blamed for women’s relatively weak 
status by both Westerners and locals. Fatima Mernissi was one of the most famous critics of 
Islam and its patriarchal nature. Many Muslims reject the notion of Islam being something 
inherently misogynistic and patriarchal – after all, the Qur’an advocates equality for everyone. 
Many issues associated with Islam are not strictly Islamic in nature: female genital mutilation 
or FGM, polygamy and traditional inheritance laws that favor sons can be found in non-
Islamic societies as well, and some practices are completely absent from Islamic sources (for 
example FGM).  
Tunisia is almost entirely Muslim, while Egypt is more diverse in this sense. Egypt’s biggest 
religious minority are Coptic Christians, who in turn belong mostly in either Coptic Orthodox 
Church or Coptic Catholic Church. It is virtually impossible to find accurate numbers, but 
estimates of Copts in Egypt range between 10 to 20%. According to CIA World Factbook, the 
percentage of Muslims is 90% with all other religions (mostly Coptic Orthodox Christians) in 
the remaining 10%. The Coptic Church often estimates their numbers to be bigger than others 
 
 
would. (Egypt – the World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency; Egyptian Copts reject 
population estimate, Al-Ahram English 26.9.2012) 
The estimations have caused controversy in Egypt, for example in 2012, when the 
government statistics office counted the number of Christians to be 5 million, while Copts 
themselves claim to be 15 to 18 million people. According to Al-Ahram, the Copts fear that 
these low estimates by the state “will be used to marginalise Christians under new 
constitution” (Egyptian Copts reject population estimate, Al-Ahram English 26.9.2012). In any 
case, the number of non-Muslims in Egypt is significantly large and thus politically important. 
The Egyptian family law is also based on religious affiliation, which means that different laws 
are applied to Muslims and Christians, for example, in the case of divorce. 
Iran’s 1979 revolution was a victory for political Islam and traditional patriarchal notions. In 
the 1980s and 1990s Islamism spread rapidly, influencing politics and society all over the 
Muslim world. The movements are various and diverse, as some seek political power and 
others do not, while some use violence as a means to achieve their goals. Islamist feminism 
represents one strand of this, and is one where women’s voices and opinions can be clearly 
heard. 
Islam is often described as a way of life, deen, not just religion. Islam means different things 
for different people, which is why Muslim feminists have been active both in the past and in 
the present. However, Islam is often used as a reason or an excuse for the oppression of 
women, and many people find support for their patriarchal traditions and misogynistic views 
in Islamic tradition. The question of Islam and women is old and I won’t be devoting my thesis 
to it; however, I cannot ignore the question entirely, because religion is one of the many 
factors that shape women’s life in the Middle East and North Africa. Islam was a major 
influence in the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt, and continues to be an important part of the 
society and political discourse. 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The Arab Spring  
 
The Arab Spring started as something that was shared across cities, countries, even 
continents. People from different social classes, ethnic and religious groups and genders 
joined together in an idealistic quest. The people’s hopes were maybe unrealistic, but they 
encouraged citizens around Middle East and North Africa to rise against their dictators.  
As I mentioned in the Preface, most people consider the start of the Arab Spring to be the 
death of a Tunisian vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, whose suicide sparked protests first in Tunisia 
and then elsewhere in the region. In spite of the more or less common inspiration – corrupt 
rulers, crooked democracy and lack of equality and human rights -, the movements were very 
different. Therefore, generalizations are hard to make, but it can be said that the movements 
were all popular demonstrations and their objectives were shared by many – this means 
women as well. The participation and activity of women during the Arab Spring is widely 
known and praised, which is why the results of the revolutions or attempts at one are 
interesting. 
The movements were born quite spontaneously and they either achieved results quickly or 
not at all. In many cases, backlash from the government was swift and often violent. 
Protesters clashed with the police in early 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria, and 
demonstrations turned violent in Yemen, Iran, and Bahrain. The demonstrations resulted in 
deaths in multiple countries, usually by security forces (e.g. Jordan, Yemen, Bahrain, Egypt, 
Iraq, Syria), sometimes in clashes between opposing groups (e.g. pro- and anti-Mubarak 
protesters in Egypt). (see Arab Spring: an Interactive Timeline of Middle East Protests, the 
Guardian 5.1.2012 for more details) 
In both Egypt and Tunisia, the protests became a revolution, and the regimes changed when 
both presidents resigned: Ben Ali on January 14th and Mubarak on February 11th. In Tunisia, 
prime minister Mohamed Ghannouchi took over temporarily, while in Egypt the Supreme 
Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed power during the transitional period. This is an 
aspect that I find meaningful – Tunisia was taken over by a civilian government, while Egypt 
was ruled by the military. “Arab Spring” is a very loose definition, but I would say that for 
most scholars and analysts, this period was 2011. I define the Arab Spring as the 
 
 
revolutionary period prior to the deposition of the presidents, after which new forces 
assumed power and changes started to take form, often painstakingly slowly.  
The different trajectories of Egypt and Tunisia could be seen emerging already during the 
revolutions, and these developments partly explain the different results: for example, violence 
and the role of the military and police was more prominent in Egypt, although Tunisia has also 
had to reconcile over the assaults during the revolution. The scale of violence, especially 
gendered violence, was on a whole different scale in Egypt. In the next chapter I will examine 
the different outcomes of the revolutions – the birth of a democracy on one hand, and a 
counter-revolution and a military dictatorship on the other. In Egypt and Tunisia as elsewhere 
women were hoping for a better status, for themselves as well as their fellow citizens. That’s 
why women were present from the start of the Arab Spring. After the initial fervor, attitudes 
were quick to change. Women were assaulted both by their fellow protestors as well as the 
military. The prevalence of sexual assault has not been as wide in Tunisia, it would seem, as it 
was in Egypt.   
4.1.1. After the Arab Spring 
 
“There is a pattern in women’s political participation during times of national crisis: 
they’re in when they’re needed; they’re out when they’re not.” (Cooke 2016:31) 
 
The above quote highlights a phenomenon that can be observed throughout decades, even 
centuries, and numerous revolutions. Cooke is one of the many researches who has studied 
the way women were first included during the revolution and then promptly excluded after 
their support was no longer needed. The example that Cooke uses in her chapter for Women’s 
Movements in Post-Arab Spring North Africa is from Algeria in 1954, where women’s 
participation in the revolution against the French was wide-spread and successful. After the 
French were gone and a new state started, women gained less than 1% of the seats in the 
national assembly. Another common example is Iran’s 1979 revolution. Both revolutions were 
categorized as patriarchal in Moghadam’s theory. 
The Arab Spring mostly followed this pattern. Haleh Esfandiari recounts the events in her 
paper, titled, Is the Arab Awakening Marginalizing Women? (Esfandiari 2012), and reports that 
 
 
women were safe in public spaces for the first time and actively participating. Egypt’s Tahrir 
Square became a symbol of the Arab Sprig in many ways – first, it represented the hopes of 
the revolutions and demonstrations across the area, and after the initial euphoria it marked 
the remarkable change when women were violently pushed off the squares and streets they 
had occupied. This was followed by a shift towards more patriarchal politics and society in 
Egypt and Libya, among others. (Esfandiari 2012:3) 
Women experienced some small victories (for example in Yemen) or lost the little they had 
(Kuwait), but in most cases the situation seems to be relatively unchanged. Libya and Syria 
collapsed and have yet to recover, Yemen is more or less the same, and the situation of 
women in these countries and as refugees abroad is devastatingly terrible. The multiple 
demonstrations, upheavals and revolutions brought little positive changes for women. This is 
one of the reasons a study of revolutions with a gender-specific focus is important; in order to 
do better in the future, we need to know what went wrong in the past.  
In Egypt, the tide turned against women after the first 18 days when Mubarak had stepped 
down. Three weeks after his departure, women were widely assaulted both physically and 
sexually during the Women’s Day march. (Badran 2016:46, 54) It became obvious that women 
no longer had a place in the center of things, and they were shamed and assaulted from every 
direction. In Tunisia, the situation developed quite differently, and women have managed to 
keep their power, although many expressed their fears after the (moderate) Islamist Ennahda 
won the elections. Many women still consider their status as threatened, or at least 
precarious, and remain vigilant. 
Dina Wahba writes about her life as a young woman before, during and after the revolution: 
“I wanted to understand why I have always felt vulnerable walking the streets of Cairo. 
I wanted to understand why the streets never felt like they belonged to me. On that 
momentous day, January 25, 2011, I was scared of many things walking into Tahrir 
Square: thugs, police, men with beards, or maybe it was just men in general. During the 
18 days of our revolution, I not only felt safe, but more importantly, I felt powerful. The 
square was an egalitarian and inclusive space; I felt I was accepted and that I belonged. 
However, this feeling did not last for long. After less than a month, in this same place 
where I had felt so welcome, I was shouted at and told to go away.” (Wahba 2016:62) 
In Egypt, the protests continued due to the slow progress of political change. The counter-
revolution of Egypt led to president elect Mohammed Mursi being deposed on July 3rd, 2013 
by the military, and marked the return of a military dictatorship. In practice, the military was 
 
 
controlled by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) who first assumed power after 
Mubarak’s resignation, pending elections, and later during the coup that ousted Mursi. In 
articles and literature concerning Egypt’s revolutions the military and SCAF are used quite 
interchangeably, and are in effect the same thing as Sisi controls both.  
SCAF has been proven guilty of multiple transgressions against the Egyptian people, and 
concerning the topic of this thesis, the most important one is the sexual violence against 
women. One of the most famous occurrences were the virginity tests perpetrated on female 
activists in 2011 after the first revolution. According to SCAF, these tests were conducted out 
of self-defense, and multiple army officials were quoted pushing the blame onto the female 
activists, who were considered dishonorable, “loose women”, “not like your daughters”. (e.g. 
El Said, Meari & Pratt 2016:15). 
Many familiar problems persist in both Egypt and Tunisia: for example, women are still 
underrepresented in the labor force and their economic opportunity remains low (The Global 
Gender Gap Report, WEF 2016). This inequality between genders is old, and the gap in labor 
force participation is especially big in the MENA region. Progress has been made globally, and 
in the region as well, but the gap remains bigger in the MENA region than anywhere else in 
the world (ILO report Women at Work – Trends 2016: figure 1). In practice this gap means, 
for example, that women are in unpaid work more often than men, they are unemployed more 
often, they get paid less and their numbers in managerial positions are small. 
Out of the 18 International Human Rights Treaties, Tunisia has signed and ratified 14, three of 
which were ratified in 2011 – that is, after the revolution. Egypt has signed and ratified 11. 
The ratified treaties include many that concern women’s rights, such as International 
Covenant on Political and Civil Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CRC), all of which have been signed and ratified by both of the countries. Tunisia withdrew 
its reservations on CEDAW in 2014, but Egypt still maintains them. I focus more on the 
implications of CEDAW in the chapters concerning legislation. (Status of Ratification -
Interactive Dashboard, OHCHR) 
Same-sex relations are criminalized in Tunisia, but not in Egypt, but in practice sexual 
relations between two people of the same gender are charged more in Egypt under the 
 
 
pretense of “debauchery”. LGBT people therefore are quite powerless and helpless when 
faced with domestic or sexual violence. 
After the revolutions, new NGOs rose in Tunisia and Egypt to work alongside old feminist 
organizations that often had ties to the government. Before, political movements were banned 
or their activity was restricted. In Tunisia, the tendency has been positive, as the government 
is enforcing rights for free speech – for example by not restricting access to internet - and lets 
organizations work in peace. Criticizing the government is allowed and the press works freely. 
In Egypt, the situation for NGOs remains difficult, and this makes advocating for women’s 
rights difficult as well. NGOs have had a huge impact globally, and also in the MENA region; a 
good example is Morocco where feminist groups have been very active and have managed to 
influence official politics (see Ennaji 2016:103-104). Tunisia’s democracy and free speech is 
still precarious, and the situation should be observed closely – unemployment continues to be 
a problem, and the current terrorist threat has forced Tunisians to re-examine their values.  
 
4.1.2. Islamists 
 
As mentioned before, one of the major disputes among scholars of the Middle East, especially 
feminist scholars, is the relation between Islamists and women’s rights, and this division 
became once again evident during the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Scholars of this topic can 
almost be divided into two strict categories: those who oppose Islamists (at least in politics) 
and who blame them for the actual or possible deteriorating of women’s rights (e.g. radical 
feminists), and those who see Islamists as a positive force for women (e.g. Muslim feminists). 
Between these groups there are, as Ennaji calls them, “reconciliatory feminists” who see Islam 
as a cultural force compatible with feminism (Ennaji 2016:102). Other middle ground groups 
are moderate Islamists or “pragmatic democratic feminists” used by Muhanna (2015). The 
divisions and enmities run deep between the two opposing groups and both see the other as a 
threat to their life style. There are multiple examples of this, and I will provide just a few, and 
describe the discourse in general terms.  
The divisions are evident in academic literature – one finds both passionate defenses of 
Islamic feminisms and fearful rants about the dangers of political Islam. Some scholars 
 
 
recognize this trend in their field; for example, in the introduction of Rethinking Gender in 
Revolutions and Resistance in the Arab World (2015), the editors state that the discourse on 
the Arab Spring is often plagued by Orientalist and Eurocentric narratives that ignore many 
meaningful factors, while religion “is posited as necessarily oppressive for women, as opposed 
to secularism, which supposedly guarantees their rights” (El Said, Meari & Pratt 2016:1). 
In the discussion of political Islam, moderate is not something one encounters often, and the 
fears seem to be based more on strawmen and hypotheticals than actual proof. For example, 
even Ennaji who seems to strive for objectivity, states that “four years after the first uprisings 
exploded, women have seen few benefits, and the rise of Islamist governments is increasing 
conservatism in the region” (Ennaji 2016:104). No proof of this rising conservatism and its 
relation to Islam is provided. She mentions women’s representation in parliament, which is 
better in Tunisia because of the maintained quota system than in countries (like Egypt) where 
the system was abolished. However, the first democratically elected rulers of Tunisia were 
(moderate) Islamists who did not abolish the quota. In the years after the revolution, women’s 
representation has also risen even in ministerial positions (see 5.1.2.). 
Ennaji also thinks that the rise in sexual harassment is tied to the new conservative 
governments, although it is hard for me to see what makes these governments somehow more 
conservative than the previous ones. In Tunisia, she sees proof of practices restrictive of 
women’s rights, such as forced veiling – and it undoubtedly is restrictive -, but she ignores the 
opposite cases where women are prohibited from wearing the hijab or niqab. In Egypt, 
women have - according to her - faced more discrimination and harassment than during and 
immediately after the revolution. She also states that “Islamism seems to be a barrier to their 
emancipation and empowerment” – although Islam is empowering and important for many 
women. (Ennaji 2016:104-106) She is just one example of a researcher with obvious bias, but 
she is not alone.  
As has been pointed out before (chapter 3.2. in this thesis), feminism is not a new 
phenomenon in Tunisia and Egypt, and feminist and nationalist struggles have gone hand in 
hand in the past. According to Moghadam, feminism and religion started clashing after the 
nationalist movement developed towards a more patriarchal and culturally traditional model 
that included religious language and symbolism. Feminism’s demands for autonomy seemed 
to be in conflict with the notion of the state as an extended family, and its goals for 
employment and political participation threatened the existing social order that was still 
 
 
firmly in the hands of men. Moghadam states that the religo-nationalist movements 
positioned themselves as opposed to internal and external oppression (e.g. colonialism) and 
that feminists were ambivalent of these aspects, and thus positioned themselves differently, 
often directly opposing fundamentalism and political Islam. (Moghadam 2013:66) An example 
of the fight between Islamist parties and secular feminists can be found in Moghadam’s book 
(2013:68) with a focus on Algeria. 
It is obvious that Mursi’s short reign included multiple warning signs for women, as he 
attempted or at least hinted at stripping women’s basic rights. His opinions shocked Egypt 
and the world alike; perhaps the most radical of his propositions included the legalization of 
FGM (female genital mutilation; an outlawed but widespread practice) and lowering the age of 
consent for marriage to 14 years for girls. Eventually, Mursi was ousted and most of his 
propositions were never realized, although the quota for women in the parliament was ended 
during his reign and has yet to be reinstituted. It is obvious that some interpretations of Islam 
and imposing them on women can be restrictive and harmful for women. I examine this 
further in chapter 5.3.1., but as McLarney says in regard to the 2012 constitution, “In the end, 
Islamic realpolitik with regard to women’s rights and equality belied dark—and erroneous—
assumptions about Islamist intentions” (McLarney 2016:111). 
The question of Islamism is highly contentious in Tunisia as well, and women’s rights activists 
are divided into opposing camps: on one side, there are the radical feminists, representing the 
older generation of Tunisian feminists, for example through ATFD and AFTURD. In the past, 
they managed to work through Ben Ali’s regime – for them, legislation was the key to gender 
equality. They are largely leftists and socialists, influenced by second wave French feminism. 
Due to their established power, they have remained influential after the revolution. They 
believe in universal human rights, and reject cultural particularism – or, as critics might say, 
refuse to view the problems of Tunisian women in their (Tunisian) context. They also reject 
all reconciliation with Islamists, and are convinced that Islamism is a threat to women. 
(Muhanna 2015:212) 
On the other side, opposing radical feminism, are Muslim feminists. According to Muhanna, 
for these women the Islamist aspect of their political life is more important than the gender 
aspect, and they use women’s rights as an instrument to further their political agendas. 
Muhanna states that, 
 
 
“[…] a considerable number of female Ennahda members, MPs and civil society 
activists invest in their party’s instrumentalization of women’s political 
participation to achieve their own political manouvring.” (Muhanna 2015:218)  
Muslim Feminists emphasize women’s role in the family and women’s rights in an Islamic 
framework, and oppose a universal understanding of human and women’s rights; for example, 
they opposed CEDAW by arguing that each culture has to create their own understanding of 
human rights, respecting their cultural and religious background. This interpretation of 
women’s rights gains reserved support from poor women who see equal rights differently 
than the upper-class feminists of the more privileged coast. (Muhanna 2015:218-219) 
Fatima Sadiqi argues that the emergence of a ‘center’ between Islamists and secularists can be 
identified in the MENA region, using Morocco as a case study. The region has been a battle 
ground between conservatives and modernists, whose respective groups often correspond 
with the groups of Islamists and secularists, especially in politics (Sadiqi 2016:17); i.e., 
conservatives are often Islamists and modernists are secularists. As Saqidi summarizes it, the 
idea of a “Center” refers to, 
“[…] an ideological middle-ground space between the increasingly antagonistic 
paradigms of secularism and Islamism in post-revolution North Africa”. (Sadiqi 
2016:15) 
Seeing that the issue of Islamists is a highly contentious one, and the two sides sometimes 
have a hard time communicating with each other. Secularists are mostly concerned with 
public sphere, and assign religion to the private part of life (Sadiqi 2016:18). Islamists see 
Islam as the foundation for everything, including politics, state-building, education – and 
women’s rights.  
According to Sadiqi, this center or middle-ground has been partly created by women’s issues, 
as it’s one of the things that the two sides argue about the most. Women’s interests (or at least 
the discourse about them) have become more diverse, and this diversification has created a 
space for a center. Sadiqi uses Morocco as an example, but according to her, this phenomenon 
can also be seen elsewhere in post-revolutionary North Africa. (Sadiqi 2016:15-16) Islamists 
and secularists (or conservatives and modernists) rarely agree, but they united their forces in 
the fight against colonialism, and again during the Arab Spring. Thus, it can be said that these 
two groups do have some common interests, although their means might be different.  
 
 
The issue between Islamists and secularists is not just about religion; it’s about identity, 
society, family and justice.  Since the beginning of modern times, people in the MENA region 
have disagreed over these aspects in their state-building endeavors; should they strive to be 
like Europeans? Are they Arabs, or Muslims, or Arab-Muslims? On what rules should the state 
be founded on, secular or religious? These are all difficult and relevant questions that are still 
debated to this day, and the discussion is very important for women’s rights as well. Women 
can be oppressed in secular countries and have rights in religious ones; for example, Egypt 
was a relatively secular state before the revolution, but women’s rights were still poor. Fear of 
Islamism can lead to oppression and even violence, as has been evident in Egypt and the 
government’s crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. I’m not trying to 
deny the possibility, or even the reality, of harmful Islamist views and practices, and I’m not 
trying to dismiss the fears of the women living with them – I’m only trying to be objective in 
the way I treat Islam and its role in politics. For women in the MENA region these concerns 
are legitimate and real, but the criticism of Western media outlets and individuals often reeks 
of blatant islamophobia (see e.g. McLarney 2016:110).  
Margot Badran argues that the division between secularism and Islam was not always so 
deep: 
“In Egypt, as elsewhere, the secular/religious binary emerged with the spread of 
a new wave of political Islam in the 1970s, when Islamists tried to polarize the 
population.” (Badran 2016:51) 
Before this, women (at least in Egypt) were able to – and often had to - advocate for their 
rights in secular as well as Islamic terms, and in the 20th century feminism in Egypt was 
simply “feminism”, not Islamic or secular feminism, which was often used by outside 
observers (Badran 2016:51).  
Converging these two theories, it could be said that the center is now re-emerging, since 
evidently it did exist before. It is to be noted, however, that Egypt has been (especially in the 
past) more religiously pluralist than most MENA countries, and the “Egyptian” identity has 
been stronger than identities tied to religion. This was evident in the 1919 demonstrations as 
well as the revolution of 2011 when people from different religions participated together as 
equals.  
“When people rose up in the 1919 demonstrations, they were declaring themselves 
Egyptians in the face of the British colonialists who called them “natives.” In the 
 
 
colonial dictionary, the word “Egyptian” did not exist. In the collective outpourings, 
being a man or a woman, a Muslim or a Christian— distinctions the colonizer 
highlighted and exploited—was not significant; what mattered was being Egyptian.” 
(Badran 2016:46) 
Tunisian female activists, Islamist and secularist, have some common interests; for example, 
fighting dictatorship and extremist Islamist narratives. Muhanna states that Islamist and 
secular feminists have learned from each other and have generated more understanding 
towards each other. Between these two groups is also one that Muhanna calls “pragmatic 
democratic feminism”, comprised of feminists who have rethought the radical leftist feminism 
of the past and who wish to reconcile feminism and cultural tradition. Secular feminism and 
Islamic feminism in Tunisia often feel like the opposing ends of a magnet, yet pragmatic 
feminists aim to bring these two together. The pragmatics advocate for feminist activism that 
is more relevant and approachable for Tunisians, and want to take religion into account. A 
former director of CREDIF has called for a “shared feminist agenda with Islamic women 
activists”, advocating for moderate politics against fundamentalists who oppose women’s 
rights. (Muhanna 2105:215-217) 
The re-emergence of a center is one possibility, although Moghadam theorizes that 
nationalism, previously compatible with feminism and feminist movements in the Middle 
East, has become a more religo-cultural nationalist movement. Feminist ideals seem to fit 
badly in the idea that the nation is an extended family. Cultural identity is important to 
modern Islamists, and in their attempt for authenticity they see women as mothers, in the 
family and in the private sphere, whereas men are the breadwinners and visible in the public 
sphere. Since women are symbols of tradition and culture, this ideology is concerned with the 
way they behave and dress as well. (Moghadam 2013:66-67)  
The discussion of the “right kind of woman” has been prevalent in both post-revolutionary 
societies of Egypt and Tunisia, and in the case of Egypt this patriarchal nationalism 
intertwined with (moderate) religiosity has been especially visible. In this framework, the 
emergence of a center seems unlikely. Old debates about identity and the state have 
resurfaced, and the two countries have had to recreate themselves – or at least try to. 
Recently, Ennahda has rebranded itself by changing their description from “Islamist” to 
“Muslim Democrat”, drawing comparisons between the Christian Democrats of Europe. The 
new label was accepted by a landslide, and it’s meant to reflect the “a forward-looking 
 
 
democratic reformist party rooted in Islamic values”. (Sherwood 24.10.2016, the Guardian) 
They have been active proponents of a revolutionary bill on violence against women (more in 
5.1.1). They don’t exactly seem like the heinous enemies of women’s rights as some paint 
them. It’s possible that the new freedom and democracy that Tunisians have experienced is 
forcing them to find common ground, a center – when the state is not oppressing opposition 
forces, people have to find a way to get along. The shift in Ennahda’s policy might be an 
indicator of radicalism or idealism – however you wish to view them - as political forces 
becoming more pragmatic – and creating a center. 
5.1. After the Revolution – Tunisia 
 
Tunisian women were an integral part of the revolution, and in addition to demanding human 
rights and freedom for all citizens, they kept in mind and voiced their concerns over their own 
status; “No democracy without equality” was the slogan of female activists. This was 
exceptional, since women have often had to put their wishes on hold in order to work with 
male activists. Tunisian women were adamant about their inclusion, which might be why the 
results of the revolution were better for the country and the women than in many other cases. 
In Tunisia, women refused to let go of the power they fought hard to get before and during the 
revolution, demanding to be heard. Hamza suggests that Tunisian women learnt from the 
failures of past revolutions and movements in France, Algeria and Iran, and managed to break 
the cycle (Hamza 2016:214-215).  
In the 2013 edition of her book Moghadam is quite hesitant about making any grand 
declarations about the outcome of Tunisia’s revolution, which is understandable – after all, 
the book was published a short time after the revolution itself and Tunisia was still in the 
progress of making its changes. To this day people still talk about Tunisia’s “democratization 
progress”, because the work is far from over. A country and people that lived under 
dictatorship for decades cannot change overnight. 
In 2017, it’s safe to draw some conclusions about the revolution, and many aspects point 
towards putting Tunisia in the category of emancipatory revolutions: the legislation was 
changed to treat women more fairly and in politics women were represented even better than 
before. However, in some ways the situation has not gotten better. 
 
 
As it did elsewhere, the euphoria of the revolution quickly turned into a harsh reality after 
Ben Ali was expelled. Tunisia experienced violent and turbulent times, women’s harassment 
in public spaces increased. Gender activists were being harassed and intimidated, and 
women’s inclusion took a turn for the worse as women were underrepresented in the 
provisional government and other transitional institutions. (Hamza 2016:215) The current 
terrorist threat also poses its challenges to Tunisia’s fledgling democracy. 
Tunisian feminists have remained vigilant after the revolution, and the rise of Islamists has 
caused concern among some of them. According to an article written by Khadija Arfaoui, 
known Tunisian feminist, and Valentine Moghadam, Tunisian feminists have been “concerned 
that some of the gender rhetoric of radical Islamists is a form of symbolic violence” (Arfaoui & 
Moghadam 2016:2). Nabila Hamza also writes that Tunisian women were “concerned with the 
rise of Islamist parties” that did give some progressive statements about women’s rights, but 
also contradicted themselves with statements that many women considered threatening and 
caused them to suspect the motives of said Islamist parties (Hamza 2016:215).  
In her article in Women’s Movements in Post-“Arab Spring” North Africa, Arfaoui takes an even 
harder stance and states that, 
 “The lack of a solid, unified front allowed al-Nahda5 […] to take over, establish 
shari’a (Islamic law), and eradicate women’s rights, except those of reproduction 
and housework.” (Arfaoui 2016:223) 
The only thing standing in Ennahda’s way were various women’s NGOs who were there to 
stop these developments (Arfaoui 2016:223). Later, she says, 
“Under al-Nahda, the new constitution was written by a majority of Islamist 
constituents, whose program was part of a huge plot meant to create an Islamist 
state crossing frontiers and nations.” (Arfaoui 2016:224) 
Arfaoui and Hamza are both Tunisian, and their comments are drastically different from other 
scholars who can, perhaps, maintain a more objective and neutral stance. I already wrote 
about the role of Islamists after the Arab Spring, but I’m including these quotes to emphasize 
and explain the worry and commitment of Tunisian women’s rights activists and the attitude 
against Islamists that many of them share. The relationship between Islamists and secularists 
is highly relevant in Tunisia. 
                                                       
5 Another – more rare - spelling of Ennahda. 
 
 
In the next chapters I present the changes in legislation, politics and society that Tunisia 
experienced after the revolution. The issue of Islamists has had a huge effect on Tunisian 
politics and Tunisian life, and it still remains pertinent. The revolution resulted in many 
changes for women, and I will put the revolution into the framework of Moghadam’s theory in 
chapter 6. In other words, after reviewing both Egypt and Tunisia, I will place them into the 
categories of patriarchal and emancipatory based on the outcomes as presented in this thesis. 
5.1.1. Legislation 
 
Big strides have been made in women’s rights since the revolution in 2011, especially in the 
field of legislation. Tunisia already had a constitution that was considered one of the most 
modern and equal in the area, and a personal status law which protected women’s interests, 
but the legislation had its flaws that were in some parts addressed after the revolution. 
The new constitution makes it the state’s obligation to protect and advance women’s rights. In 
2014, Tunisia withdrew its reservations on CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women), still maintaining, however, that some aspects might 
be rejected if they are in conflict with Islam (Universal Periodic Review Submission on Tunisia 
2.10.2016, HRW). Since late 2015, women have been allowed to travel out of the country with 
their children without the permission of the child’s father.  
Tunisia has not, however, ratified the Maputo protocol (also known as Protocol to the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa). In 2014, Human 
Rights Watch urged Tunisia to sign the protocol, amend the personal status code to ensure 
equality of genders, and devise a strategy to combat violence against women (Tunisia’s 2014 
Parliamentary Elections: A Human Rights Agenda, HRW 30.9.2014). A law on gender-based 
violence is still in progress, but underway, and the personal status code still retains some 
aspects that discriminate against women, for example in child custody. The draft of the law on 
domestic violence was submitted to the parliament in 2016, but I have been unable to find the 
results – if there are any. 
The way towards the post-revolution constitution was long and difficult, and included 
multiple drafts before the last one was accepted by the democratically elected People’s 
Assembly. One of the major disputes during the process was the status of women, as a draft of 
 
 
the constitution referred to women as “complementary” to men (Article 2.28, draft 
14.8.2012). After major backlash, the part was removed. 
The 2014 constitution, the result of the long battle, is devoted to human rights, and citizens’ 
rights are ensured. The citizens are guaranteed, for example, the right to life, health, culture, 
water, freedom of religion and opinion, and information. Droits de l’Homme is mentioned ten 
times in the French translation of the constitution (official translation in English is not 
available). The constitution often refers to men and women separately, specifying that the 
article applies to both male and female citizens (e.g. Tout citoyen et toute citoyenne a droit au 
travail – “All male and female citizens have the right to work”; article 40, translation mine). 
Discrimination based on disability is also forbidden (article 48). In spite of the constitution’s 
commitment to human rights, homosexuality is still illegal in Tunisia.  
In addition to the constitution, citizens’ rights are specified in the personal status code. The 
first one was promulgated in 1956, and guaranteed progressive rights to women. Since the 
code sets the legal parameters for the personal life of citizens, e.g. marriage, custody, etc., it 
has been especially important for women.  
The latest version of the personal status code was approved in 2014. The CSP (as it is often 
abbreviated after its French name, le code du statut personnel) makes domestic violence a 
criminal offence, allows women to seek compensation for it, and includes possibly the most 
progressive laws in the region regarding children born out of wedlock. In most Arab 
countries, these children have few - if any - rights, but Tunisian children receive a birth 
certificate, Tunisian citizenship and the mother’s surname if the father is unknown. If 
paternity is established, the father is required to give the child his surname and to pay child 
support. After the revolution, there seems to have been some calls to repeal this legislation; 
however, it still remains in place. (Combating Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls: 
Policies to Empower Women in the Arab Region 2013:24) 
Below is a comparison of the previous legislative documents and their 2014 counterparts to 
highlight the attention devoted to women in the new constitution. I have kept the French 
translations of the 2014 Constitution for those who are able to read French ; after them, I’ve 
provided my own translation. 
 
 
 
1959 Constitution (last amendment in 
2010); 
Personal status code 1956 
2014 Constitution 
No mentions of women in constitution; 
equality among citizens guaranteed 
(Constitution: Preamble, page 5) 
La famille est la cellule de base de la société. Il 
incombe à l’État de la protéger. (Art. 7) 
The family is the basis of society ; it is the 
State’s duty to protect it. 
Marriage can only be formed if both parties 
consent. (Art. 3, CSP) 
 
Both parties have to be 18 years of age, 
except under special and specified 
circumstances. (Art 5-8, CSP) 
Les citoyens et les citoyennes sont égaux en 
droits et en devoirs. Ils sont égaux devant la 
loi sans discrimination. (Art. 21)(gender-
specific!) 
Female citizens and male citizens are equal 
in their rights and responsibilities ; they are 
equal before the law, without discrimination. 
 L’État veille à garantir la représentativité de 
la femme dans les assemblées élues. (Art. 34) 
The State seeks to guarantee female 
representation in elected assemblies. 
 L’État s’engage à protéger les droits acquis de 
la femme et veille à les consolider et les 
promouvoir. L’État garantit l’égalité des 
chances entre l’homme et la femme pour 
l’accès aux diverses responsabilités et dans 
tous les domaines. L’État s’emploie à 
consacrer la parité entre la femme et l’homme 
dans les assemblées élues. L’État prend les 
mesures nécessaires en vue d’éliminer la 
violence contre la femme. (Art. 46) 
The State is committed to protecting the 
acquired rights of women, and seeks to 
consolidate and improve them. The State 
guarantees equality of opportunity in all 
areas. The State is devoted to parity between 
women and men in elected assemblies. The 
State takes necessary measures to eliminate 
violence against women. 
 
The new constitution shows commitment to ensuring and improving women’s rights. 
However, there still remains legislation to be amended as some parts of the personal status 
code have not been amended. For example, women still do not have an equal right to 
inheritance, and laws concerning child custody are also discriminatory; remarried women 
cannot have her children live with her, unlike remarried fathers. (Tunisia – Events of 2015, 
HRW World Report 2016) The Personal Status Code still includes a requirement of a dowry, 
although minimal and mostly symbolic (Article 3; see Assaulted and Accused:13).  
 
 
Article 23 states that husbands are the heads of the family, and that spouses must perform 
their “conjugal duties” according to custom. They are, however, expected to cooperate in 
matters related to the family – including financial affairs. This article mentioning conjugal or 
marital duties, together with Article 13 stating that the husband cannot compel his wife to 
sexual relations before the dowry is paid, is seen to allow marital rape; “conjugal duties” – i.e. 
sex - must be performed, and in case it isn’t, the husband can compel their wife, since the 
dowry has been paid. Marital rape is not explicitly prohibited, and the most common 
interpretation I have encountered is that marital rape is legal. The authorities, however, seem 
to disagree: in their response for questions posed by CEDAW in 2010, the statement given 
stated that marital rape was criminalized just as any form of rape, based on articles 227 and 
227bis of the Tunisian penal code (Code pénal – see Sources). (Assaulted and Accused 
2015:24) 
These aforementioned articles concerning “attacks on modesty” do criminalize rape if it 
happens using violence, using or threatening to use arms, and with or without the use of 
violence if the victim is less than 10 years old. The article only mentions consent in the case 
when the victim is less than 13 years of age; in other words, the age of consent is 13, before 
which the victim cannot consent. Article 227bis states that the rape of a girl under the age of 
15 – with or without the use of violence – is punishable, but a rape of a girl between ages 15 
and 20 can be resolved by the perpetrator marrying the victim. Abductions also factor into the 
punishments (Article 239; charges are dropped if the kidnapper marries the victim). As can be 
seen, the criminalization of rape is vague and not concerned with consent but the use of 
violence, and the grounds for prosecuting marital rape seem thin. A family judge interviewed 
by Amnesty agrees that articles 227 and 227bis allow prosecution of marital rape, but that it 
happens very rarely – if ever. Sex is considered a duty in marriage, and even the penal code 
makes it seem like it can only happen outside of marriage – although, to be fair, the articles 
are vague. According to Amnesty, some cases have been prosecuted for physical violence. 
(Assaulted and Accused 2015:24, Code pénal articles 227 and 227bis) 
While compiling their report, Amnesty received information from Tunisian officials on rape 
and other forms of sexual violence (including sexual harassment). Based on the numbers they 
received, numbers of rape and attempted rape of girls under the age of 18 have gone down – 
or they’re merely reported rarely. In 2010, the number of reported cases was 50, decreasing 
steadily (except for a spike in 2013 when 42 cases were reported), and ending in 28 in 2014. 
 
 
Cases of abduction of girls under 18 have gone up (57 in 2010, 94 in 2014 – and none in 
2013), whereas under “eloping with a minor” the numbers remain steady (44 in 2010 and 40 
in 2014). Looking at the numbers given to Amnesty, it can be seen that the numbers on 
abductions of girls are exactly same as cases of rape and attempted rape; 28 in 2014, 42 in 
2013, 29 in 2012, 34 in 2011 and 50 in 2010. (Assaulted and Accused 2015:28) I’m not sure 
what conclusions to draw from this, but it is suspicious. Are all rapes treated as abductions as 
well? Do all abductions entail rape or attempted rape? In any case, it’s obvious that these 
numbers don’t reflect reality.  
The US Department of State’s Country Report on Tunisia states that rape is a taboo and an 
underreported subject. The report also states that the government enforces laws on rape, 
although reports of it were few and convictions below the number of incidents – suggesting 
that not all alleged rapes resulted in convictions, which is normal up to a certain point. 
(Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 - Tunisia, US Department of State) The 
numbers given to Amnesty probably show the number of complaints filed with the police, and 
seeing – for example - that a 2010 study conducted by the Tunisian Office of Family and 
Population (ONFP) showed thatabout 7,5% of women had experienced sexual violence during 
the last year, the actual number of rape victims per year should be in the thousands6 (Rapport 
enquête nationale sur la violence à l’égard des femmes en Tunisie 2010).  
The point is that rape is much more common than the numbers the government is giving out, 
which doesn’t necessarily mean that they’re lying – there are multiple reasons to not report a 
rape, starting from the fact that rape is a taboo. According to Amnesty International’s report, 
Tunisian rape victims face harassment if they report the crime. One victim, upon reporting a 
rape by two police officers, was charged with “indecency”. Victims of sexual and domestic 
violence are blamed and accused for the crime committed against them, rejected by their 
community, while the criminals may walk free. There is even a term for this – victim-blaming -
, and it’s unfortunately common everywhere in the world. Tunisian women are locked in 
abusive marriages and encouraged to continue in them, so as not to bring shame to the family. 
(Assaluted and Accused, Amnesty:4) 
                                                       
6 There are currently about 11 million Tunisians. Assuming that women make up about half of the population, 
the number of women is 5,5 million. 7,5% out of 5,5 million 412 500. I’m not an expert in rape statistics but it is 
clear that rape is very common and largely underreported.  
 
 
Gender-based violence in general is extremely common: 47% Tunisian women have 
experienced violence, and of these women one in six has suffered sexual violence. These 
numbers are, however, from 2010 when state officials conducted a survey on gender-based 
violence, although according to the Guardian, “there is little evidence” that the situation has 
gotten better since the revolution (Sherwood 24.10.2016, the Guardian). CREDIF, the agency 
dedicated to study issues related to women, conducted a study between 2012 and 2015 in 
gender based harassment in public spaces, and the study discovered that 53,5% of women 
had been subjected to psychological (i.e. being followed) or physical harassment. 41% had 
experienced physical violence in public. According to these numbers, the situation has 
actually deteriorated since the revolution. (Marzouk 8.6.2016, TunisiaLive) 
In 2016, the parliament was handed a draft law to eliminate violence against women. The 
draft, submitted by the Ministry of Women and Family, is aimed at, 
 “all forms of gender-based violence directed against women by any perpetrator, 
whatever form it takes, without discrimination on the basis of birth […]” etc. 
(Nadhif 11.8.2016, Al Monitor)  
In practice, the law would touch on all forms of violence, including economic abuse, and would 
be incorporated into other government policies; marital rape would be outlawed; and rapists 
would no longer be able to escape punishment by marrying their victims. Penalties for sexual 
harassment would also follow, and police officers would be trained on gender issues. The bill 
was expected to pass by the end of 2016, but I haven’t been able to find an update. (Sherwood 
24.10.2016, the Guardian; Nadhif 11.8.2016, Al-Monitor) 
According to the Guardian, the bill has been supported and championed by Ennahda, the 
moderate Islamist party, and might therefore challenge common notions of Islam. An MP of 
the party stated, “We see no contradiction between Islam and protecting women’s rights. We 
have a progressive reading of Islam”. The change in legislation is not enough for the active 
proponents of this bill who want to change attitudes and eventually, society at large. In this 
endeavor, changing the legislation is only the first step. (Sherwood 24.10.2016, the Guardian). 
In Tunisia, the wearing of the niqab and the hijab were banned in education establishments 
and state offices, and both presidents sought to eradicate it entirely. Bourguiba reportedly 
called the hijab “a miserable rag” (Smadhi & Joyce 26.4.2014, Al-Jazeera). During Ben Ali, the 
persecution of veiled women continued and women were forced to remove their headscarves 
before entering universities, workplaces, and sometimes while on the street (Amnesty 
 
 
International Report 2008 - The State of The World’s Human Rights 2008:301). After the 
revolution, the restrictions were lifted, but new ones have been placed since 2014. (Smadhi & 
Joyce 26.4.2014, Al-Jazeera) Veiling divides feminists: some believe its inherently patriarchal 
and oppressive, while others support women’s right to choose their own clothes. Penalizing 
one form or another of clothing – especially since it’s only women’s clothing that’s a political 
issue - does not seem to respect women’s freedom of expression or their personal choices. 
The government argued that the niqab can be used as a disguise by terrorists (Smadhi & Joyce 
26.4.2014, Al-Jazeera). 
In many ways, Tunisian legislation is friendly to women and progressive. The problem with 
legislation is, however, its implementation. The progressiveness of a law makes little 
difference if it is not actually followed and penalized. Something is off if crimes are not 
reported, and that is at the root of the problem – violence against women is something that 
legislation cannot eradicate, but it definitely helps. Tunisia still has some problems regarding 
human rights, and the difficult situation after the terrorist attacks of 2015 resulted in a long 
state of emergency. The constitution and legislation are not perfectly in line with each other, 
which means the work must continue.7 
5.1.2. Politics 
 
“It was a battle between, on the one hand, secular groups who wished to 
maintain and even promote the advanced status of women and, on the other 
hand, Islamist and Salafist forces, who wished to break with the past, which they 
perceived as too Westernized, corrupting of Tunisia’s Arab-Islamic background, 
authoritarian, and undemocratic. This unfolding confrontation formed the 
backdrop of the process of drafting a constitution, amid anxiety surrounding the 
place of Islam in the new political system.” (Hamza 2016:217) 
The above quote from Nabila Hamza wraps up the spirit of the post-revolution era and the 
difficult discussion around women’s rights, Islam, and the future of the Tunisian people. This 
conflict penetrates every discussion about Tunisia, and it seems that Islam is never absent 
from them. The conflict between Tunisian political forces cannot be overemphasized – Tunisia 
was close to complete chaos very soon after the revolution - it experienced turmoil, and even 
political assassinations of opposition leaders Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, which 
                                                       
7 More information on the situation of human rights in Tunisia e.g. Universal Periodic Review Submission – 
Tunisia, HRW 2016.  
 
 
shocked and shook the Tunisian people, and the country seemed to deteriorate further8. In 
the end, Tunisia ended up better than one might have expected, and the Nobel-winning 
committee of peace brokers is one of the actors responsible for it. The above quote indicates 
that there might have been some forces who wished to return to tradition instead of adhering 
to – in their opinion - Westernized modernity. Tunisian national identity was re-defined, but 
not in such negative and contentious terms as in the revolutions of Algeria and Iran where the 
West was clearly an enemy and traditional culture and religion the solution. Instead of 
“returning” to old times, Tunisians chose to look forward.  
The first months after the revolution were marked by instability, continuing protests and 
political leaders changing frequently. The formulation of a new constitution started with the 
establishment of National Constituent Assembly. 57 women were elected to the Constituent 
Assembly out of 217 representatives (26,3 %)9, which was disappointing, seeing that the 
number and input of female activists during the revolution was equal to that of men (Hamza 
2016:216). Out of the 7 million eligible voters (all citizens over the age of 18), 4,4 million 
registered as voters, and 75% of those actually voted. The elections were deemed fair and 
transparent by the observers. The elections were won by the moderate Islamist party 
Ennahda with 89 seats. (IPU Parline)  
The process went through many hardships, and the country was nearing a crisis. Women and 
women’s organizations also had their complaints, especially when the 2012 draft included a 
part where women were referred to as “complementary” to men within the family. This 
complementarité was vigorously protested against as it denied women’s agency and 
independence from men, and in the end the adopted constitution of 2014 recognizes women 
and men as equals (Article 46). Article 21 of the 2014 constitution states the following: 
“All male and female citizens have the same rights and duties. They are equal before 
the law without discrimination.”  
The 2014 parliamentary elections resulted in the secular Nidaa Tounes (or Nida Tunis) party 
winning with what the Guardian called “an explicitly anti-Islamist platform.” Nidaa Tounes 
ended up with 85 seats out of 217, and the Islamists still finished second with 69 seats. 
                                                       
8 A man suspected of radical Salafism was suspected of both assassinations. Before his death, Belaid received 
multiple death threats and reportedly stated "All those who oppose Ennahda become the targets of violence”. 
(Tunisia: Chokri Belaid assassination prompts protests 6.2.2013, BBC;, Morris 6.2.2013, the Independent UK)  
9 There are some discrepancies to be found here; some sources (e.g. Hamza 2016:216) claim the number was 49 
women (22,6%). In any case, the representation of women was probably somewhere between 22-27%.  
 
 
Ennahda’s loss can be seen as a battle between political Islam and secularism, but according 
to the Guardian, analysts viewed the results as a consequence of Ennahda’s poor performance 
on economy and fulfilling the revolution’s promises. (Tunisia election results: Nida Tunis wins 
most seats, sidelining Islamists 30.10.2014, the Guardian). After these elections, women made 
up 31% of the parliament with 68 out of 217 seats (in 2011 57 out of 217). 
Tunisia continues to observe a gender quota system for parliamentary representation, and 
this was included in the constitution as well, although not in a very clear or binding way. 
According to Article 46 of the 2014 constitution,  
“[The state guarantees] equality of opportunities between women and men to 
have access to all levels of responsibility and in all fields. The state seeks to 
achieve equal representation for women and men in elected councils.” 
(translation from constitutionnet.org, link in sources).  
According to the new electoral law of May 2014, gender parity is to be realized and 
guaranteed, although it was not required that the heads of lists should alternate between men 
and women in order to ensure that more women would be elected. Women and men alternate 
on the list, but as mentioned women rarely stand at the top of the list (Ohman 2016:10, 
constitutionnet.org). Due to the closed-list system, parties are more important than individual 
candidates, and women’s placement on the list dictates the results for them. In June 2016, this 
changed when the government adopted a law requiring alternating female and male heads on 
the lists (Universal Periodic Review Submission on Tunisia 2.10.2016, HRW).  
Since the electoral law of 2014 mandates that all lists must have an equal number of men and 
women, political parties have essentially been forced to include women in their campaigns. 
Before the elections of 2014, the number of female candidates and registered female voters 
was high (51%). The presidential elections also had two female candidates, Amina Mansour 
al-Karoui and Kalthoum Kennou. In the end, only Kennou’s candidacy met the requirements 
set, and she became the first women in Tunisian history to run for president. (Hamza 
2016:218)  
It is to be noted that while Tunisia’s 31% representation is a good achievement and is much 
better than the global average, this number does not reflect women’s representation 
elsewhere – for example in the cabinet or in leadership positions in parliamentary committees 
(Ohman 2016:8). Also, while the percentage of women is relatively good, it’s only moderately 
better than in Ben Ali’s time – in 2009, women comprised 27% of elected members of 
 
 
parliament. During Ben Ali’s time, four ministries out of 41 had female heads; the number 
currently is three, which is not much worse but still a very low number. (Hamza 2016:216) 
The World Bank estimates the percentage of women in ministerial level positions in 2015 was 
10,5%, and the percentage of female ministers 11,11% (Gender Data Portal – Tunisia, the 
World Bank). The positions these women were appointed in are also noteworthy; as usual, the 
Minister of Women, Family and Children; Minister of Tourism and Handicrafts; and Minister 
of Culture. 
The latest government, however, was accepted by the parliament in late August 2016. Due to 
the changes brought by the forming of a new government, four women rose to the parliament, 
further increasing the percentage of female MPs to 33,6%. Detailed and trustworthy sources 
on parliaments and governments in Tunisia and Egypt are often hard to find, or they don’t 
specify the gender divisions in political offices. However, based on Tunisian websites, the 
number of female ministers also increased in 2016. The current government includes six 
female ministers and two female secretaries of state – eight in total out of 26 ministers and 14 
secretaries of state, comprising therefore 20% of all cabinet members. While the previous 
female ministers were responsible for areas that can be seen as traditionally feminine – 
handicrafts, family, and culture -, the newly appointed secretaries of state are in charge of 
health, finance, development, investments and international cooperation as well as energy, 
mining and renewable energy. The new government is also remarkably young: Prime Minister 
Chahed was 40 years old at the time of his appointment, while Saida Ounissi, Secretary of 
State for professional training and employment was 29 years of age – and a woman. Five 
members of Chahed’s cabinet are under 35 years of age.10  
It’s obvious that there is still work to be done – Tunisia has many competent, educated and 
experienced women, and a good representation in parliament, but they are disproportionately 
underrepresented in higher positions. However, the trend is positive: the percentage of 
women in parliament and in government has increased steadily since the revolution, and the 
current numbers – 34% and 20% - are a noteworthy achievement. It is also remarkable how 
many advances have been made since the revolution, and Tunisian feminists can almost sigh 
                                                       
10 I’m providing sources in this footnote as an exception because it would take too much space in the chapter 
itself: Tunisia's new government wins parliamentary approval, Al-Jazeera 27.8.2016;  
Chahed‘s cabinet: 26 ministers and 14 secretaries of state, Agence Tunis Afrique Presse 20.8.2016; Zayat 
25.9.2016, the Arab Weekly; Focus sur les femmes du nouveau gouvernement, qui sont-elles? [Part III], Femmes de 
Tunisie.com 23.8.2016. 
 
 
from relief – the trend of including women has only grown stronger in the years after the 
revolution, and political leaders seem committed to improve the status ad representation of 
women. 
In the non-governmental sector, well-established feminist organizations, specifically ATFD 
and AFTURD, were key actors in post-revolutionary times, and were possibly one of the 
reasons why Tunisian women made more gains than many their counterparts elsewhere in 
the Arab world. Comparing to other revolutions in history, Tunisians were successful in this 
regard, and the status and experience of Tunisian feminist organizations seems to have been a 
positive influence. The new free atmosphere also made it possible for Tunisians to start new 
organizations, which they did very proactively. The number of NGOs practically exploded as 
Tunisians exercised their new political rights, and many of these organizations devoted 
themselves to shaping the future of the country. Giulia Daniele wrote an article in 2014 
studying the role and effect of Tunisian women’s organizations, and concluded that,  
“Overall, the Tunisian uprising can be represented in terms of a remarkable case 
in which civil society, including the women's organizations, has played a useful 
and effective role at a political and social level, ensuring the emergence of a 
feasible alternative pathway.“ (Daniele 2014:16)  
The development from pre-revolutionary times has been positive: women’s representation in 
politics has gotten better as the number of female MPS rose (moderately, but still), and 
women voted and participated as candidates actively. The new constitution ensures their 
rights and orders the state to act in their best interest. Women have remained vocal activists, 
and have participated in many organizations, many of which are new, while others, already 
established organizations, had an important and effective role during and after the revolution. 
Tunisian women still face many problems, but as I’ve said, the tendency seems to be positive. 
As Hamza says,  
“[…]no final victory has been won, but all ingredients are there for social and civil 
equality between the sexes in Tunisia, and above all, for women’s voices to be 
heard in their determination to build a better future for Tunisian women and the 
country in general.” (Hamza 2016:219)  
 
 
 
 
5.1.3.  Society  
 
Unemployment was one of the instigators behind the Arab Spring, and it remains a problem. 
Women’s unemployment, however, is even greater than men’s: in 2016, the numbers were 
27,4% for women and 15% for men. According to the Ministry of Professional Education and 
Employment, the difference is even more drastic between men and women who have 
completed tertiary education, with unemployment rates of 22-50% for women and 15% for 
men (Tunisie: 40% des femmes diplômées du supérieur sont au chômage, HuffPost Maghreb 
1.3.2017). Women’s overall participation in the labor force remains low (only 28%) compared 
to men’s participation, which is 76%. (Global Gender Gap Report 2016 – Tunisia, WEF 2016) 
The rate of unemployment was 15% in 2015, which is very high (ILOSTAT). In 2016, Tunisia 
was ranked 126th in the WEF’s Global Gender Gap Report, scoring low in economic 
participation, for example in labor force participation. In comparison, Tunisia scored quite 
high in political participation and education (ranking at 71 and 106, respectively). (Global 
Gender Gap Report 2016, WEF 2016) 
The Human Development Report of 2016 placed Tunisia at 97 (in the category of high human 
development), and its gender inequality index was 0.289 in 2015. These numbers alone mean 
nothing, but compared to others they tell us that Tunisia is doing relatively well in the areas 
that the GII measures – reproductive health, empowerment and the labor market11. Based on 
GII, Tunisia is bumped up to number 58 – a remarkably good achievement. Tunisia’s GII has 
gotten steadily better, and the trend has continued since the revolution – although it seems 
that the development is a bit stalled at the moment. Tunisia’s GII places the country in the 
second best category (out of four) together with most Eastern European countries, the United 
States, and – quite surprisingly – Saudi Arabia. (HDR 2015 GII, 2016:215; see Attachment 1: 
Statistics)  
The Gender Inequality Index is a part of the Human Development Index, and through it one 
can get a more specific focus on women as a group. The Gender Development Index, also a 
part of HDI,  
                                                       
11 “HDRO calculations based on data from maternal mortality ratio, adolescent birth rate, share of seats in 
parliament, population with at least some secondary education and labour force participation rate”, Gender 
Inequality Index (GII), UNDP.  
 
 
“[…] measures gender gaps in human development achievements by accounting 
for disparities between women and men in three basic dimensions of human 
development—health, knowledge and living standards […]”. (Gender 
Development Index (GDI), UNDP) 
In other words, GDI is women’s Human Development Index compared to that of men’s. The 
Human Development Index highlights aspects of people’s lives instead of just focusing on the 
countries’ GDP, measuring the health and well-being of the citizens of each country. 
Therefore, is women’s HDI is lower than that of men’s, it’s proof of inequality between the 
sexes. 
The countries faring best in this area have a GDI close to 1; for example, Norway, ranked 
number one in the Human Development Report, has a GDI of 0.993 and is therefore placed 
into the best category of five, the divisions made based on deviation from gender parity. 
Whereas Tunisia’s GII was quite good and the country reached the second-best category, its 
GDI places it in category four out of five: the HDI of Tunisian women was 0.680 compared to 
0.753 of men, making Tunisia’s GDI 0.904. Tunisian women fare equally well or even better 
than men in the categories of life expectancy and expected years of schooling, coming up short 
in mean years of schooling and losing in estimated GNI, which was 4662 dollars per capita 
compared to Tunisian men’s GNI of 15 967 dollars – a huge difference. The conclusion that 
can be drawn here – once again -, is that the economic opportunities of Tunisian women are 
far worse than those of their male counterparts. (HDR 2016, GDI 2015) Overall, Tunisia’s HDI 
has risen steadily from 1990, although the progress has slowed down (HDR country profiles, 
Tunisia; see Attachment 1: Statistics) 
Tunisia fared well in a poll conducted by the Thomson Reuters Foundation – out of 22 Arab 
countries that were studied, Tunisia was the 6th best country for women. The results 
highlighted the high number of women in parliament and Tunisian family law. (POLL: 
Women’s Rights in the Arab World, Thomson Reuters Foundation 12.11.2013) 
Illiteracy is not as prevalent as in Egypt, for example, but women’s literacy rates are slightly 
lower than men’s. Among young people (15 to 24 years old), 98% of men were literate 
compared to 96% of women in 2010. Among older people, the difference between men and 
women has been more pronounced, but the situation has gotten slightly better: in 2010, the 
rate of illiteracy was 71% for women and 86% for men; in 2016, 73% of women were literate 
compared to 90% of men. Women are also more educated than men, and dominate some 
 
 
industries. In 2013 and 2014, 30% of engineers, 42% of medical doctors, and 53% of 
pharmacists were women. Education and literacy can’t, therefore, be the reason for the 
troubles Tunisian women face in the labor market. (UNICEF country profiles; Assaulted and 
Accused 2015:12, WEF Global Gender Gap Reports 2010 and 2016; see Attachment 1: 
Statistics) 
Tunisia has been included in the World Value Survey only in Wave 6. The World Value Survey 
is an organization of social scientists who study the values and beliefs in nearly one hundred 
countries and their development over the years. In Tunisia, the survey took place in 2013, and 
therefore it is not possible to compare the results from before and after the revolution as I do 
in the corresponding chapter concerning Egypt. However, the results surely tell us something 
about the values of post-revolution Tunisia. 
The figures below represent the percentage of people who view the mentioned aspect as 
“very important” in their lives. As we can see, Tunisians value family and religion very highly, 
although friends and leisure time are also important for them. Politics, however, is not as 
important. 
    2013 
Family All 97,6 
  men 97,5 
  women 97,7 
Friends All 48,2 
  men 51,6 
  women 44,5 
Leisure time All 36 
  men 38,6 
  women 33,1 
Politics All 19,3 
  men 21,3 
  women 17 
Religion All 95,4 
  men 94,3 
  women 96,7 
 
Below are the percentages of people are those who agreed strongly with the given statement. 
Less than half of the interviewed people think that men are naturally better political leaders 
or business executives, equal rights between men and women were not considered very 
 
 
important for democracy, and the attitudes towards divorce are apparently still very hostile, 
and it is not considered to be acceptable. Tunisians’ attitudes towards violence in the family 
were, however, not very accepting. Unsurprisingly, women considered violence against the 
wife to be “never justifiable” more than men. (Wave 6 (2010-2014) - Tunisia 2013, World Value 
Survey; to compare the results with Egypt’s, see Attachment 1: Statistics) 
 
      
Men make better political leaders All 40,6 
  men 45,3 
  women 35,4 
Men make better business 
executives All 33,9 
  men 43,5 
  women 23,1 
Being a housewife is just as 
fulfilling as working for pay all 47,2 
  men 49,2 
  women 45 
It is essential for democracy that 
women have the same rights as 
men all 36,4 
  men 26,8 
  women 47,1 
Divorce is always justifiable all 6,2 
  men 6,5 
  women 6 
Divorce is never justifiable all 40,6 
  men 36,6 
  women 45 
Man beating his wife is always 
justifiable All 1,8 
  men 3 
  women 0,5 
Man beating his wife is never 
justifiable All 67,8 
  men 57,6 
  women 79,2 
 
According to the Guardian, Tunisia is “a country of contradictions when it comes to women’s 
rights”. Women have access to free contraception and abortion, and as many as 30% of the 
 
 
country’s engineers are women. However, in the rural societies the people follow traditional 
rules and customs. According to Amnesty’s report Assaulted and Accused, women’s word is not 
equal to that of a man’s when it comes to accusations of domestic violence. Raped women 
bring “dishonor” to their families, victims of domestic violence are pressured to drop their 
claims, and violence in the family is seen as “normal”. This becomes evident in the conviction 
rate as well: only 10% of prosecuted cases of domestic violence ended in convictions. 
(Sherwood 24.10.2016, the Guardian) The Truth and Dignity Commission, committed to find 
justice after the Ben Ali rule, states that they have received 15 000 complaints of rape, torture 
and degradation under the regimes of Ben Ali and Bourguiba. (Assaulted and Accused:11-12)  
A 2015 study by UGTT found that 32% of all women experienced physical violence, 29% 
experienced psychological abuse or harassment, and 16% experienced sexual violence. A 
large number of these abuses happen inside a marriage, and while the legislation on domestic 
violence exists, it’s rarely and poorly enforced. (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
2016 - Tunisia, US Department of State) These numbers correspond almost perfectly with 
numbers of the 2010 study conducted by the Ministry of Family, which suggests that violence 
has not increased in Tunisia (Rapport enquête nationale sur la violence à l’égard des femmes en 
Tunisie 2010:39). However, the numbers do not correspond with a study conducted by 
CREDIF, who found that 53,5% of Tunisian women had experienced physical or psychological 
harassment in public places between the years of 2011 and 2015. 78% of these women said 
that they had experienced psychological violence, while over 75% said that the violence they 
had experienced had been sexual in nature. Over 24% stated they had experienced it more 
than ten times during these four years. (Marzouk 8.6.2016, TunisiaLive) The different studies 
are difficult compare because they focused on different areas; for example, ONFP’s 2010 study 
focused on the type of violence and on violence inside the family.  
CREDIF’s study seems to, therefore, show an increase in violence against women: in 2010, 
46,7% of women had experienced any kind of violence in their lifetime, while according to 
CREDIF’s study, 53,5% of women had experienced violence in public during the last four years 
(Marzouk 8.6.2016, Tunisia Live). Unfortunately, this study is currently only available in 
Arabic and I haven’t therefore been able to study it closely.  
Foreign Policy, on the other hand, wrote in 2016 that in spite of Tunisia’s progressive 
personal status code and a freshly promulgated constitution, domestic abuse is as prevalent 
as ever. According to the article, the acts go unpunished mostly because women don’t report 
 
 
them. In a country where domestic violence is criminalized and roughly one third of women 
suffer from it, reporting a family member – often a husband – is discouraged. Social stigma 
and pressure from both family members and even law enforcement makes it difficult for 
women to seek legal action. A Tunisian member of parliament interviewed for the story states 
that the problem is not legislation, but the mentality of the Tunisian people. She says, as I have 
elsewhere in this thesis, that the legislation is not the problem – implementation is. She also 
suggests some solutions to combat the problem: NGOs have an important role in changing 
attitudes, and the state should do its part in educating the people and offer help. Women can’t 
escape their abuse – legal action is not a valid option, and neither is divorce, which is also 
heavily stigmatized. (Ghribi 7.8.2016, Foreign Policy)  
Instead of turning to the police, women often go to their families for help. Their families, 
however, prioritize the marriage over the welfare of the abused. Over a half of the abused 
women interviewed by Amnesty International stated that they did not report the abuse 
because it was an “ordinary occurrence which does not deserve to be talked about”. Women 
are expected to bear in silence the abuse, seen as a normal part of life and marriage. ONFP’s 
2010 study found that a great part of violence happens inside the family, which means that 
the abused might have nobody to turn to. (Ghribi 7.8.2016, Foreign Policy; Assaulted and 
Accused 2015:18, Enquête Nationale sur la Violence à l’Egard des Femmes en Tunisie 2010 
2011:42) 
In addition to divorce being socially unacceptable, women often lack the financial means to 
support themselves and, therefore, lack the means to escape the marriage. The lack of 
women’s shelters also makes it difficult to escape the abuse, especially since it seems that 
their family members are often not very sympathetic to their situation. Divorce can be 
obtained on mutual consent, with proof of harm, or without grounds. The first one is the 
easiest, while a divorce with proof of harm means a lengthy legal process, and the last means 
that the instigator of the divorce pays all costs. To ensure financial security and “spousal 
maintenance” (i.e. alimony), women must seek for a harm-based divorce – and prove the 
abuse. According to Amnesty International’s study, women only seek legal remedies as a last 
resort. For the study, Amnesty interviewed experts; one which, a lawyer offering legal help 
the victims of domestic abuse, explained the atmosphere in Tunisia: 
 
 
“A woman is always responsible for her victimhood even if the husband beats 
her, cheats on her or drinks. Divorce is always her fault.” (Assaulted and Accused 
2015:20) 
It is therefore not very surprising that reports of violence are rare (roughly 5100 – 5500 
annually between 2010 and 2013), and the majority of them are withdrawn or dismissed, 
after which the investigation is dropped. In 2012-2013, only 28,9% of the accepted 
complaints resulted in a conviction. The biggest reason for women dropping their claims is 
their financial dependence on their husbands. Instead of guaranteeing legal procedure, police 
often become mediators in domestic assault cases, and can make the perpetrator sign a 
commitment in which he promises to stop hurting their spouse. These documents ”[…] have 
no legal standing and are largely ineffective”. According to Amnesty, the police also fails to 
inform the victims of their rights, and education and aid are therefore on the shoulders of 
NGOs dedicated to the cause. (Assaulted and Accused 2015:21-22) 
Interestingly, ONFP’s 2010 study found that divorced women had sustained violence more 
often than other groups. For example, while 21% of married women had experienced physical 
violence, the number was 59% for divorced women. However, the study suggests that women 
confronted with continuous abuse end up getting divorced, and the level of violence 
experienced by divorced women during the last 12 months is much lower than other women. 
(Rapport enquête nationale sur la violence à l’égard des femmes en Tunisie 2010 2011:42, 48-
49) This would suggest that divorce does ameliorate the situation of abused women, but 
society’s stigma and economic grievances hinder them from obtaining one. 
According to Moghadam, the influence of Islamists has resulted in discussions of appropriate 
dress and an era of (re)veiling in all Muslims countries. Moghadam, as many other feminist 
scholars, is highly critical of Islamists. She writes about Salafists that emerged after the 
revolution, “asserting their right to influence policies and laws”, and advocating for the niqab 
(veil covering the face in addition to the hijab that covers the hair and sometimes neck) to be 
allowed in the university. She states that the amount of heavily veiled Tunisian women was 
unprecedented and tied to the assertiveness of the re-vitalized Islamic movements. The 
appearance of heavily veiled women was, however, undoubtedly partly due to the fact that 
veiling had been illegal since 1957 and its use was therefore possible for the first time in 50 
years. Moghadam’s interpretation seems to be that aggressive Islamists sought to take control 
of the society in Tunisia and elsewhere in the Muslim world; in my opinion this is based more 
on conjecture than evidence. She also states that veiling can be “regarded as affiliation with 
 
 
the values and goals of political Islam”12, but I don’t see the connection. Veiling can be a 
personal religious choice, not an endorsement of any political wing. (Moghadam 2013:70) 
A report by Pew Research Center found that Tunisia is the only country in the Middle East and 
North Africa where women face harassment over wearing religious dress. However, the same 
study also lists Tunisia among eight countries13 in the region where women face harassment 
over not wearing religious dress. (Restrictions on Women’s Religious Attire, Pew Research 
Center, 5.4.2016) 
The conclusion to draw from these different numbers and reports is that violence against 
women has been and continues to be a serious problem in Tunisia. There are also indicators 
that sexual harassment has become more prevalent after the revolution, but I’m hesitant 
about making any statements about it due to the lack of comparable evidence. It is evident 
that legislation needs to be further amended to support women, but implementation and 
attitudes of Tunisians continue to be the biggest obstacle in ending violence and 
discrimination against women. Some solutions for this were given in the chapters above; 
education for the people, support for victims of violence (e.g. shelters, help lines), and 
commitment from the justice system. Tunisia needs to continue on the path of ensuring a life 
free of violence for all people, regardless of their gender, sexual orientation, dress or political 
views.  
 
5.2. After the Revolution - Egypt 
 
In my opinion, to understand Egypt’s recent developments one must examine both the first 
revolution and the following counter-revolution; the first says a lot about Egypt’s atmosphere 
at the time, and although the people rejected the Islamist rule, their thoughts as well. The 
                                                       
12 She also says that veiling can be regarded as “an identity marker”, a sign of one’s piety, or as affiliation with 
political Islam. The sentence leaves room for interpretation, and to me it seems like the viewer makes the 
judgement; they either see the veil (or lack thereof) as a sign of identity and religion or as a sign of political 
affiliation, even though there is little ground to do so. Dress itself tells little of someone’s religious background, 
and regarding someone as an Islamist based on their clothing is, in my opinion, prejudiced.  
13 Both Israel and the Palestinian territories were included, as separate countries. According to the study, women 
in Egypt do not face harassment over dressing or not dressing according to religious code. Egypt’s religious 
plurality might have something to do with this; it would interesting to know whether Muslim women or 
Christian women (for example) experience pressure over the way they dress in their own communities.  
 
 
counter-revolution is a direct result of the Islamist regime, rising from the first revolution, and 
expressing in many ways a reaction to it. Therefore, it is necessary to understand both 
revolutions and their results. Mursi’s and the Muslim Brotherhood’s effect can still be seen in 
current Egyptian politics and society. 
In Egypt, the change in the atmosphere started already during the revolution – the protests 
and demonstrations had started as everyone’s project, but suddenly women were harassed 
and pushed off the streets – often literally and in a violent manner. Women were increasingly 
not welcome into the public sphere. This became obvious after the revolution. It was not the 
first time in history this has happened; women have always been welcome in the making of a 
revolution, but when the dust settles, men seek to regain control. This shift in attitudes and 
practices can be seen in France’s 1789 revolution, Iran’s 1979 revolution, Algeria 1962 – all of 
which were patriarchal revolutions -, and in Egypt.  
As we know from the previous chapters, the Arab Spring is not the first occasion in which this 
has happened – as Milton-Edwards points out, this kind of development was evident already 
in the nationalist struggles around Middle East and North Africa. Women’s rights have been 
irrelevant or at the very least expendable to revolutionaries throughout the ages. In the 
nationalist struggles, there never was a clear position regarding women’s rights (with Turkey 
as an exception), and the possible changes were postponed. This has always been the case 
with women who have been told that their time would come after the more pressing matters 
were taken care of - often this time never arrives. 
Nationalist struggles offered a role for women. However, women 
“[…] were consistently reminded that while their struggle must take second place 
to the larger fight for national independence and freedom against colonial rule, 
their freedom would come only when the people were freed from the yoke of 
colonialism and imperialism.” (Milton-Edwards 2000:176) 
This applies to most nationalist revolutions and independence struggles of the mid-1900s, 
and for this reason alone it can be argued that Egypt represents the patriarchal model of 
revolutions – the pattern is the same as in the patriarchal revolutions of the past. In some 
patriarchal revolutions women’s rights were outright rejected, as happened in France’s 1789 
revolution.  
Women’s rights weren’t prospering in Egypt before the revolution, but the fight for equal 
rights had been continuous and some progress had been made.  The revolutions demanded 
 
 
equality and freedom, and women assumed this meant equality and freedom for everyone. 
Sadly, they were soon proven wrong. Women’s rights were shown to be, once again, 
dispendable.  
It’s important to note that women can play a part in patriarchal revolutions and societies– as I 
said before, women’s interests vary, which means that some women may want things that can 
seem as counterproductive. For example, one of the MPs behind the attempts at legislation 
changes to lower the age of marriage, for example, was a female MP from the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Esfandiari 2012:3). Women are a part of patriarchal societies, and many of 
them wish to uphold the system. Women are not just passive objects, but agents of their own 
emancipation or tradition. Women have supported patriarchal values and protested 
vigorously against attempts to undercut them. Both of these aspects are evident in the Arab 
Spring, in Egypt as well as Tunisia. 
After Mubarak was ousted, the first round of parliamentary elections were organized in 
November 2011 and the second in January 2012. The 40 parties registered in the elections for 
the seats in the People’s Assembly were in practice divided into two blocs: the Democratic 
Alliance and the Egyptian Bloc. The former consisted of Islamist and non-Islamist parties, 
while the latter consisted of leftists and liberals. In the end, the Democratic Alliance, led by the 
Freedom and Justice Party formed by the Muslim Brotherhood, won two third of the seats, 
and the elections were deemed fair by international observers (IPU Parline). Elections for the 
Shoura Assembly were held shortly after, and the Freedom and Justice Party and its allies won 
106 of the 180 seats. Later in 2012 Mohamed Mursi was elected as president, and was 
therefore the first (and currently the only) democratically elected state head in Egypt. Mursi’s 
rule only lasted for a year, from June 2012 to early July 2013, when he was removed from 
office by a military coup after a wave of continuous and violent protests. One of the people 
behind the coup was General Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi, the Minister of Defense, who would later 
become president. Mursi is currently imprisoned and sentenced to death – a verdict that has 
been largely criticized internationally - , along with many of his fellow Brotherhood members.  
Sisi has proven to be as authoritarian as his predecessors, and his priorities are safety and 
stability. This has meant cracking down on journalists and activists as well as Islamists. The 
attacks against opposition forces have sometimes been violent, and often widely reported – 
although Sisi denies the results independent international organizations have gathered, 
saying that they are attempting to harm Egypt and its interests. Sisi has deflected all criticism, 
 
 
accusing “evil powers” with nefarious aims (Sisi deflects criticism over human rights record, 
says 'evil powers' aim to isolate Egypt 17.4.2016, Ahram Online), or stating that a “Western 
perspective” of human rights cannot be applied to Egypt (Samuels 5.5.2016, the Independent 
UK). A recent story by Al Jazeera, titled How Sisi is destabilising Egypt, accuses Sisi of 
“propagating alternative facts”, a term first used by President Trump’s team in the USA, using 
them to excuse human rights violations against “enemies of the state”. Sisi’s repression has 
gradually moved on from Islamists to include, for example, businessmen, journalists, as well 
as student and labor protests. Civi society in Egypt has very little room to work – according to 
Al Jazeera, Sisi has accused organizations working in human rights and democracy of 
scheming with the Muslim Brotherhood in an attempt to cause chaos in the country. 
(Hamzawy 2.4.2017, Al Jazeera English) 
Forced disappearances, murder, torture, freezing of funds and unfair prison sentences have 
been used against diverse groups of people, often in the name of counter-terrorism14. Protests 
are banned, as is the country’s largest opposition group the Muslim Brotherhood, many of 
whose members have been imprisoned and sentenced to death. Although homosexuality is 
not illegal in Egypt – unlike Tunisia -, multiple people have been arrested because of it, often 
under charges of “debauchery” Others have been imprisoned over charges of “defamation of 
religion”, while journalists and independent organizations are harassed, their funds frozen 
and some even imprisoned. (Amnesty International Annual Report 2015/2016 – The State of 
the World’s Human Rights 2016:145-149). 
Maybe the most egregious example of Sisi’s policy on human rights is the massacre of 2013, 
when Islamist protestors were fired at on multiple occasions, resulting in over 1150 deaths. 
The most famous and deathly occasion happened in the Rab’a square where at least 817 
people were killed. Human Rights Watch, among others, condemned the killings, calling them 
“serious violations of international human rights law” and even “crimes against humanity” (All 
According to Plan - The Rab’a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt, Human Rights 
                                                       
14 A new law was adopted in 2015 (law 94, 2015) that allows broad and vaguely defined measures for fighting 
terrorism. The President was granted power to take “necessary measures to ensure public order and security”. 
Special courts were also established and journalists were fined for reporting differently than the state. (Amnesty 
International Annual Report 2015/2016 – The State of the World’s Human Rights 2016:145) 
“An assembly law passed in November 2013 authorizes the Interior Ministry to forcibly disperse protests that 
they have not been approved in advance and to arrest demonstrators on vague grounds such as “attempt[ing] to 
influence the course of justice” or “imped[ing] citizen’s interests.”” HRW Rab’a massacre article 
 
 
Watch 12.8.2014). Egypt also still retains the death sentence. In spite of all this, Egypt is a 
member of the UN’s Human Rights Council.  
The situation is not advantageous to women’s rights, especially since women’s rights 
organizations have very few opportunities to work for their cause without fear of persecution, 
violence, or even death. In the next chapters I will look at changes in Egypt regarding women’s 
rights and status.  
5.2.1. Legislation 
 
For the parts about Egypt’s constitutions, current and past ones, I refer quite heavily to 
McLarney’s quite excellent chapter in Women’s Movements in Post-Arab Spring North Africa 
(2016). I have of course done my own research on the constitutions as well, but since 
McLarney has already conducted great research on this, I use her chapter extensively. 
Moushira Khattab’s chapter in the same book complements it quite fittingly. 
The constitution of Egypt is an important document, and its language is deeply meaningful. 
For example, in the 1956 and 1971 constitutions, shari’a was a main source of legislation, but 
in Sadat’s 1980 constitution it’s the main source of legislation. According to McLarney, the 
wording was changed to counteract the uproar caused by peace with Israel after the Camp 
David Accords, and the so-called “Jihan’s law” (1979) that introduced many reforms for 
Egyptian women (McLarney 2016:118). “Jihan” is Jihan Sadat, and as mentioned before, state 
feminism’s ties to the presidents’ wives are apparent.  
Egypt adopted a new constitution in 2012 in spite of wide-spread protests and criticism. 
Western media voiced its concerns over women’s rights under the new Islamist regime – in 
some ways, these concerns were legitimate and shared by many Egyptian women, but they 
also ignored some parts of the new constitution. For example, the constitution explicitly 
guaranteed “equality and equal opportunities for all citizens” – men and women alike. 
According to McLarney, the language related to gender of the 2014 constitution is almost 
identical to the 2012 constitution. In the 2012 constitution, “[…] the liberal language of 
women’s rights and equality converged with Islamist political aims”. (McLarney 2016:110-
111) 
 
 
Khattab points out some negative aspects of the constitution, especially how it was 
formulated. Instead of adapting the 1971 constitution based on the changes that were already 
introduced and accepted by the people, a new constitutional declaration (2011) was written 
hastily and was never brought to popular vote. Khattab also says that Article 11 of the 1971 
constitution, stating the commitment to bring a balance to women’s duties at work and inside 
the family, was removed together with the prohibition of gender-based discrimination, 
previously included in the article on non-discrimination. This was also when the gender quota 
for members of parliament was removed. Khattab’s interpretation of the events is that the 
Islamists pretty much took over the democratic transition, and caused all other forces (non-
Islamist women, churches) to leave the constitutional committee. (Khattab 2016:133-135) 
These changes were interpreted to signal the exclusion of women, and in line with this, 
women were chased off of Tahrir Square, harassed, and physically excluded from activism:  
“This incident brought down the curtain on the final act of a masterfully directed 
show where women were used for the political gains of others and then 
discarded when they sought the tiniest bit of recognition.” (Khattab 2016:134) 
This seems to be how many women felt at the time. McLarney argues that women’s rights 
activists might have overreacted to the 2012 constitution, but it is obvious that the tendency 
was not positive. The response from Egyptian women is important. 
Some problematic language has been preserved in multiple constitutions, such as the 
emphasis of women’s “duty” to her family, for example: “the state facilitates for women the 
agreement between her work in society and her duties to the family” (Article 19, 1956 
Constitution). This point was present (verbatim) in the constitutions of 1971, 2012 and 2014. 
A clause modeled after the 1971 constitution was entered into an early draft of the 2012 
constitution, stating that women are equal with men in public life15 when it doesn’t conflict 
with Islamic jurisprudence, but after public uproar this clause was removed. According to 
McLarney, this introduced a new dimension into the conflict between women’s rights in the 
public and in the family by bringing up religion as a possible restricting aspect. The 2012 
constitution, in spite of its liberal language in some parts, included unequal laws in regard to 
polygamy, divorce and testimony. (McLarney 2016:113-114) McLarney wraps up this 
                                                       
15 “The state shall guarantee the agreement between the duties of a woman toward her family and her work in 
society, considering her equal status with man in the fields of political, social, cultural, and economic life, without 
contravening the laws of Islamic shari’a”, Article 11:1971 
 
 
conflicting approach and reasons for it – accurately, in my opinion - with the following 
statement: 
“The authors of the 2012 constitution clearly aimed to thwart resilient 
assumptions about the incompatibility of Islam with gender equality. But they 
also wielded a long-developed discourse of gender equality in Islam as a political 
tool”. (McLarney 2016:114) 
The reasons for such a seemingly progressive attitude are manifold; possibly and probably 
genuine concern and will to give women and all citizens the rights they were believed to be 
entitled to; attempting to prove that Islam is not in conflict with women’s rights; or it may 
have been a natural continuum to previous Islamic thinkers who were concerned with issues 
regarding social justice and interpreted through and Islamic lens (e.g. al-Ghazali, Qutb; see 
McLarney 2016:115). McLarney argues that secularist notions of human rights affected 
Islamic thought (2012 constitution), and Islamic thought in turn affected secularist policies 
(2014 constitution) (McLarney 2016:115-116), although in my opinion this trend can be seen 
elsewhere in Egypt and the Middle East. Every now and then secular rulers use Islamic 
imagery and rhetoric to boost their power, and they often have to retain at least an official tie 
to Islam as a state religion in order to keep the masses at their side.  
Khattab’s and McLarney’s interpretations of the short Islamist reign are vastly different, and it 
seems obvious to me that a single truth cannot be found. Mursi’s reign did threaten women’s 
rights and human rights, and although some reactions may have been exaggerated, the 
people’s concerns were legitimate and should be taken seriously. The end of Islamist rule did 
not, however, end discrimination against women or improve women’s status. It is possible 
that women’s rights would have been even worse under Islamists, but the fact remains that 
women’s rights are still poor, in some ways more than before. 
The family has always been an important part of Islam and the life of Muslims, and through 
family life various thinkers have attempted to organize and ideal Islamic society where rights 
and duties are in balance. The emphasis that the Islamists based on the family alarmed some, 
although the same language has been present in previous constitutions. I would argue that 
Egypt has continuously valued the family as a priority, which in turn can mean that women’s 
role in the family has been prioritized over their own individual needs and concerns. This, 
however, is not just an Islamist tradition, since highly secular rulers such as Nasser have used 
 
 
similar language (“The family is the basis of society, founded on religion, morality, and 
patriotism”, Article 5, 1956 constitution).  
Some articles of the 2012 constitution seem to have also been misinterpreted due to fear of 
political Islam: according to McLarney, the constitution’s promise for providing free services 
for motherhood and childhood were seen as an Islamist goal to confide women into their 
homes, assigning them the role of child-bearing as their primary purpose. The negative 
reaction to this article, originally from the 1956 and 1971 constitutions (Article 18 and Article 
10, respectively), was not limited to Western media, but many Middle Eastern NGOs and 
media outlets were also concerned about this (McLarney 2016:114-115). In spite of this, the 
clause found its way into the 2014 constitution (Article 10). 
“We are drafting a Constitution that affirms that the principles of Islamic Sharia 
are the principal source of legislation, and that the reference for the 
interpretation of such principles lies in the body of the relevant Supreme 
Constitutional Court Rulings.” (Constitution 2014, Article 10, p. 5) 
“The State shall ensure the achievement of equality between women and men in 
all civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution. The State shall take the necessary measures to 
ensure the appropriate [بسانم ,munaasib] representation of women in the houses 
of representatives, as specified by Law. The State shall also guarantee women’s 
right of holding public and senior management offices in the State and their 
appointment in judicial bodies and authorities without discrimination. The State 
shall protect women against all forms of violence and ensure enabling women to 
strike a balance between family duties and work requirements. The State shall 
provide care to and protection of motherhood and childhood, female heads of 
families, and elderly and neediest women.” (Constitution 2014: Article 11, p.7-8)  
Article 11 promises to ensure women’s rights in society, politics and the family; women are 
promised “appropriate” representation in parliament, the right to hold senior management 
offices, and protecting women from all forms of violence. As mentioned before, the state is 
also supposed to ensure women the possibility of establishing a balance between work and 
family. None of these promises have been met. Of course, the definition of “appropriate 
representation” is unclear in itself. This can still be considered progress from Sadat’s 1971 
constitution where it is stated that, 
“The State shall guarantee the proper coordination between the duties of woman 
towards the family and her work in the society, considering her equal status with 
man in the fields of political, social, cultural and economic life without violation 
of the rules of Islamic jurisprudence.” (Article 11, 1971) 
According to this clause, women are equal with men except when it conflicts with shari’a.  
 
 
In 2013, the previous constitution was suspended and a new roadmap was announced. The 
new constitutional committee included more women than its predecessor, restored Article 11 
and signaled a vague commitment to gender equality. However, Khattab states that women 
still remain the only group with limited rights. Khattab describes the constitution as a “step in 
the right direction” (Khattab 2016:136). In reality, the additions compared to the previous 
constitutions and legislation (not counting 2012) are not great.  
 
1971 constitution (mod. 2007) 2014 constitution 
Shari’a as the main source of legislation (art. 
2) 
Shari’a as the main source of legislation (art. 
2, other religions specified in art. 3) 
State guarantees equality of opportunity to 
all citizens. (art. 8) 
State ensures “equal opportunities for all 
citizens without discrimination”. (art. 9) 
Family is the basis of society, “founded on 
religion, morality and patriotism” 
“The State strives to preserve the genuine 
character of the Egyptian family—with the 
values and traditions it embodies—while 
affirming and developing its character in 
relations within the Egyptian society.” (art. 
9) 
“The family is the nucleus of society, and is 
founded on religion, morality, and 
patriotism. The State shall ensure its 
cohesion, stability and the establishment of 
its values.” (art. 10) 
Protection of childhood and motherhood 
(art. 10) 
The state ensures that equality between men 
and women will be achieved; motherhood 
and childhood are protected and supported 
by the state (art. 11)  
Balance between women’s duties ensured, 
“without violation of the rules of Islamic 
jurisprudence” (art. 11) 
Women are protected against violence; state 
ensures that they can “strike a balance 
between family duties and work 
requirements” (art. 11) 
“All citizens are equal before the law. They 
have equal rights and duties without 
discrimination between them due to race, 
ethnic origin, language, religion or creed.” 
(art. 40); no mention of gender 
“All citizens are equal before the Law. They 
are equal in rights, freedoms and general 
duties, without discrimination based on 
religion, belief, sex, origin, race, color, 
language, disability, social class, political or 
geographic affiliation or any other reason. 
Discrimination and incitement of hatred is a 
crime punished by Law. The State shall take 
necessary measures for eliminating all forms 
of discrimination, and the Law shall regulate 
creating an independent commission for this 
purpose.” (art 53); the commission has not 
been created as far as I know 
The law may stipulate a minimum 
representation of women in the various 
political and legislative bodies. (art 62) 
The state ensures an “appropriate” 
representation of women in the houses of 
representatives (art 11) 
 
 
 
Based on these comparisons, some small improvements in the Constitution have been made. 
The improvements are not major, and it’s not certain that the government is committed to the 
Constitution. The Constitution can say pretty much anything, but the reality is different; for 
example, Article 5 states that the political system of Egypt is based on “[…] peaceful rotation of 
power […], respect for human rights and freedoms”.  
Egypt still maintains its reservations on CEDAW. In general, Egypt maintains that it agrees to 
follow the principles of CEDAW as long as it is not in conflict with shari’a. For example, Egypt’s 
law on nationality is slightly complicated and unfavorable to women: children born to an 
Egyptian father automatically inherit their father’s nationality, but for mothers this is 
different – a child born to an Egyptian mother abroad is not automatically Egyptian, although 
nationality can be applied for under certain circumstances (Article 2 to Law 26/1 97528). 
This is in conflict with CEDAW. 
Another reservation concerns equality between men and women in all matter regarding 
family and marriage. According to the reservation on article 16, 
“This is out of respect for the sacrosanct nature of the firm religious beliefs which 
govern marital relations in Egypt and which may not be called in question and in 
view of the fact that one of the most important bases of these relations is an 
equivalency of rights and duties so as to ensure complementary which 
guarantees true equality between the spouses.” (Declarations, Reservations and 
Objections to CEDAW, UN Women)  
The constitution prohibits discrimination based on gender, but women still don’t enjoy the 
same status and rights as men. The US State Department states that discrimination is still 
widespread and that “[a]spects of the law and traditional practices continued to disadvantage 
women in family, social, and economic life”. The discrimination women face invades all 
aspects of their lives – violence, threat of violence, harassment, unequal pay and bias in the 
work-place are just some of the things that effectively hinder women from achieving their full 
potential. According to the State Department’s report, the NCW (National Council for Women), 
its members appointed by the government, “led efforts” to combat this discrimination, 
although no examples or results are given, neither have I seen any elsewhere. In 2015, a video 
showed multiple police officers assaulting two female citizens both sexually and physically, 
and in reaction the Ministry of Interior opened an investigation into the event. There has been 
no news of any developments in this case; a case that testifies on both the wide-spread abuse 
 
 
women face in Egypt, and the indifferent attitude of the government and society in large 
towards solving this problem or even seeking justice for the victims. (Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices for 2016 Egypt, US State Department) 
Egypt has no unified family law, but instead all faiths apply their own legislations and rules. 
The constitution says the following: 
“Islam is the religion of the State and Arabic is its official language. The principles 
of Islamic Sharia are the main source of legislation. The principles of Christian 
and Jewish Sharia of Egyptian Christians and Jews are the main source of 
legislations that regulate their respective personal status, religious affairs, and 
selection of spiritual leaders.” (Constitution 2014:Articles 2 and 3,) 
As Islam is the biggest religion in the country, the Personal Status Law is applied most often. 
This law is widely based on Islamic shari’a, which is not a unified canon of laws and is open to 
interpretation. Christians also apply their own laws, which means that divorce is not possible 
for Christians except in the case of adultery or if one of the spouses converts to another 
religion16. Women are therefore in unequal positions based on their religion, and converting 
may be the only way to escape an abusive marriage. However, Christian inheritance is still 
conducted based on shari’a, which means that the amount of inheritance for men is double the 
amount of a woman’s. (Combating Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls: Policies to 
Empower Women in the Arab Region 2013:23; according to the US State Department 2016 
report on Egypt, Christian women are not entitled to any inheritance) In other instances, for 
example when two people of different denominations marry, resorting to Islamic shari’a is not 
possible.  
The church wields the power over the marriages of its subjects, and a new draft law does not 
aim to reduce this, even though it suggests some loosening on the subject of divorce. 
According to Mada Masr, right after the revolution in 2011 some Christian groups campaigned 
for the possibility of a civil marriage or at least a reform of divorce practices. One group was 
Copts 38, whose name refers to 1938 when the late pope of the Coptic church decreed that 
divorce should be permissible for multiple reasons, for example abuse. In 1971, another pope 
                                                       
16 This is the case for Coptic Orthodox Christians, which is the biggest Christian group in Egypt. For Protestants 
and Catholics, divorce is not possible. In the Greek Orthodox church the rules are not as strict. It should be noted 
here that finding information on the family laws and practices of non-Islamic communities has proven to be 
difficult, and I use the independent publication Mada Masr as a source here.  
 
 
declared that this was against the teachings of Christianity. (Shams El-Din 16.2.2017, Mada 
Masr) 
Unofficial marriage contracts are common in Egypt, and legal. According to the UN and 
ESCWA report on domestic violence, both ‘urfi and misyar marriages occur in Egypt. A ‘urfi 
contract is contracted by a Muslim cleric and with two witnesses present, but it’s not 
registered officially, while a misyar marriage means that the woman agrees to renounce her 
shari’a-based rights, and the marriage is registered in court. Both practices make it possible 
for people to divert laws on, for example, the age of consent, and they leave the woman 
without any legal protection and at the mercy of her community should the companionship 
end. The point of these practices is to sexual relations possible in an acceptable and halal way. 
(Combating Domestic Violence Against Women and Girls: Policies to Empower Women in the 
Arab Region 2013:21) 
In 2014 Egypt criminalized sexual harassment (e.g. New law to end sexual harassment in 
Egypt, Al Jazeera English 10.6.2014), but the phenomenon is still wide-spread. Egypt 
experienced a dramatic increase in sexual harassment after the beginning of the revolution, 
and Tahrir Square became known world-wide as a hub for sexual violence and harassment. 
The perpetrators were not just fellow protesters, but police officers took part in this, and 
women were subjected to notorious virginity tests. Sexual harassment after the revolution is 
alive and well, and according to a survey conducted by the UN in 2013, 99,3% of Egyptian 
women were harassed daily, the harassment and violence ranging from catcalling to gang 
rapes (Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual Harassment in Egypt Results / Outcomes 
and Recommendations Summary 2013:6).  
How much has this new law affected reality? In theory, those found guilty could be sentenced 
to up to five years in prison, or a fine of 50 000 EGP (c. 5000 euros), while the minimum 
detention ranges from six months to two years. This change was introduced by interim 
president Adly Mansour, in charge after the ousting of the Islamist president Muhammed 
Morsi, and before Sisi. The law itself is quite progressive: for example, it prohibits "implying 
sexual or obscene gestures […] including modern means of communication”, i.e. cell phone 
communications and messages sent via internet. The punishment becomes more severe if the 
offence is made with the “intent of receiving sexual gratification from the victim”, or if the 
perpetrator is in a position of power over the victim. (Abdelaziz 10.6.2016, CNN) In addition 
to this, NGOs have reported sexual harassment perpetrated by the police, and women are 
 
 
therefore discouraged from filing a report or pressing charges in fear of further harassment. 
According to the US State Department’s report on Egypt, no convictions have been made on 
sexual harassment charges. (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 Egypt, US 
State Department) 
The US State Department draws attention to some of Egypt’s laws in its report on Egypt and 
human rights, for example legislation pertaining to rape and domestic violence. Rape is 
outlawed, but it’s definition is very rigid, and does not include spousal rape, which remains 
legal. The State Department also stated that the state does not enforce the law effectively. The 
punishment for rape is severe – up to 25 years or life imprisonment in cases of armed 
abduction -, but the police is reported to pressure women to drop their charges. The situation 
is quite similar with domestic violence, which is also not illegal – although apparently some 
exceptions can be made, but the victim must be able to provide several eyewitnesses. A study 
conducted by the Egyptian agency of statistics (CAPMAS) found that about 5,6 million women 
in Egypt experience domestic violence, while estimates by NGOs of the prevalence of rape is 
several times higher than the estimates of the government, and it can be assumed that this 
applies to domestic violence as well. (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 
Egypt, US State Department) 
Based on the US State Department’s report, NGOs work tirelessly in the areas in which the 
state shows little or no interest. The status of NGOs is, however, very precarious, which means 
that the status of women depending on their services is also precarious. 
Female genital mutilation or FGM (or cutting, also sometimes called female circumcision) is 
still a wide-spread practice; multiple sources confirm this, but for example the Ministry of 
Health in Egypt stated in 2014 that about 92% of women and girls between the ages of 15 and 
49 have undergone the procedure. The numbers have decreased, but it is expected that 56% 
of girls under 19 will undergo FGM in the future. (Egypt: New Penalties for Female Genital 
Mutilation - Further Reform Needed to Protect Girls, Human Rights Watch 9.9.2016)   
FGM has been outlawed in Egypt since 2008, and just recently the punishment was 
reexamined; since 31.8.2016, the parents escorting their daughter to this procedure can face 
up to three years in prison, and the doctor performing it can be sentenced to five to seven 
years in prison, or up to 15 years if the procedure leads to disability or death (Egypt: New 
Penalties for Female Genital Mutilation - Further Reform Needed to Protect Girls, Human Rights 
 
 
Watch 9.9.2016). Strict punishments are without a doubt necessary, but the new law has been 
widely criticized. The practice of FGM is impossible to monitor, as is the imprisonment the 
parents of 90% of the female population, in addition to which the actual problem lies in 
society. People still believe FGM to be a necessary procedure, and legislation will not change 
this. The struggle against FGM seems to extend only to legislation, and is thus not effective.  
Many parents, doctors and even statesmen still believe in the practice, which means that it 
will not be eradicated any time soon. In fall 2016, an Egyptian member of parliament stated 
that women should undergo FGM because Egyptian men are sexually weak (for example 
Essam El-Din, Al-Ahram English 7.9.2016). This is tied to the notion that women cannot 
control their sexual urges, and therefore need to undergo FGM. Elsewhere, positive changes 
have been seen with community training – when the elders of a family or a village stand 
behind stopping FGM, the cycle is broken and no more girls are subjected to this horrendous, 
dangerous and sometimes deadly practice. UNICEF has recommended more preventive and 
protective measures in 2010 (Legislative Reform to Support the Abandonment of Female 
Genital Mutilation/Cutting, UNICEF, August 2010), stating that punishment should be used as 
a last resort because it would affect the family negatively. After the new legislation was 
announced, HRW urged Egypt to adopt broader reforms and direct funds towards preventing 
FGM instead of just penalizing it. In addition to insufficient action besides legislation, the laws 
against FGM are not applied; according to HRW, only one prosecuted case has led to a 
conviction. This number speaks volumes about Egypt’s commitment to stopping FGM. (Egypt: 
New Penalties for Female Genital Mutilation - Further Reform Needed to Protect Girls, Human 
Rights Watch 9.9.2016). 
Child marriage has also been illegal since 2008, and in 2015 Egypt aligned its internal policies 
with international ones by withdrawing its reservation to an article of the African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child. The reservation was made in 1999, when Egypt’s 
minimum age for marriage was 18 for boys and 16 for girls, but this changed in February 
2015: 
“The reservation to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
that Egypt lifted in February stated that Egypt would not be bound by article 
21(2), which says that states should take effective action, including by passing 
legislation, to make 18 the minimum age of marriage for both sexes.” (Egypt: 
Small Forward Steps on Child Rights - Abuses Against Children Still, HRW 4.3.2015)  
 
 
The law is, however, applied insufficiently. In practice, it bans registration of a marriage with 
a spouse that is under 18 years of age. According to Human Rights Watch, child marriage is 
still “endemic” in rural areas, and families regularly accept unregistered marriage contracts 
(Egypt: Small Forward Steps on Child Rights - Abuses Against Children Still Rampant, Human 
Rights Watch 4.3.2015). A survey on the economic cost of gender-based violence (The Egypt 
Economic cost of Gender-Based violence survey or ECGBVS) conducted in 2015 found that 27% 
of girls marry before the age of 18, and while the majority of women married out of their own 
will, 11% stated that they had been forced to marry their current of most recent husband. 
(ECGBVS 2015 2016:50). The number of girls marrying before the age of 18 is declining, and 
16,5% of women aged 18-22 had married as children. (Malé & Wodon 2016) 
The US State Department draws attention to some of Egypt’s laws in its report on Egypt and 
human rights, for example legislation pertaining to rape and domestic violence. Rape is 
outlawed, but it’s definition is very strict, and does not include spousal rape, which remains 
legal. The State Department also stated that the state does not enforce the law effectively. The 
punishment for rape is severe – up to 25 years or life imprisonment in cases of armed 
abduction -, but the police is reported to pressure women to drop their charges. The situation 
is quite similar with domestic violence, which is also not illegal – although apparently some 
exceptions can be made, but the victim must be able to provide several eyewitnesses. A study 
conducted by the Egyptian agency of statistics (CAPMAS) found that about 5,6 million women 
in Egypt experience domestic violence- NGO estimates of the prevalence of rape is several 
times higher than the estimates of the government, and it can be assumed that this applies to 
domestic violence as well. (Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 Egypt, US 
State Department) 
Based on the US State Department’s report, NGOs work tirelessly in the areas in which the 
state shows little or no interest. The status of NGOs is, however, very precarious, which means 
that the status of women depending on their services is also precarious. 
In conclusion, some improvements have been made regarding legislation, but family law in 
Egypt remains unequal. In 2012, at the time of writing of the new edition of Modernizing 
Women, Moghadam stated that the countries with the most conservative family law were 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan and Egypt. The abysmal status of women in Saudia Arabia and Iran 
is quite well known, and it is alarming that Egypt fares bad enough to be considered to be in 
the same category with these countries. 
 
 
5.2.2. Politics 
 
Egypt’s relationship with gender quotas is complicated. In its old constitution from 1972, 
amended in 2009, women were reserved 64 seats in the parliament’s lower house. As I 
pointed out in the previous chapter, Article 11 of the 2014 Constitution declared that the state 
“[…] shall take the necessary measures to ensure the appropriate representation of women in 
the houses of representatives, as specified by Law”. The same article also states that women’s 
right of holding public and senior management offices in the State and their appointment in 
judicial bodies and authorities without discrimination” will be guaranteed. 
The constitutional committee, however, rejected the idea of gender quotas in elections, quite 
evidently contradicting itself, or possibly didn’t have a clear idea of what “appropriate 
representation” consists of. It is also possible they thought the 2% representation that the 
2011 elections resulted in was quite appropriate. Article 118, however, reserved one third of 
the seats in local councils for female representatives. In the 2011 elections parties were also 
required to nominate at least one woman for each district (46 districts in total). 
(Quotaproject.com, Egypt) 
The 2011-2012 elections for the People’s Assembly (lower chamber) and the Shoura Council 
(upper chamber) were won by the Freedom and Justice party, i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood, 
who, together with its allies, won 235 of the 508 seats in the People’s Assembly, and 106 of 
the 180 seats in the Shoura Council. The elections resulted in 10 women being elected or 
appointed to the People’s Assembly (1,97%) and 12 women being elected for the Shoura 
Council (4,4%). (IPU Parline) The constitutional committee that was formed in 2011 for the 
purpose of promulgating a new constitution did not include a single woman (8 people in 
total). Representation in parliament diminished from 12 % to only 2 %, which is alarmingly 
low. (Esfandiari 2012:3-4)  
Muhammed Mursi was elected president of Egypt in the country’s first free elections. The 
Freedom and Justice Party, whose candidate Mursi was, was very popular among Egyptians. 
Unfortunately, in Morsi’s words and choices we can see the pattern that points towards the 
patriarchal model of revolution: Egyptians witnessed calls to decriminalize FGM, lower the 
age of marriage for girls from 18 to 14, and ending women’s right to initiate divorce. Before 
elections, Mursi thought women and non-Muslims should not be allowed to run for 
 
 
presidency, but after his election he started making amends by promising to appoint a female 
vice-president and other women to his cabinet. (Esfandiari 2012:3) Eventually, his cabinet 
included two women, one of which was also a Christian, out of 35 members (Egypt's Morsi 
swears in new cabinet, Al-Jazeera 2.8.2012). 
The representation of women in the parliament remains low, although the 2015 elections 
broke records by electing more women – as well as minorities and people with disabilities – 
than ever; compared to the 10 and 12 women elected in 2011-2012, the 2015 elections saw 
75 women elected into the House of Representatives17. Later, president Sisi appointed 28 
more members of parliament, including 14 women – the law concerning the House of 
Representatives stipulates that the president can appoint up to 5% of the total amount of 
parliament members, but half of them must be women. (Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 2016 Egypt, US State Department) The percentage of women in parliament, 
therefore, was 14,9% in 2016 – very low, but still slightly better from 2010 when the 
percentage was 12,7%, or 2012 with less than 5% in the two chambers. The number of 
women has fluctuated, but it has generally been very low with a somewhat better 
representation in the Shoura Council. Percentage of women in ministerial positions was 
11,8% in 2016. (See Attachment 1: Statistics) 
In 2015, three women were appointed to a position in the cabinet of Prime Minister Sherif 
Ismail. The appointment was commented upon with phrases that that focused more on the 
women’s looks than their positions or experience; al-Arabiya’s headline, for example, was 
Three ‘beauties’ join Egypt’s new Cabinet, but still not enough?, the phrase “still not enough” 
apparently due to the fact that many women’s rights activists don’t consider three ministers 
out of 33 to be enough representation for women. The women were Ghada Waly, a veteran in 
development and first appointed in 2014, in the position of Minister of Social Solidarity. NGOs 
are her area, and according to al-Arabiya she launched the implementation of the 
government’s restrictions on them. The other two hold the positions of immigration and 
Egyptian expatriate affairs, and international cooperation (not the same as foreign affairs). 
This was not the only time the appearances of highly visible women were scrutinized; in 
August 2016 eight female news anchors of a state-run channel were suspended due to their 
weight and were forced to go on a diet. (Meky 21.9.2015, Al-Arabiya News English; US State 
                                                       
17 Egypt switched from a bicameral system two a unicameral one in 2014, changing from the People’s Assembly 
and the Shoura Council to the House of Representatives. (IPU) 
 
 
Department Country Reports 2016 Egypt) According to the US State Department, in 2016 
women led four cabinet ministries. There were no women among the 27 governors and 
members of the Supreme Court, and women represented less than 1% of judges. (Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016 Egypt, US State Department) 
The 2015 elections were the first parliamentary elections since the counter-revolution, and 
served to secure al-Sisi’s power. Before the elections, Sisi had called for “a unified front in 
parliament”, and a ten-party coalition with the name of In Love of Egypt became the most 
powerful force inside the parliament with 250 seats. Only three other parties won more than 
ten seats out of the 596 in the parliament, 28 of which were appointed by President Sisi. Voter 
turnout was very low, about 29%, in spite of the fact that voting is compulsory. This probably 
says something about Egyptian people’s belief in democracy and elections after the revolution 
and the subsequent disaster – voter turnout was over 60% in the 2011-2012 elections. (IPU 
Parline)  
 
5.2.3. Society 
 
It can be seen that Egypt and Tunisia have gone vastly different paths after their revolutions. 
In Egypt, the lack of women in public spaces is striking. The streets are full of men, and cafes 
and restaurants are filled with them. These cafes are common also in Tunisia, and women can 
rarely be seen frequenting them. If they are present, they are with their husbands or other 
male relatives. These cafes often spread themselves on the sidewalks, and walking past these 
establishments is anxiety-inducing and uncomfortable. As I mentioned before, sexual 
harassment is extremely common, and women are subjected to it regardless of their age, 
marital status, or dress. 
Badran thinks that the feminist revolution of Egypt is still underway. I have been unable to see 
any real proof of this, but I would be glad to be proven wrong. Badran herself mentions female 
graffiti artists who are taking space and performing a visible form of art (Badran 2016:32-33), 
but this is not something that is widely-spread or that can be seen having a major impact. 
Perhaps this is a symbol or a signal; a past example of this is the dramatic unveiling 
 
 
performed by Huda Sharawi and Saiza Nabrawi, the founders of the Egyptian Feminist Union, 
which for many mark a beginning of feminism in Egypt (Badran 2016:52).  
“Spurning invisibility and anonymity by uncovering their faces was a signal step in 
women’s journey on the path of political activism and their own liberation, as they 
themselves declared. Rejecting domestic re-confinement after their entry on the public 
stage of nationalist militancy and refusing face veiling were interconnected. Domestic 
seclusion and face veiling were both mechanisms of female control, distancing women 
from greater immersion in public life that women were increasingly resenting”. 
(Badran 2016:52) 
Still, women do not have a voice or occupy public spaces; even performing music publicly is 
considered taboo. A number of new NGOs rose after the revolution, but due to the difficult 
circumstances (e.g. foreign funding, free speech issues) their work is hindered. Badran has 
high hopes for the future, but her article is, in my opinion, based more on idealism than 
realism. 
Sexual harassment has increased in both countries, but in Egypt it is a plague. In revolutions, 
social conventions are often suspended, since the whole premise of a revolution includes 
subordination against the ruler and its laws. In Egypt, some social conventions seem to have 
been eradicated, and sexual harassment has become so wide-spread, it has to be considered 
acceptable. Sexual harassment has been illegal for years now, and there are multiple NGOs 
working in this area (HarassMap, OpAntiSH), but no tangible results have been achieved.  
According to the previously mentioned survey conducted by UN Women, 99,3 % of women in 
Egypt experience sexual harassment. According to 48,9% of the respondents, sexual 
harassment has gotten worse after the revolution, while 44% feel the amount has been the 
same before and after. Only 7% feel that the situation has gotten better. The results also 
report the way women reacted to harassment: 44% said they felt frightened and deeply hurt, 
35,9% that they were angry and they screamed. This says a lot about a woman’s everyday life 
in Egypt – according to the same survey, the majority of women experience harassment daily 
or weekly, which means that these women experience fear, hurt and anger on a daily basis 
due to reasons that are out of their control (the survey also found no aspects that would 
instigate harassment; instead it was found that women of all ages, social classes, professions 
etc. are subjected to sexual harassment) (Study on Ways and Methods to Eliminate Sexual 
Harassment in Egypt - Results / Outcomes and Recommendations Summary 2013: 6-7, 11). 
 
 
7,8% blamed themselves for going out in the street or going to work, which is terribly absurd, 
but might explain why women are often underrepresented in public places. 
Sisi himself has made conflicting comments regarding the situation that was deemed an 
“epidemic” in many news sources (Trew 14.8.2013, Al-Jazeera and others): on one hand, he 
denounced the attackers of a woman and her teenage daughter and visited her in the hospital, 
but on the other, he has defended the virginity tests and made dubious comments about the 
nature of female protestors. Then again, according to Al-Jazeera, he “he urged the government 
to take all necessary measures to combat sexual harassment and implement the new law 
rigorously” during his campaign and his time as president. (New law to end sexual harassment 
in Egypt, Al Jazeera 12.6.2014) 
"The virginity tests were done to protect the girls from rape, as well as to protect the soldiers 
and officers from rape accusation”, Sisi, who was at the time chief of military intelligence, said 
according to Al Jazeera (12.6.2014). Sisi is not alone in blaming the victims for being in the 
wrong place or dressing suggestively or being of “loose morals” – this phenomenon can be 
seen world-wide and has been reported many times -, and some Egyptians have raised the 
question why she was out and about in the first place (Mohsen 16.3.2012, Al Jazeera). As seen 
before, even harassed and abused women blame themselves for the crime committed against 
them. With this atmosphere, it is no surprise. 
Violence against women and girls is also still wide-spread. According to a report published by 
UNICEF in 2015, over 60% of children in Cairo, Alexandria and Assiut had experienced 
physical violence during the past year. Boys were subjected to physical abuse more often than 
girls. A large majority of the children of the study had experienced emotional violence, and 
most of them (around 40% in Cairo and Alexandria, 66% in Assiut) had also witnessed 
domestic violence in their homes. The study describes sexual violence as an “intensely 
sensitive issue”, which, the researchers said, affected the responses they received in their 
study. 2-6% of the children said they had experienced sexual touching – most of them girls-, 
and that two thirds of girls surveyed in Cairo had experienced sexual harassment. Most 
believed the blame falls to women and girls, who through clothing or behavior somehow 
cause the harassment. The study found out – as women in Egypt and elsewhere already know-
, that harassment happens regardless of these aspects and it touches women across social, 
economic and religious groups.  
 
 
In addition to this, different groups blamed different factors; parents blamed the internet, 
children blamed the decline in security and law enforcement since the revolution, teachers 
blamed mobile phones, and religious leaders blamed “the influence of Western culture, the 
Internet, overpopulation and a deteriorating economic situation (with more people sharing 
smaller spaces)”. (Violence Against Children in Egypt 2015:3-4)  
A study conducted by the UNFPA, CAPMAS and NCW (National Council for Women) focusing 
on the economic cost of gender-based violence states in its preface that  
“In Egypt, according to the latest Demographic Health Survey of 2014, amongst 
other researches and surveys, a remarkable increase in violence against women in 
recent years is noted […].” (The Egypt Economic cost of Gender-Based violence 
survey (ECGBVS) 2015 2016:VIII; emphasis mine) 
This would suggest that the problem has only gotten worse after the revolution. 
As I pointed out in the chapter on legislation, FGM is still prevalent in Egypt. The extent of the 
mutilation varies, as well as other rituals related to it. FGM is not an exclusively Egyptian or 
Muslim practice, but is common in many areas around Middle East and Africa. Regional 
differences inside Egypt are also quite large, as was found in the previously mentioned study: 
In Cairo, 65% between 13 and 17 had experienced genital mutilation or cutting, while in 
Alexandria the number was 39% and a staggering 94% in Assiut. The study also found out 
that a small minority (7%) of girls in Assiut believed that FGM was harmful. The numbers 
were bigger in Alexandria and Cairo, although they did not exceed 55% (number of girls 
between the ages of 16-17 in Alexandria). (Violence Against Children in Egypt, 2015:4) This 
discrepancy might be explained with socioeconomic differences between the three areas; for 
example, Assiut also has the highest illiteracy rate in Egypt (30%). The Egypt Economic cost of 
Gender-Based violence survey (ECGBVS) 2015 found that FGM was most common among 
illiterate people, and got rarer with a higher educational level. (The Egypt Economic cost of 
Gender-Based violence survey (ECGBVS) 2015 2016:52) 
There is, however, some cause for optimism – of the children interviewed for UNICEF’s 2015 
study, under half of the children of Assiut said they would continue the practice, while only 
5% in Cairo and Egypt said they would do so (Violence against children in Egypt 2015:4). FGM 
is also less prevalent among younger generations, which suggest that its popularity is 
diminishing fast – 75% of women aged 20 to 24 had been circumcised, while the number for 
 
 
women between 18 and 19 was 60% (The Egypt Economic cost of Gender-Based violence 
survey (ECGBVS) 2015 2016:50). 
Although the fertility rate has declined, both Tunisia and Egypt have a large number of young 
citizens looking for work and hoping to start a family. Overpopulation is an extremely serious 
problem in Egypt, and the vast masses of fertile young people combined with a culture that 
adores and appreciates children does not exactly help with the situation. Infant mortality has 
gone down and Egyptians are more educated than ever which hopefully means that there is 
no longer a need to make as many children a before. Overpopulation has overwhelmed the 
already vulnerable system, which is not a good sign for the services that the government is 
struggling to provide, and which many women are dependent on. 
Illiteracy in Egypt is still widespread and a big problem, and the Egyptian Central Agency for 
Public Mobilization and Statistics estimated in 2014 that about 25% of the population is 
illiterate. Progress has been made, and the young population is more literate than the older 
generations, but illiteracy still poses a major challenge. The discrepancy between the literacy 
rate of men and women is alarming: according to CAPMAS, 82% of Egyptian men are literate 
compared to 65% of women. (More than 25% of Egypt’s population ‘illiterate’, Egyptian Streets 
9.9.2014) According to the 2016 Global Gender Gap Report (WEF), 68% of women are literate, 
compare to 84% of men. There are only small differences in the estimates, and it’s obvious 
that the problem is of devastating proportions; how can one expect economic independence 
or political participation from someone who cannot work an ATM by themselves, or who 
cannot attain information about issues home and abroad? 
The differences between girls and boys in enrollment in school are not big, but more girls 
remain outside of the education system than boys. Education in Egypt is free, but those who 
can afford it, place their children in private schools. According to data collected by the World 
Bank, in 2015 more girls than boys attended primary and secondary school, but in the tertiary 
level this is suddenly reversed (Gender Data Portal – Egypt, the World Bank). 
Egypt ranked 132nd in the Global Gap Report of 2016, scoring low in economic participation 
and opportunity, and especially low in labor force participation (138th). There are fewer 
women than men in the work force with a low number of 24% of all women compared to 80% 
of men (Gender Gap Report 2016 - Egypt, WEF). This is obviously just the number of work in 
the official sector – a big part of work done by women is in other sectors, in small businesses 
 
 
for example. Women’s work in the house and with children is often also not counted as work. 
Unemployment has gone up for both genders since 2000, and for women the number is 
currently 27,8% (compared to 8,5% for men; or 24% for women and 9,8% for men, according 
to WEF). Women are also paid less than their male counterparts, and while educated women 
have better employment opportunities, the social pressure to stay home and not pursuing a 
career is strong. (Gender Data Portal – Egypt, World Bank; Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 2016 Egypt, US State Department) 
Women face many challenges when entering the work force: women are systematically 
discriminated in hiring, they are discriminated against inside their place of employment, the 
pay gap is vast (according to WEF, women’s pay is on average 78% compared to their male 
counterparts), and men are promoted more often than their more qualified female 
counterparts. Maternity leaves are also very short (3 months mandated in the civil service 
law), even shorter in the private sector than in government jobs, which poses major 
challenges for balancing work and personal life. Due to this, women with better financial 
resources hire nannies or take a shorter leave on their own expense.  
In addition to principle and ideology, women’s status is important from an economic point of 
view; women’s input in the work force has been increasingly important, and Egypt has 
attempted to support women’s employment due to financial ambitions. Women’s work in the 
family and in enterprises remains important, but the conflict between these two is still to be 
solved. The US State Department’s country report states that women’s rights activists claimed 
religious and traditional influences hindered women from pursuing a career. (Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices for 2016 Egypt, US State Department; McLarney 2016:120) 
A story as reported by the United Nations (Progress of the World’s Women 2015-2016 - 
Transforming Economies, Realizing Rights, 2015) paints a picture of women’s economic 
empowerment in Egypt: the story starts in 2008 when a team led by a feminist scholar at the 
American University in Cairo started a program called the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT). 
The idea was that women should be compensated for their unpaid work, and that they should 
receive their own bank cards and the payment into their own bank accounts. The program 
also included capacity training from social workers in the form of giving out information on 
housing, voting, and other practical aspects in the women’s lives. The program was a success 
in the neighborhood of Cairo where it was implemented – until the revolution.  
 
 
In 2012, the project was put on hold just as it was about to be implemented in the rural areas 
of Upper Egypt. The government announced that it was not interested in continuing the 
project. In spite of the protests of the women who had benefitted of the program, it was ended 
as it was “deemed against the interest of Egypt”. After the counter-revolution, the project 
received some funding after a minister, Ghada Wali (a woman with a history in international 
development), took interest. The future of the project remains unsure, and the leader says 
that they are “under tremendous scrutiny”, and that she hoped no one would notice this 
money was going towards empowering women. (Progress of the World’s Women 2015-2016: 
125-127) 
The conclusions that can be drawn from this story are that, as always, women’s rights have 
not interested the Egyptian government before or after the revolution. The empowerment of 
Egyptian women is in their own hands, and their hands are tied by oppression in every stage 
of life. A female scholar and a female minister managed to change the lives of a fraction of 
Egyptian women because of their own initiative. As has been concluded before, in order for 
women’s rights to be advances, a country needs female activists and policy makers. So far, 
women’s rights are resting on an unsecure foundation, pioneered by a few educated and 
privileged women.  
The Human Development Report places Egypt at 111th in 2015, among countries of medium 
human development. Unfortunately, there is no recent data for Egypt’s Gender Inequality 
Index (GII), the latest being 0.575 in 2012. The only comparison can be made with its 2005 
score, which was 0.581. The conclusion one can draw from this is that the reproductive 
health, empowerment and labor force participation of Egyptian women is quite bad, and 
progress is very slow. Egypt’s 2012 GII puts it in the worst category of the four. (Gender 
Inequality Index, 2015) Whereas Tunisia’s relative position rose when scored based on GII 
alone, Egypt goes the other way and drops to 135. There are 188 positions, which means that 
Egypt’s GII is quite terrible. Arab countries are the second worst area for women – average 
score being 0.535 - after Sub-Saharan Africa where the average score was 0.572. As can be 
seen here, Egypt is worse off than Arab countries in general, and is in the level of Sub-Saharan 
countries. (HDR 2016:215-216) Regarding GDI, Egypt is placed in group five – the worst of 
them -, with a GDI of 0.884. The HDI of Egyptian women was 0.640 compared to 0.724 of men. 
(HDR 2016, GDI 2015; see also Attachment 1: Statistics and Chapter 6 for a more visual 
comparison) 
 
 
A survey study conducted by the Thomson Reuters Foundation ranked the Arab countries 
from worst to best based on the state of women’s rights in the country. Egypt was last of the 
22 countries, after Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Tunisia, as I mentioned before, was number 
six. The results drew attention to the poor status of women in politics, society, and economy; 
sexual harassment, religious family law, FGM, and poor representation in the parliament. 
Other highlighted aspects were the rise in violence, “Islamist feeling”, and trafficking. (POLL: 
Women's rights in the Arab world and POLL-Egypt is worst Arab state for women, Comoros best, 
Thomson Reuters Foundation 12.11.2013)  
One of Egypt’s many problems is overpopulation, but family planning does not seem to be 
very high on the government’s agenda – although it seems to be widely accepted. The 
prevalence of modern contraceptive methods was 56,9% in 2014 (Gender Data Portal – Egypt, 
the World Bank), which is not bad compared to the global average of 64% (Trends in 
Contraceptive Use Worldwide 2015 2015:1). The use of modern contraceptive methods has 
increased from year 2000, but only by 3%. Interestingly, in Tunisia the use of modern 
contraceptive methods has decreased over time: in 2000, 56,7% of women used modern 
contraceptives, while in 2014 the number was 50% - quite a significant drop (Gender Data 
Portal – Tunisia, the World Bank). It’s difficult to say what the reason for this could be, 
especially since the fertility rates for Tunisian women are lower than their Egyptian 
counterparts. Tunisians get married later and since sex outside of marriage is frowned upon, 
it’s possible that a significant number of women don’t need contraceptives. I can’t know for 
sure, though, but I found this fact intriguing.  
It was recently uncovered that only 40% of infants are breastfed until the recommended age 
of six months. According to the women, this is because they have to work and thus cannot be 
home to feed the baby. Even for this, women face unfair prejudice: 
“Why then do many Egyptian mothers seek infant formula? Could it be as 
psychiatry consultant and fellow at the royal College of Psychiatrists in London 
Khalil Fadel suggests, that they are taking an “easy route” and have become “lazy 
because everything in society has become plastic, false and takeaway.”” (Kamel 
31.10.2016, Mada Masr) 
The law allows women an hour for breastfeeding every day, but this law is not always 
followed and an hour is often not enough for a trip home and back. There are also a lot of 
misconceptions about breastfeeding and its advantages and disadvantages, which suggests 
 
 
that new parents need to be educated. Additional problems have been caused by the shortage 
of formula in 2016. (Kamel 31.10.2016, Mada Masr) 
A change in values can be detected. World Value Survey tracks the values of different states in 
different waves, the latest being 2010-2014 (Wave 6) and the one before that 2005-2009 
(Wave 5). In Egypt’s case the surveys were conducted in 2008 and 2012 – before and after the 
revolution. These surveys of course only include a very small percentage of the people, but 
surely some indications of the changing attitudes of Egyptian can be found. For example, the 
importance of family has increased very slightly, while the importance of friends and leisure 
time has gone down. It should be noted, though, that the sample size was 3051 in 2008 and 
less than half of it, 1523, in 2012. The latter sample is significantly smaller.18 Below is some 
analysis based on the surveys. (World Value Survey Wave 5 and Wave 6 – Egypt, see link in 
Sources) 
    2008 2012 
Family All 97,7 97,4 
  men 97,1 96,9 
  women 98,3 97,8 
Friends All 43,2 54,9 
  men 48,1 63,6 
  women 38 46,2 
Leisure time All 13,3 21,1 
  men 14,6 23,9 
  women 12 18,2 
Politics All 9,1 31 
                                                       
18 Another important aspect is the nature of questions that were excluded from the survey in Egypt. In 2008, the 
explanation in the results paper was: “It doesn´t consist with the Egyptian society's traditions and ethics” and 
“The Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) refused to put them in the questionnaire for 
some reasons”. In 2012, the explanation was more blunt: “These were deleted by Authorities or for security 
reasons (not accepted to be asked)”. The removed questions were quite different, the only constant being the 
question of whether or not the interviewee would like to have a drug addict or an unmarried couple as 
neighbors. Questions about the army and the government and the people’s trust in them were removed both 
times. In 2012, questions regarding army rule were retracted, as were (from what I can see) all questions related 
to religion, even such questions as “do you believe in God”. Questions regarding the acceptability of prostitution, 
abortion, and sex before marriage were removed, which is a shame because these questions are quite essential 
for women’s rights and status. The survey took place at a very critical time in Egypt, during which the army was 
in power. Mursi was elected president in July, and the survey took place in March and April 2012. 
 
 
 
  men 12,6 36,9 
  women 5,5 25,1 
Religion All 95,4 94,1 
  men 94,2 93,2 
  women 96,7 95,1 
 
Above is a small sample I collected based on the survey. Here are the percentages of people 
who deemed the aspect as “very important”. As we can see here, family remains very 
important, although the value of friends and leisure time has increased. Based on this, 
Egyptians are also much more interested in politics than they were before – although, to be 
fair, this survey was conducted in 2012 right at the time of elections. If this survey was 
conducted today, the numbers might be very different. 
Another revelation of the 2012 survey is that Egyptians in 2012 were quite unhappy, 44% of 
people describing themselves as “not at all happy”. Out of women, on the other hand, 40,6% 
were “not at all happy” and 21,5% were “completely dissatisfied” with their lives. Women 
were, however, extremely active in different organizations.  
    2008 2012 
Men make better political leaders All 72,9 54,4 
  men 78 61,9 
  women 67,7 46,9 
Men make better business 
executives All 63,1 51,1 
  men 67,6 60,4 
  women 58,4 41,9 
Being a housewife is just as 
fulfilling as working for pay All 65,9 48,8 
  men 66,1 54 
  women 65,7 43,7 
It is essential for democracy that 
women have the same rights as 
men All 50,6 24,7 
  men 46,1 22,2 
  women 55,3 27,2 
Divorce is always justifiable All 8,8 9,4 
  men 8,6 7,6 
  women 9,1 11,3 
Divorce is never justifiable All 28,5 24,5 
  men 28,9 22,1 
  women 28,1 26,9 
 
 
Man beating his wife is always 
justifiable All   2,5 
  men   2,7 
  women   2,2 
Man beating his wife is never 
justifiable All   38,9 
  men   34,6 
  women   43,3 
 
Above is another table I modified from the World Value Survey results, now with percentages 
of people who agree strongly with the given statement. Some changes in attitudes towards 
women in politics and business has taken place, although men remain more conservative than 
women. Perhaps the most interesting finding based on this table is that only half of the people 
in 2012 from the people in 2008 considered equal rights between men and women to be 
essential to democracy. As I mentioned before, a great percentage of Egyptians are divorced, 
although in both installations of the survey divorce was frowned upon and only a tiny 
minority classified themselves as divorced at the time of the survey. This would indicate that 
the stigma of divorce is still great. The statistics on attitudes towards violence in the family 
were only available for 2012, and it seems that many Egyptians still accept it. 
As we can see now, Egyptian women face obstacles in pretty much every area of their lives. 
Violence and sexual harassment remain grave problems, and women are disadvantaged in 
politics as well as the job market. Some small improvements can be detected – FGM is getting 
rarer, Egyptians are becoming increasingly literate, Egyptian women are more educated than 
ever, and the values of the people have changing positively. However, the situation for women 
has not improved since the revolutions, and in some ways, it has actually gotten worse. 
Changes are needed, but the difficult situation of civil society organizations makes it almost 
impossible to address and demand changes for the issues that affect women, and since 
political will is obviously lacking, there are very few opportunities to produce change. 
6. Conclusions 
 
The first time I presented WEF’s Gender Gap Report as proof of women’s status in Tunisia and 
Egypt, I received a healthy amount of criticism, especially regarding Egypt’s abysmal score in 
 
 
the report. No one questioned the fact that women are not doing well in Egypt, but instead 
focused on the number, which put Egypt behind Saudi-Arabia. I tried to argue my point and 
defend the statistics, but these arguments were promptly disregarded. Obviously there had to 
be something wrong with the report or the methods for it to reach this kind of a conclusion! 
I took my critics’ advice and searched for other statistics as well. Another one, the previously 
mentioned Thomson Reuters Foundation’s poll on women’s rights in the Arab World, ranked 
Egypt as the worst country in the area, putting it behind countries like war-torn Iraq and 
strictly patriarchal Saudi-Arabia.  
How do these polls and studies reach these numbers? Is Egypt really doing that bad? Could it 
be that we trust our prejudices more than (seemingly) neutral statistics? For me, “it cannot 
be” is simply not a sufficient argument. These kinds of statistics are of course somewhat 
unreliable and very limited, and they don’t show the whole picture. Situations and rankings 
change – while in 2015 Egypt was at 136 and below Saudi-Arabia (number 134), in 2016 
Egypt was ahead of it with the ranking of 132 while Saudi-Arabia fell to 141. I have made two 
histograms to highlight this problem. 
 
This is a histogram comparing the ranking of Tunisia and Egypt throughout the years. The 
point of the WEF Gender Gap Report is that number one is the best, therefore positive 
developments should lead the countries towards number one. However, since the number of 
the countries in the report changes, and the changing scores of the countries change their 
ranking in relation to each other, a well developing country might have a worse ranking even 
though its score has gotten better.  
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This shows the scores of both countries and their development. The higher the score, the 
better, with 1 being the equivalent of gender equality. This shows much more clearly that both 
countries have developed positively since the revolution, although Egypt has had some ups 
and downs more than Tunisia. Judging by these numbers, both countries are making progress 
towards gender equality, and especially Egypt has made quite a leap forward.  
 
0,56
0,57
0,58
0,59
0,6
0,61
0,62
0,63
0,64
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Sc
o
re
s
Year
Tunisia scores
Egypt scores
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
V
al
u
e
Year
Gender Inequality Index
GII Tunisia
GII Egypt
Arab average
 
 
 
These histograms I have made show a comparison between Egypt and Tunisia, including the 
Arab average as well. In the one on GII, the best score is close to zero, while in GDI it’s the 
other way around. As can be seen here, Tunisia is faring consistently better than Egypt and 
other Arab states. The development is slow in both countries, but the trend is positive and 
both countries have improved since the revolution. 
The fact remains that Egypt is still far behind compared to Tunisia. It is quite obvious that 
Tunisia falls into the category of an emancipatory revolution, while I would argue that Egypt 
represents the patriarchal model. This can be seen in the graph I presented earlier that can 
now be updated:  
Changes in     Examples   
      Egypt Tunisia 
Politics 
Participation and 
representation       
    parliament 1 1 
    MEPs/ministers 0 1 
    political rights 0 1 
  Women excluded/included   -1 1 
Society Discourse       
    women's role -1 0 
    femininity: negative -1 -1 
    women & nat identity -1 -1 
  patriarchal religion/modernity    -1 1 
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  exclusiveness/inclusiveness   -1 1 
Legislation         
  changes in constitution   0 1 
  exclusiveness/inclusiveness   -1 1 
  family-law: neg/pos   0 1 
  Results: -6 7 
 
I have gotten the scores of -6 for Egypt and 7 for Tunisia, showing clearly that Egypt belongs 
in the category of patriarchal revolutions, and Tunisia is emancipatory revolutions.  
Tunisia went through positive changes in all three aspects. Regarding legislation, Tunisian 
family law was further amended to help women, and the constitution included clauses that 
protect women’s equality. In the political sphere, women’s representation increased, they 
gained more political rights (e.g. new election system), and they have been mostly included in 
political decision making. Tunisia even had a female presidential candidate. The discourse 
regarding women, however, has been divisive, and often volatile. Sexual harassment increased 
after the revolution, and women have not always been represented fairly or accurately in the 
media; for example, a young woman who was raped was told to marry her rapist on prime-
time television. However, women have managed to hold on to their power and visibility, and 
society is somewhat inclusive to women, although the situation needs work.  
For a while it looked like patriarchal religion was on the rise, and some still worry over it, but 
for not it looks like both religious and secular forces can live side by side in relative peace, 
with new religious freedom made possible for women. Perhaps a section on implementation 
of the laws should be added into this graph; if it were, both countries would obviously be 
subtracted a point since in spite of Tunisia’s progressive laws, women don’t get justice in the 
event of rape or domestic violence. Tunisian government, however, seems committed to 
democracy and pluralism, and shows concern for human rights as well as dedication to 
upholding the constitution. This is vital – without political will, there will be no changes. 
Tunisian NGOs are blooming and influencing Tunisian politics and society actively. All of these 
aspects signal a bright future for Tunisia, with economy remaining a serious problem. The 
revolution managed to address women’s strategic interests, an important aspect in 
Moghadam’s theory. 
 
 
In Egypt, the situation looks quite different: the constitution did not include many significant 
improvements for women, and while legislative changes have happened (e.g. law on sexual 
harassment), the implementation is lacking and does not address the roots of the problems. In 
politics, women’s representation is abysmal and the gender quota was abolished. Women 
have not gained more political rights or opportunities, and they remain largely excluded. Men 
still control the discussion on women’s bodies, lives, and welfare, which leads to some 
abhorrent discussions: an Egyptian member of parliament suggested, for example, virginity 
tests for female students (Fenton 1.10.2016, the Independent UK). Sexual violence and 
harassment exploded after the revolution, and Egypt is making very slow progress to fight 
this. The government seems disinterested, although some steps to the right direction have 
been made. The government has provided legislative means to fight sexual harassment and 
FGM, but these tools are insufficient and not used in practice. Egyptian society and discourse 
are not female-friendly, and there have been attempts to attach Egyptian women to Egyptian 
nationalism in a patriarchal sense. Patriarchal religion gained a big victory with the election of 
Mohamed Mursi, and his successor has proven to be an enemy of radical Islamism, although 
he does not oppose religion itself. 
According to Badran, Egypt’s democratic transition cannot be finalized without a feminist 
revolution. The patriarchal values and practices that still prevail in Egypt are stopping the 
country from becoming a state that is truly equal and free. The Egyptian revolution must 
include “a full-fledged feminist revolution in order to dismantle patriarchal structures and 
practices inimical to the creation of an egalitarian state and society”. For her, this also includes 
a paradigm shift in the interpretation of Islam as well, “moving from a patriarchal to an 
egalitarian understanding and practice of Islam”. While the political part of the revolution is 
over as there is no development or end in sight for Sisi’s rule, she states that the feminist 
revolution is still ongoing. (Badran 2016:46-47)  
Compared to Tunisia, Egypt does seem to have somewhat more patriarchal values as well – 
although the difference is not as striking as one would assume. The two countries have some 
similarities in their post-revolution values – family and religion are important for both -, but 
Tunisians trust women’s abilities as political and business leaders more than Egyptians. 
Tunisians are more negative towards violence in the family as well as, maybe surprisingly, 
divorce.  
 
 
Moghadam states that there are at least four pathways to democratization, some of which are 
international pressure, loosening of authoritarian rules and restrictions, and grass root 
movements (Moghadam 2013:214). Grass root movements were integral in the 2011 
revolutions, and they’re doing well in Tunisia. The path for Egypt is at the moment clouded: 
the state is cracking down on civil society organizations as well as individual activists, which 
leaves little space for grass root movements. International pressure is not high as the world 
seems more focused on the crisis in Syria, and there is no indication that Sisi will loosen his 
control. Perhaps this is according to Sisi’s plan; it is unclear how long he wishes and intends to 
stay in power. At the moment, he tolerates no dissent. If Sisi wishes to remain in power, he 
can most likely do so, as he has Egypt’s vast army in his pocket and Western countries more 
interested in economic gains than civil society development19. International pressure, when 
there is any, has not resulted in anything but more authoritarianism from Sisi. 
Women’s rights are pretty much at his mercy – although Sisi has shown interest or at least 
tolerance towards women’s struggles, other more pressing needs will always come first for 
him. Women’s activism might even be seen as a form of opposition or dissent, which makes 
the activists’ situation precarious and even dangerous.  
According to Moghadam, the aspects that encourage a country’s democratization are  
“a society’s wealth, socioeconomic development, capitalism, an educated 
population, a large middle class, civil society, civic culture, human empowerment 
and emancipative values, a homogenous population, foreign intervention.” 
(Moghadam 2013:215) 
Egypt is still lacking in many of these. For example, the middle class, a key factor in 
democratization for researchers such as Barrington Moore, is in Egypt virtually non-existent. 
A large number of the population live in poverty, civil society is repressed, a good number of 
citizens are educated but unemployed while illiteracy rate remains high. Foreign intervention 
is unlikely, probably impossible. Tunisia, however, is economically better off, has a middle 
class, its people are educated (while still many of them are unemployed and illiteracy exists 
especially in the rural areas), civil society especially after the revolution is strong, and the 
                                                       
19 For example, France has been strengthening their economic ties with Egypt while offering little or no criticism 
on the country’s human rights violations. While visiting Egypt in April 2016, France’s President Hollande 
underlined the importance of security as a precondition for business. This is perfectly in line with Sisi’s policies 
that aim towards internal security and saving the failing economy. (Sisi deflects criticism over human rights 
record, says 'evil powers' aim to isolate Egypt, Ahram Online 17.4.2016) 
 
 
state is quite liberal and often promotes liberal values. Regional disparity is a problem for 
both countries, and a major challenge for equality and democracy.  
Studies have shown that women’s political agency, political participation and feminist 
activism further amendments in family law. Therefore, to make legislation female-friendlier, a 
country needs female activists and legislators. (Htun & Weldon 2011:4) One of the findings of 
the International IDEA’s publication Political finance and the equal participation of women in 
Tunisia: a situation analysis (2016) was that gender quotas were beneficial for women and 
improved their opportunities for participation (Ohman 2016:8). Quotas are one of women’s 
rights activists’ key demands, for example in Egypt, and they are advantageous especially in a 
situation where women’s representation would otherwise remain low. It is harder for women 
to enter public decision making for multiple reasons (e.g. responsibilities in the family, 
prejudice, lack of access to financial resources, lack of education and experience etc.), and it’s 
important for the people to choose the women to represent them. In Egypt, the president 
nominates some people for the parliament, but the representatives need to be representatives 
of the people, not Sisi.  
Violence against women and girls is still a grave problem in both countries. This is an aspect 
that needs urgent attention in both countries, and its importance cannot be undermined. As 
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan says, 
“Violence against women is perhaps the most shameful human rights violation. 
And, it is perhaps the most pervasive. It knows no boundaries of geography, 
culture or wealth. As long as it continues, we cannot claim to be making real 
progress towards equality, development and peace.” (The Egypt Economic cost of 
Gender-Based violence survey (ECGBVS) 2015 2016:4) 
We have now seen the different outcomes that the two revolutions had, and I will now try to 
find the reasons behind the outcomes. After the 2011 revolutions, the two countries seemed 
to choose a similar path by electing Islamist parties to power; however, the end result was 
very different in Tunisia and Egypt. In Tunisia, a free election brought a new party into power 
with the Islamists acquiescing to this. Egypt on the other hand experienced a new wave of 
demonstrations and protests, and later a return to military dictatorship. Both countries were 
inexperienced in democracy, and learning to live and work in a democratic state was difficult, 
but Tunisians managed to come out of a crisis stronger than ever. In Egypt, however, the 
attempt at democracy failed.  
 
 
People often cite Tunisia’s legislation as the source of the country’s relative modernity and 
equality. The legislation and constitution were very strongly inspired by French legislation, 
which some people believe to be the reason for Tunisia’s progressiveness. I think this is 
oversimplifying things – French legislation or France at the time of Tunisia gaining 
independence were not the epitomes of modernity, and it is condescending to give credit to 
France as the champion of Tunisia’s progress. Tunisia has had its own progressive people 
before, during and after France’s rule, and abortion on request was, in fact, legalized two 
years before France (Assaulted and Accused 2015:12). Tunisia also chose to give women 
political rights immediately after its independence – something that France failed to do for a 
very long time. 
There were also other contributing factors that some scholars tend to forget; Moghadam, for 
example, does not mention France at all, but instead emphasizes the post-World War II era 
and the different development strategies of new independent states. Tunisia adopted an 
egalitarian family law, while Morocco (also an old colony of France), in contrast, opted for a 
very patriarchal family law. The development of women’s status has been influenced by 
exogenous factors, but also endogenous ones. (Moghadam 2013:10) 
In many ways, Tunisia has exceeded its former colonial master – France only granted women 
the right to vote after the Second World War, while Tunisia’s women gained the right 
immediately after the country gained its independence. The French often view themselves as 
the champions of secularity and equality and take too much credit for their former colonies’ 
success. According to Moghadam, France’s own revolution is a classic example of a patriarchal 
revolution; liberté, égalité, fraternité only applied to male citizens. Haleh Esfandiari, whom I 
quoted before, thinks that Tunisia’s strong secular tradition and progressive legislation are to 
thank for its relative success concerning women’s rights (Esfandiari 2012:3). Tunisia has 
made its own conscious choices in regard to women’s rights, and it is hard to say how much 
France’s legislation influenced the minds of the rulers of the time. In any case, Tunisia had a 
strong foundation on which to build its post-revolution society. 
Moghadam states that violence or lack thereof in mass demonstrations during the revolution 
affects its outcome for women, because this kind of hyper-masculinity and masculine way of 
contention may exacerbate the masculine environment of the society. In these cases, a 
positive outcome for women is unlikely. (Moghadam 2013:216) This fits Tunisia and Egypt 
perfectly – whereas Tunisia’s revolution was quite non-violent (but not entirely), Egypt was 
 
 
the opposite. Violence was perpetrated both by the state armed forces as well as 
demonstrators, which includes the violence of male protesters against women.  
In Egypt, the discourse turned against women after the first revolution. Female activists were 
described extremely negatively, and in addition to verbal abuse they endured physical and 
sexual violence of extreme proportions – perpetrated both by SCAF, who had assumed power 
after the ousting of Mubarak, and male protesters. The protests continued after the initial 
revolutions due to the slow progress towards the wanted result – democracy -, and it seems to 
me that women became the scapegoats of a military junta struggling with unruly citizens. As is 
well known, women were an important factor in the revolution, and pushing them out of the 
public space and silencing them seems to me an effective tactic – in silencing half of the 
population, SCAF would find its position ameliorated. This way women became the victims of 
a military coup. 
In Tunisia, women were vocal about their concerns during the revolution and kept their rights 
on the agenda, instead of sacrificing themselves for the “greater good”. Tunisian women broke 
the cycle of history where women have been active participants in revolutions and 
movements for more rights only to be sidelined later, in spite of promises that their time 
would come. This is a lesson that can be learnt from Tunisians – in order to ensure their 
inclusion, women’s rights cannot be forgotten during revolutions. Otherwise it’s likely that 
“later” will never come. 
In the beginning of this thesis, I mentioned Moghadam’s theory that patriarchal revolutions 
happen when the country in question emphasizes their own cultural background, in “reaction 
to external modes of control”. In Egypt’s case, I find little proof of reaction to external modes 
of control; foreign media and states were interested in the revolution, but I haven’t found 
evidence to suggest that foreign parties were directly involved or tried to influence Egypt in a 
significant way. However, the rise of Islamists and their rhetoric can be viewed as 
emphasizing Egypt’s cultural background. Salafists wish to return to what they see as the 
golden age of Islam, when it was at its purest and the community (umma) was living according 
to sunna, and this was present in the first revolution. During his term Sisi has made a point of 
distancing Egypt from the international community, and often blames foreign agents who 
want to harm Egypt as reasons for, for example, Egypt’s bad reputation regarding human 
rights. Nationalism seems to be on the rise, and Sisi wants Egypt to conduct its business 
independently, without restrictions or pressure from other states. In conclusion, Moghadam’s 
 
 
theory seems to add up, especially if we include religion in the definition of cultural 
background.  
By now we’ve seen the results of Tunisia’s and Egypt’s revolutions and the reasons for their 
outcomes. I believe this will prove to be useful in the future, especially when new revolutions 
arise. We as citizens of nations and the world need to pay attention to people in precarious 
situations – when regimes fall, people fall with them, but the weakest should not be further 
marginalized. We can predict outcomes and stop negative consequences from taking place. 
The women of Tunisia were especially vigorous in resisting a change towards a more 
patriarchal revolution, and I believe this is one of the biggest reasons why Tunisia went 
towards a different direction than Egypt.  
Women’s rights and status are hard, possibly impossible, to determine objectively, and their 
impact on women’s everyday lives are questionable. Women can be happy in unequal 
societies, and unhappy in countries with relative equality, and they have their own dreams, 
aspirations and views. This thesis is the result of an academic study, not a representation of 
people’s opinions, and many Egyptian and Tunisian women might not agree with the results, 
and that is to be expected. My goal was never to tell the women of these two countries how 
they should feel and what they should want in life – my goal was to examine different aspects 
of their respective societies, and the changes that they went through after the revolutions. 
This thesis is not the ultimate truth, but another way to look at the radical change in the area. 
Only time will tell how women’s status will develop, and Tunisians and Egyptians are the 
agents of the changes still to come. 
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